Seyfarth partner Dawn Mertineit will be attending and presenting at the Intellectual Property Owners Association Annual Conference in Boston from September 10-12. This event brings together Intellectual Property professionals across law firms, corporations, service providers, and academia and offers educational programs, committee meetings, and networking opportunities.

Dawn will be speaking on a panel titled “Trade Secrets Under Pressure from the Winds of Public Policies.” The informational session will focus on newly enacted and proposed laws and regulations including the EU AI Act, EU Data Act, and TRIPS/WTO IP waiver, along with increasingly restrictive government policies that affect trade secrets. Dawn’s co-panelists are Kenneth Corsello from IBM and Tom Valente from the Intellectual Property Owners Association.

For more information and program registration details, visit the IPO website.

On May 11, 2011, Georgia passed the Restrictive Covenants Act, which made enforcing employee restrictive covenants far easier than it was under Georgia common law. In an odd twist, a law that Georgia intended to make it easier to enforce restrictive covenants has made it more difficult to enforce employee non-solicits. On June 13 2023, in North American Senior Benefits v. Wimmer, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that an employee non-solicit must include an express geographic restriction—a requirement that previously did not exist under Georgia’s common law regime. Employers should revise any restrictive covenant agreement accordingly to avoid a challenge to the enforceability of an employee non-solicit.

Under Georgia’s common law, the Georgia Court of Appeals squarely held that an employee non-solicit did not require a geographic or relationship-based restriction. And, even after the passage of the Restrictive Covenants Act, most employee non-solicits did not include a geographic restriction. Instead, agreements generally included a provision like the following:

During the term of Employee’s employment and for a one-year period following Employee’s separation from the Company, Employee shall not, directly or indirectly, solicit any employee of the Company to leave the Company’s employment or to join a competitive organization.

Some agreements, in a nod to the Act, added a limitation that the employee non-solicit would be limited to colleagues with whom the employee had material contact. Most agreements did not incorporate any reference to a geographic limitation—beyond a potential implied limitation based on where the company’s employees were located.

One year after Gallant, the court of appeals signaled that old Georgia law may not be the same as new Georgia law. Previously, under Georgia common law, the Court of Appeals issued a physical precedent only decision[1] where the majority opinion invalidated a customer-specific non-compete that did not include an express geographic limitation. The court of appeals reasoned that the Act required a “reference” to a geographic area limitation, and failing to include that limitation meant the restriction was void.

The decision drew a dissent from Judge Ray—now on the federal bench—who asserted that a customer-based non-compete met the statute’s geographic requirement because the covenant was limited to customers with whom the employee worked, so the “lack of a geographic area restriction is of no consequence.”

In another 2-1 decision, the court of appeals in North American Benefits expanded the geographic area requirement to employee non-solicits. The court of appeals pointed to the definition of “restrictive covenant” in the Act, which included an agreement to protect a business’s interest in confidential information, customers, and employees. Because the Act classified an employee non-solicit as a “restrictive covenant,” the employee non-solicit must be “reasonable in scope, time, and geographic limitation.” The employee non-solicit did not contain a geographic area limitation, so it was unenforceable to the extent it restricted post-employment conduct.

The court of appeals also confirmed that the Act permits a court to “blue pencil” a covenant to strike out overbroad language, but it does not authorize a court to equitably reform a covenant by revising or inserting a restriction.

Key Takeaways

Georgia employers should revise their employee non-solicits to include an express geographic area limitation. Employee non-solicits without this limitation will be found unenforceable barring an intervening decision from the Georgia Supreme Court or rehearing at the Georgia Court of Appeals. On July 17, 2023, North American Senior Benefits filed a certiorari petition with the Georgia Supreme Court, so the court of appeals’ decision may not be the last word here. But given the potential consequences if the decision stands, employers should be proactive and review their employee non-solicits and incorporate an express geographic area limitation.

Additionally, the decision serves as a reminder that restrictive covenants should be drafted in a manner that will allow a court to “blue pencil” the restriction into an enforceable form if it is found to be overbroad.


[1] In Georgia, decisions issued as “physical precedent only” are not binding precedent but are considered persuasive authority. 

On July 10th, the European Commission issued its Implementing Decision regarding the adequacy of the EU-US Data Privacy Framework (“DPF”). The Decision has been eagerly awaited by US and Europe based commerce, hoping it will help business streamline cross-Atlantic data transfers, and by activists who have vowed to scrutinize the next framework arrangement (thereby maintaining their relevance). Regardless of the legal resiliency of the decision, it poses an interesting set of considerations for US businesses, not the least of which is whether or not to participate in the Framework.

For those who followed the development and demise of the Privacy Shield program and the Schrems II case, it has been apparent for some time that the fundamental objection of the activists and the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) to the original Privacy Shield was the perception that the US intelligence community had an ability to engage in disproportional data collection without any possibility of recourse by EU residents whose personal information may be swept into an investigation. The actual functioning of the program for the certifying businesses were much less controversial.

Since the structure of the program wasn’t the primary reason for Privacy Shield’s revocation, from a business perspective, the current DPF looks a lot like the old Privacy Shield. For businesses who made the decision to participate in the Privacy Shield program in the past, the operational burden shouldn’t be much different under the new DPF, if they have already taken steps to operationalize the requirements.

What is interesting about the new DPF is how it may impact a company’s decision to choose  between the Standard Contractual Clauses (“SCCs”) and the alternative adequacy mechanism for transfers. There is also some interest vis-à-vis the DPF and its interactions with state privacy laws.

DPF v. SCCs

One of the components of the new SCCs that were adopted in 2021 (which did not exist in the prior version of the SCCs) is the requirement for all SCCs to be accompanied by a transfer impact assessment (“TIA”)[1]. A TIA is designed to assess whether there are legal barriers to the enforcement of the SCCs in the relevant importing jurisdiction – in this case, the US. Many commentators, and some courts, have applied the Schrems II reasoning to argue that use of the SCCs as a transfer mechanism to the US is not effective in all circumstances, because the Foreign Intelligence Services Act (“FISA”) authorizes US intelligence to engage in bulk collection under section 702 and such programs are not proportional and do not have reasonable safeguards required under EU law.

Although the SCCs are still used to transfer European data to the US (mostly because after Privacy Shield was invalidated, practically speaking, they had been the only remaining transfer mechanism for many businesses), several commenters have taken the position that, if Schrems II is taken to its logical conclusion, then any use of SCCs in the US is effectively impossible, because US companies cannot live up to their promises in the SCCs. This was noted in an expert report commissioned by the German Conference of Independent Data Protection Supervisors to assess the broad reach of FISA section 702 programs. Needless to say, companies who undertake a TIA as part of their deployment of SCCs are also under some level of uncertainty as to the effectiveness since a TIA is not the opinion of a supervisory authority, but rather their own interpretation, and that of their legal counsel – which said expert report may cast doubt on.

The DPF is not plagued by such uncertainty. Specifically, recital 200 of the Decision expressly states the legal protections surrounding FISA programs are adequate and “essentially equivalent” to EU protections related to intelligence and national security. This is a momentous declaration, in our estimation, because as a consequence, participation by a company in the DPF seems to remover the need for a TIA for a transfer mechanism. Put another way, the recital 200 provides binding authority for the assertion that the primary motivation for a TIA (i.e. FISA section 702 programs) is now moot in that the DPF participants have sufficient safeguards (even in light of FISA 702) regardless of undertaking a TIA. Note that the removal of a TIA requirement only works for participants in the DPF and TIAs are still required when relying on the  SCCs as a transfer mechanism.

DPF v. State Law

Because the DPF establishes “essentially equivalent” controls for participants, the differences between the scope and requirements of EU privacy law and US state privacy law are brought into more apparent contrast. Looking across the two general frameworks, the differences in concepts, protective requirements, and other controls may actually motivate businesses who are already subject to the various state omnibus privacy laws, to skip participation in the DPF. This is mostly because the DPF is a bit more reasonable to businesses with respect to the exercise of individual rights than some state laws.

For example, the GDPR does not require the controller to comply in full with an access request if the response would “adversely affect the rights” of others, including, a business’ trade secrets or intellectual property[2]. The California Consumer Privacy Act has no such express limitation related to business’ data. That being said, there are a number of possible arguments available under other laws (trade secret, confidentiality obligations, etc.) that could justify a limiting a response to an access request. However, those limitations are not express in the California law – and they are in the GDPR and the DPF.

Similarly, the principles in the GDPR and DPF allow for a denial of an access request where responding to such request triggers an undue burden on the business. The California law’s limitation is a bit narrower than the GDPR/DPF limitation in this instance. California requires responsive disclosures to access requests unless the request is “manifestly unfounded or excessive” [3]. This standard narrower than the DPF standard of “…where the burden or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the risks to the individual’s privacy…”[4].

Conclusion

This lack of alignment between DPF requirements and state law may lead to operational  confusion and uncertainty by US businesses interested or actively involved in the transfer of personal information from the EU. Regardless of the confusion related to the overlapping US and EU privacy laws, businesses who have previously participated in and are familiar with the Privacy Shield program may find it useful to also participate in the DPF. Additionally, for some business models, participation in the DPF can mean reduced administrative and legal costs as compared to putting in place and maintaining SCCs. However, it must be remembered that the DPF is not the same as compliance with US state privacy laws – even though some omnibus state privacy laws echo GDPR concepts. There are significant distinctions which have to be managed between the tactical implementation of a privacy program for US state law and a DPF compliance program.

Finally, even though there has been a commitment by some to challenge the DPF at the CJEU, the Commission’s approval of the DPF does not necessarily signal a “wait and see” approach. It is instead a time for companies to carefully evaluate and review their transfer activities, their regulatory obligations, and the most appropriate path forward.  All these years after Schrems II, it is at least nice to have a potential alternative to SCCs, in the right business conditions.


[1] Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914 Recitals 19 through 21

[2] GDPR, Article 15(4) and Recital 63.

[3] Cal. Civ. Code 1798.145(h)(3)

[4] Commission Implementing Decision for DPF Annex I, Section III.4; 8.b, c, e; 14.e, f and 15.d.

At the beginning of the pandemic, concerns were raised that trade secret misappropriation might take a new form. Indeed, with large swaths of the workforce working from home, spouses, roommates, or others living in the same area had an increased opportunity to purloin confidential information that might not have been available to them previously.

But a recent case in Massachusetts highlights that this is not unique to pandemic-era work-from-home setups. While the events forming the basis of the dispute in BioPoint, Inc. v. Dickhaut et al. occurred during the pandemic, the facts reveal that information sharing between employees of competitors can happen even in traditional settings.

In BioPoint, the plaintiff employed non-party Leah Attis, who was engaged to defendant Andrew Dickhaut. Dickhaut was managing director for the newly opened Boston office of defendant Catapult Staffing, LLC, which like BioPoint, provides consulting services and recruits short-term labor for its clients. Initially, Catapult did not make placements in the life sciences industry, instead focusing on the tech, light industrial, accounting, and finance industries. Despite having had “little, if any” experience in the life sciences and pharma industries (in contrast with BioPoint, whose employees had years of life sciences recruiting experience), Catapult decided to explore those industries in 2018.

At trial, BioPoint introduced evidence that Attis had repeatedly shared proprietary BioPoint information with Dickhaut at his request, including pricing information, candidate information (including their bill rate and pay rate, which are highly confidential), and even internal notes on client agreements. Using this information, Dickhaut approached prospective BioPoint clients to successfully pitch Catapult’s services, and proposed candidates to those clients whose information he was only aware of from Attis—despite BioPoint’s warnings to Attis not to share such information with Dickhaut. In one case, a BioPoint recruiter was about to make a placement for a medical director at a BioPoint client, only for Catapult to lure the candidate away for its own client placement, offering the candidate a better rate for her services—information which Dickhaut obtained from Attis.[1] As a result, the jury awarded BioPoint over $300,000 in damages based on misappropriation of trade secrets and tortious interference.

Following the jury trial, the judge conducted a bench trial on BioPoint’s remaining claims for unjust enrichment and violation of Massachusetts’ unfair and deceptive acts and practices statute, known in the Commonwealth as Chapter 93A. Ultimately, the court determined that “the jury’s verdict amply [on both misappropriation of trade secrets and tortious interference] supports a determination that Catapult violated Chapter 93A” through its agent, Dickhaut. Specifically, the court found that “Dickhaut’s conduct and culpable state of mind is imputable to Catapult as his employer under the long-established principles of vicarious liability,” and awarded BioPoint treble damages jointly against both Dickhaut and Catapult, resulting in a total damages award of over $5 million. Additionally, under Chapter 93A, BioPoint was entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees (over $2.5 million), for a total award of more than $7.5 million, plus pre- and post-judgment interest.

This decision (and the accompanying eye-popping damages award) serve as a reminder that employees must be advised of the need to keep an employer’s trade secrets and other proprietary information strictly confidential, including from their friends and family members—and should also be advised of the consequences for failing to do so. Even with BioPoint’s warnings to Attis, she still shared information with Dickhaut that permitted Catapult to develop relationships with BioPoint prospects and to make placements that otherwise would have likely been made by BioPoint. Employers must remain vigilant and take appropriate measures to protect its proprietary information from being shared by employees. While BioPoint is surely pleased with the verdict, it no doubt wishes it had been able to prevent the misappropriation to begin with and avoid the headache of a lengthy federal suit.


[1] Perhaps unsurprisingly, upon learning of her conduct, BioPoint fired Attis, who subsequently joined Catapult.

The D.C. Circuit recently held that a “Mutual Non-Disparagement” clause requiring an employer to “direct” its employees not to disparage a former employee could reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting the employer itself from making disparaging statements.

In Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Foundation, Dr. Terri Wright, a former employee of the Eugene and Agnes E. Meyer Foundation (the “Foundation”), filed suit against the Foundation after discovering its CEO, Nicola Goren, had made disparaging statements about her.

The Foundation hired Wright in early February 2018 as its Vice President of Program and Community.  During Wright’s tenure, Goren criticized her “interpersonal skills” and identified “communication issues.” In October 2019, Goren fired Wright, citing the same concerns.  Wright believed these alleged issues were pretextual, but to attempt to avoid litigation, she entered into a Severance Agreement with the Foundation. The Severance Agreement contained a provision titled “Mutual Non-Disparagement” that read as follows:

You agree that you have not made, and will not make, any false, disparaging or derogatory statements to any person or entity, including any media outlet, industry group or financial institution, regarding the Foundation or any of the other Releasees, or about the Foundation’s business affairs and/or financial conditions; provided, however, that nothing herein prevents you from making truthful disclosures to any governmental entity or in any litigation or arbitration. Likewise, the Foundation will direct those officers, directors, and employees with direct knowledge of this revised letter agreement not to make any false, disparaging or derogatory statements to any person or entity regarding you; provided, however, that nothing herein prevents such individuals from making truthful disclosures to any governmental entity in litigation or arbitration.

Continue Reading D.C. Circuit Holds Contractual Clause Directing Non-Disparagement Implies Employer Itself Cannot Disparage

On May 31, 2023, a Harris County Texas District Court jury found a telecom company acted in bad faith by filing a $23 million trade secret misappropriation lawsuit against a rival where the underlying technology was found to not actually be a trade secret.

Background & Analysis

In February 2019, Telecom firm Teligistics, Inc. (“Teligistics”) sued its rival Advanced Personal Computing, Inc. d/b/a Liquid Networx (“Liquid Networx”) and company executives Travis Wood and Robert Short, alleging they misappropriated trade secrets concerning its online platform for handling contracts named Telibid. Specifically, Teligistics alleged a former Liquid Networx employee obtained a copy of Teligistic’s internal Request for Proposal (“RFP”) in order to “tweak” Liquid Networx’s internal RFP, rather than spending time and resources developing their own RFP. 

Continue Reading Not All Documents Labeled Confidential Actually Are: Texas Jury Finds $23M Trade Secret Case Was Brought in Bad Faith

In Seyfarth’s third installment in the 2023 Trade Secrets Webinar Series providing valuable insights into navigating this evolving landscape, Seyfarth attorneys covered a range of topics, including the latest technology threats, the importance of communication and training, revisiting confidentiality policies, alternative trade secret protections, and updating restrictive covenant agreements. Here are the key takeaways from the Seyfarth webinar:

  1. Staying Informed about Technology Threats: Employers must stay up to date with the latest technology employees can use to misappropriate sensitive data. This includes being aware of potential tools and methods that could compromise trade secrets. Equally important is keeping abreast of advancements in technology that can help detect and prevent such misappropriation. By staying informed, organizations can proactively address emerging threats to their trade secrets.
  2. Communication and Training for Trade Secret Protection: Regular communication and training are critical in ensuring that employees understand the significance of treating proprietary information with extreme care. The webinar emphasized the need for clear and consistent messaging about the value of trade secrets and the consequences of mishandling them. By fostering a culture of awareness, organizations can strengthen their employees’ commitment to protecting trade secrets.
  3. Revisiting Confidentiality Policies for Remote Work: The shift to remote work necessitates revisiting confidentiality policies and practices. Organizations must ensure that their policies address the unique circumstances of virtual and hybrid work environments. This includes reviewing remote access protocols, data encryption methods, and guidelines for secure information sharing. Adapting confidentiality policies to the remote work setting helps safeguard trade secrets effectively.
  4. Implementing Alternative Trade Secret Protections: Given the current legislative and regulatory activity surrounding non-compete agreements, organizations should explore additional trade secret protections. The webinar emphasized the importance of implementing confidentiality training, policies, and agreements. Regular audits to track trade secrets and limiting access to only those who need it for their job responsibilities were highlighted as crucial measures to mitigate risk.
  5. Updating Restrictive Covenant Agreements: To comply with evolving state and federal laws, organizations should review and update all restrictive covenant agreements. Ensuring that these agreements are narrowly tailored and legally compliant is essential. By keeping restrictive covenants in line with the latest legal requirements, organizations can strengthen their trade secret protections while mitigating potential legal risks.

This webinar shed light on the critical aspects of safeguarding trade secrets in the evolving remote work landscape. By staying informed about technology threats, fostering communication and training, revisiting confidentiality policies, implementing alternative trade secret protections, and updating restrictive covenant agreements, organizations can effectively protect their valuable intellectual property. These takeaways provide a roadmap for organizations to navigate the unique challenges of managing trade secrets in a remote work environment while staying compliant with legal obligations.

You can view a recording of the webinar and all other webinars in our Trade Secrets & Non-Competes Webinar Series here.

On January 1, 2022, the latest amendments to the Illinois Freedom to Work Act (“Act”) became effective. As we previously described, that Act sets forth various requirements governing restrictive covenant agreements in Illinois. Among other things, the Act codified the so-called Fifield Rule by defining adequate consideration for enforcement of a restrictive covenant to be either two years of employment or some other consideration, such as “additional professional or financial benefits.”

Not surprisingly, what are sufficient “additional professional or financial benefits” remains an open question. However, one recent appellate opinion from the Third Appellate District provides helpful instruction regarding the need to specifically identify the “additional professional or financial benefits” in any restrictive covenant agreement. In Midwest Lending Corp. v. Horton, 2023 IL App (3d) 220132, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to which the plaintiff sought to enforce certain post-employment restrictive covenants. The defendant, who was employed for only seven months, challenged the enforceability of the restrictive covenant agreement because he was not employed for at least two years and received no other consideration. In response, plaintiff relied upon a $25,000 sign-on bonus that defendant received as part of his offer letter and claimed that this bonus was “adequate consideration.” The court disagreed because the offer letter never identified the restrictive covenant agreement nor any of its terms. As such, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the bonus was consideration expressly provided in exchange for the defendant agreeing to the terms of the restrictive covenant agreement.

While Midwest Lending’s ruling was based on common law and not a construction of the Act, employers who opt to provide additional consideration to enforce restrictive covenant agreements should take care to explicitly identify the “additional professional or financial benefits” provided in exchange for the employee’s acceptance of the restrictive covenants.

Establishing jurisdiction over a defendant is critical in every lawsuit. Trade secret cases are certainly no different.  A recent appellate decision from Texas underscored this important point by dismissing a plaintiff’s claim against a defendant – who did not even deny that he received misappropriated trade secrets – for lack of jurisdiction.

The case is Joe Formicola v. Virtual Integrated Analytics Solutions, LLC, 14th Court of Appeals, Texas, Case No. 14-22-00412-CV (the state court case is Virtual Integrated Analytics Solutions LLC vs. Optimal Designs Incorporated et al., Case No. 202215877, in the 189th District Court of Harris County, Texas). On May 11, 2023, the Texas Court of Appeals Court overturned the trial court’s ruling and granted Formicola’s request to dismiss Virtual’s claims against him for lack of personal jurisdiction.  

The plaintiff, Virtual, is a Texas company, which sells products and services to a variety of technological Industries. One of Virtual’s direct competitors is Optimal Designs Inc., another Texas corporation controlled by James Reed, a Texas resident. 

Virtual offered to purchase Optimal and hire Reed as a new director. Reed accepted the offer, but before the deal was completed, Virtual began sharing trade secrets with Reed, including a profit-sharing agreement that Virtual was actively negotiating with another company, Himarc. Virtual tasked Reed with finalizing the agreement with Himarc, but instead of doing so,  Reed started seeking out other partnerships that included Optimal and excluded Virtual.  It was during this time that Reed approached Joe Formicola, a Michigan resident, and offered to deliver the misappropriated Himarc partnership. Formicola accepted Reed’s proposal and began engaging in a business partnership with Reed based on Virtual’s confidential information and business relationship.

Virtual ultimately filed suit against several individuals and entities, including Formicola. In response, Formicola filed a special appearance for purposes of challenging jurisdiction, but the trial court denied Formicola’s motion. At no point did Formicola ever attempt to contest the trial court’s jurisdiction over him on a factual basis, nor did he ever produce any evidence disproving Virtual’s allegations that he had received misappropriated trade secrets from Reed. Instead, Formicola simply challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction on a purely legal basis by arguing that Virtual’s allegations, even if true, were insufficient to establish both general personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction.

In its response to Formicola’s motion, Virtual only addressed the issue of whether the trial court had specific personal jurisdiction over Formicola. Similarly, on appeal, Virtual only defended the trial court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.

As the Texas Court of Appeals noted, “Virtual did not allege that Formicola ever came to Texas to meet with Reed regarding this business relationship. Similarly, Virtual did not allege that Formicola agreed to operate this business in Texas, or that he ever solicited any business customers in Texas. Virtual did not even allege that Formicola had hatched the plan to misappropriate Virtual’s trade secrets. Quite the opposite, Virtual alleged that Reed obtained the trade secrets from Virtual in Texas, and then Reed approached Formicola in Michigan with a plan for their misappropriation.”

Based on these facts, the Appeals Court concluded that “Reed’s unilateral activity cannot be attributed to Formicola for jurisdictional purposes. The facts alleged in Virtual’s live pleading, even if true, do not demonstrate that Formicola purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas.” Accordingly, the Appeals Court concluded that “the trial court erred by denying Formicola’s special appearance because the facts alleged by Virtual are legally insufficient to show that Formicola purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas” and dismissed all of Virtual’s claims against Formicola for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Takeaway:  Before incurring the considerable time, energy, and expense associated with preparing and filing suit against a defendant in a trade secret case (where, more often than not, it is critical that the case proceed immediately and likely also involves a motion for emergency injunctive relief), be particularly careful to have nailed down personal jurisdiction.  Thoroughly examine where the alleged misappropriation and wrongdoing occurred, especially in cases involving parties from multiple states. Otherwise, extremely valuable time could be lost forever to the detriment of your legitimate trade secret claims.

Wednesday, July 19, 2023
3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. Eastern
2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. Central
1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. Mountain
12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m. Pacific

REGISTER HERE

Confidentiality obligations and restrictive covenants are crucial tools employed by organizations to protect sensitive information, trade secrets, and competitive advantages. However, recent state law and regulatory developments and NLRB decisions have created a complex web of considerations that employers must navigate when drafting and enforcing these agreements. Seyfarth’s fourth installment in the 2023 Trade Secrets Webinar Series aims to provide in-depth insights into two key areas of concern: carveouts to employment confidentiality obligations and the intersection between the NLRB and restrictive covenants, including the NLRB’s recent attacks on confidentiality provisions and non-compete agreements.

During this webinar, our esteemed panel of legal experts will delve into the following key topics:

  • The evolving landscape of employment confidentiality obligations and risks created by overbroad restrictions
  • The NLRB’s increasingly aggressive positioning against restrictive covenants
  • Recent case studies
  • Strategies for compliance and risk mitigation

Speakers

Alex Meier, Partner, Seyfarth Shaw LLP

Sul Ah Kim, Partner, Seyfarth Shaw LLP

Cary Burke, Partner, Seyfarth Shaw LLP

REGISTER HERE


If you have any questions, please contact Sadie Jay at sjay@seyfarth.com and reference this event.

This webinar is accredited for CLE in CA, IL, NJ, and NY. Credit will be applied for as requested for TX, GA, WA, NC and VA. The following jurisdictions may accept reciprocal credit with these accredited states, and individuals can use the certificate they receive to gain CLE credit therein: AZ, CT, NH. The following jurisdictions do not require CLE, but attendees will receive general certificates of attendance: DC, MA, MD, MI, SD. For all other jurisdictions, a general certificate of attendance and the necessary materials will be issued that can be used in other jurisdictions for self-application. Please note that attendance must be submitted within 10 business days of the program taking place. If you have questions about jurisdictions, please email CLE@seyfarth.com.