Trading Secrets : Trade Secrets Lawyers & Attorneys : Seyfarth Shaw Law Firm : Computer Fraud, Confidentiality Agreements, Corporate Espionage

Plaintiff IDG USA, LLC (“IDG”), a Georgia company with its principal place of business in North Carolina, commenced an action against a former employee, Kevin J. Schupp (“Schupp”), a New York resident, alleging breaches of a Non-Compete Agreement, breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, unfair competition, and theft of trade secrets.

In a 12 page decision, IDG USA, LLC v. Schupp, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3260046 (W.D.N.Y. Aug.18, 2010), the District Court granted IDG's Motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, enjoining Schupp from: (1) working for any competitor of IDG within 50 miles of IDG's Amherst, New York office, (2) soliciting orders from IDG’s identified “major” customers with whom Schupp had had contact , and (3) disclosing or using confidential information and/or trade secrets of IDG. The court also denied Schupp’s Rule 12(c) cross-motion to dismiss the Complaint, expressly finding that IDG’s allegations that Schupp used his knowledge of IDG's major, revenue-generating customers and its pricing policies for the benefit of his new employer, and disclosed information regarding IDG’s Amherst Office's control over pricing issues to one of those customers were sufficient to render the causes of action plausible for purposes of a Rule 12(c) analysis.

The Complaint alleged that IDG is a national distributor and supplier of industrial materials, has a Northeast Division, with a principal office in York, Pennsylvania, an a regional office in Amherst, New York, which  is responsible for the company's customer base in upstate New York and western Pennsylvania.  It was further alleged that in 1998, IDG acquired Schupp’s previous employer, AFL, and retained most of AFL's employees including Schupp, whom immediately began working out of IDG's Amherst, New York office as a Sales Associate.  IDG claimed that Schupp serviced many of IDG's major revenue generating clients, most, if not all of whom were assigned to Schupp by IDG, which had preexisting relationships with the clients.

The operative agreements before the District Court were a Non-Compete Agreement (the “NCA”) and a Confidentiality Agreement, entered into between IDG and Schupp.  The Court found that Schupp received “additional compensation in the amount of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) in consideration for his execution, delivery, and performance of th[e] [NCA] .”   Notably, the Court found that the NCA restrained Schupp, for the period of one year from the date of the termination of his employment with IDG, from accepting employment with any competitor of IDG, for work similar to that he performed at IDG, within a fifty (50) mile radius of any office to which he was assigned during the twelve months prior to the termination.

The Complaint went on to allege that on January 14, 2010, Schupp voluntarily terminated his employment without advance notice, and that within days after his resignation he commenced employment as a sales representative with Abrasive-Tool Corp. (“Abrasive”), a company that sells many of the same products as IDG and offers customers similar services.  It was shown that Schupp worked out of Abrasive's Buffalo office, which is within ten miles of IDG's Buffalo office.  The Court found that Schupp had solicited orders on behalf of Abrasive from long-standing, major revenue producing clients he was assigned to service and entertain during his employment with IDG, and further disclosed to an IDG customer confidential information regarding its Amherst Office's control over pricing issues.

Of primary interest, the District Court found that IDG had demonstrated the threat of irreparable harm by Schupp’s conduct by reason of: (a) Schupp’s contacting three “Major Customers” of the  company” (identified by the Court as customers whose purchases from IDG exceeded $25,000 in the previous twelve months) and quoting prices for Abrasive's goods and services to one of these Major Customers; (b) three Major Customers requesting pricing information and quotes from IDG, something they had not required in the previous ten years; (c) another Major Customer informing IDG that it would no longer do business with IDG; and (d) the fact that the month following Schupp's resignation from IDG, IDG experienced a reduction in its sales to ten of the thirteen Major Customers which had been serviced by Schupp.

Specifically, the Court held:

Here, IDG has sufficiently demonstrated that Schupp violated paragraph 7(a) of the NCA when he commenced work at Abrasive, as a sales associate in its Buffalo office, immediately after resigning from IDG. Likewise, IDG has sufficiently demonstrated that Schupp immediately began soliciting orders on Abrasive's behalf from IDG's Major Customers in violation of the NCA's paragraph 7(b). Schupp does not dispute IDG's attestations in this regard. In addition, the NCA expressly provides that “if Schupp is permitted, after cessation of his employment with [IDG], to trade upon th[e] training and th[e] confidential information which he had received by virtue of his position of trust and confidence with [IDG] ... irreparable damages will result to [IDG],” and that “any breach of the [NCA's] covenants ... would not be readily or appropriately compensable in damages”  Courts have found that such language in an employment agreement “ ‘might arguably be viewed as an admission by [the former employee] that plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm were he to breach the contract's non-compete agreement.’ ” On the evidence presented at this juncture, including the NCA's provisions, Schupp's conclusory assertion that any damage to IDG can be rectified by a monetary award is rejected.

Finally, the Court rejected Schupp’s argument that IDG had “materially breached” the NCA by reducing his annual salary from that stated in the NCA, prior to his resignation. IDG argued that because the salary reduction was not a “material breach,” Schupp was not excused from performance of his obligations and, in any event, Schupp waived any breach when he continued to work for IDG after his salary was modified.  The District Court found IDG's contentions that it did not materially breach the agreement and that Schupp acquiesced to a modification of the NCA consistent with New York decisional authority involving employment agreements similar to the NCA, citing: In re Footstar, Inc., 04-22350, 2007 Bankr.LEXIS 2302, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007); Hanlon v. MacFadden Publications, 302 N.Y. 502, 505, 99 N.E.2d 546 (1951)); Bottini v. Lewis & Judge Co., 211 A.D.2d 1006, 1007-1008, 621 N.Y.S.2d 753 (3d Dep't 1995); Dwyer v. Burlington Broadcasters Inc., 295 A.D.2d 745, 745-746, 744 N.Y.S.2d 55 (3d Dep't 2002); Gebhardt v. Time Warner Entm't-Advance/Newhouse, 284 A.D.2d 978, 978-9, 726 N.Y.S.2d 534 (4th Dep't 2001); Bottini, 211 A.D.2d at 1007-1008, 621 N.Y.S.2d 753; and Mosely v. Island Computer Prods., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6437, 2006 WL 318815, at *2-4  (E.D.N.Y. Feb.9, 2006).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

             On July 27, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s order enjoining a senior executive from Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., from working for one of Bimbo’s competitors, Hostess, until after the district court resolved the merits of Bimbo’s misappropriation of trade secrets claim against the executive. Among other trade secrets at issue in the lawsuit is the recipe for Thomas’ English Muffins, which were estimated to account for approximately $500 million in Bimbo’s annual sales income. Defendant Chris Botticella is alleged to be one of only seven people who possess all of the knowledge necessary to replicate independently the muffins.

            The Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s finding that Bimbo was likely to prevail on the merits of its misappropriation of trade secrets claim under Pennsylvania’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“PUTSA”). Specifically, the Circuit Court left undisturbed the district court’s determination that Bimbo likely would be able to prove at trial that Botticella would misappropriate Bimbo’s trade secrets if allowed to work at Hostess.

            The Circuit Court focused on PUTSA section 5303 and related case law, which allows courts to enjoin actual or threatened misappropriation of trade secrets. The district court’s finding that there was “[a] substantial likelihood, if not an inevitability, that [Botticella] will disclose or use Bimbo’s trade secrets in the course of his employment with Hostess,” was proper, held the Circuit Court. In so holding, the Circuit Court rejected Botticella’s argument that the district court could only issue an injunction where it is shown that it would be “virtually impossible” for Botticella to perform his new job at Hostess without disclosing trade secrets.

            In reaching this holding, however, the Circuit Court took exception with the district court’s analysis of Pennsylvania’s law concerning the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine. Specifically, the Circuit Court noted that “[w]hile we agree…that Pennsylvania law empowers a court to enjoin the threatened disclosure of trade secrets without requiring a plaintiff to show that disclosure is inevitable, we do not consider that an injunction granted absent such a showing was issued pursuant to the ‘inevitable disclosure doctrine’.” Rather, said the Court, an injunction enjoining one from assuming particular employment may issue where the facts of the case demonstrate a substantial threat of trade secret misappropriation.

            Citing the district court’s findings of fact, the Circuit Court held that the district court had, and properly exercised, discretion to enjoin Botticella from working at Hostess to the extent his proposed employment there threatened to lead to the misappropriation of Bimbo’s trade secrets. The Circuit Court noted that, among other things, the district court found that (1) Botticella had accessed via his laptop computer in his final days at Bimbo highly sensitive information belonging to Bimbo which information would have been damaging to Bimbo if obtained by a competitor; (2) Botticella’s explanation at deposition regarding his suspicious use of the laptop was “confusing at best” and “not credible”; and (3) Botticella’s conduct following his acceptance of the Hostess job offer demonstrated his intention to use Bimbo’s trade secrets during his employment with Hostess. As to this latter point, the district court found that Botticella (a) did not disclose to Bimbo his acceptance of a job offer from a direct competitor and remained in his position to receive Bimbo’s confidential information, (b) received Bimbo’s confidential information after his acceptance of the Hostess job offer, and (c) copied trade secret information from his work laptop onto external storage devices.

The Third Circuit’s decision provides guidance to employers as to the showing required to enjoin former employees from assuming new employment where the facts show that there is a substantial threat of trade secret misappropriation.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In New York, injunctive relief will not be awarded unless the plaintiff sets forth specific non-monetary harm to Plaintiff in a trade secret case.

In Systems Management Planning, Inc., v. Gordon, 23 Misc.3d 1104(A), 2009 WL 901514 (N.Y.Sup.) (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co, April 3, 2009), the court, in determining a preliminary injunction, assumed that the trade secret status of the information and the fact of its misappropriation has indeed occurred and therefore focused on the issue of irreparable harm and the “related” doctrine of inevitable disclosure. 

Plaintiff asserted that, in all cases, irreparable harm is presumed when trade secrets have been misappropriated. The Gordon court first noted that “no appellate case in New York has laid down such a hard and fast rule” and the subsequently declined to adopt such a rule citing the recent Second Circuit decision in Faiveley Transport Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., --- F.3d at ---, 2009 WL 636020 (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 2009) (such a presumption “might be warranted in cases where there is a danger that, unless enjoined, a misappropriator of trade secrets will disseminate those secrets to a wider audience or otherwise irreparably impair the value of those secrets.”)

The Gordon court, applying the principles of Faiveley Transport, concluded that plaintiff in that case had not adduced clear evidence of irreparable harm. Instead, the court found the plaintiff’s moving affidavit wholly lacking, because it merely stated in conclusory fashion that the defendants had used the confidential and proprietary information that they stole to unfairly divert business and solicit certain specified customers. The court held that these “conclusory assertions wholly fail to show how this worldwide $20 million business cannot readily ascertain its damages if successful in proving that the claimed diversion of six customers resulted from defendant's misuse of wrongfully appropriated trade secret information, instead of what defendants insist was legitimate competition occurring in the absence of a confidentiality agreement or restrictive covenant.”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

I start by warning you that this case is old, over 5 years old, in fact.  However, when it arrived in my regular e-mail of case synopses, I thought I would take a look, and given the long, slow holiday week, I thought it might have a nugget to share and to keep in mind as we go into 2010. 

The case, The Newark Group, Inc. v. Sauter, Civ. Action No. C2:01-CV-1247, 2004 WL 5782100 (S.D. Ohio), was pending back in 2004.  This particular opinion, on Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's jury demand, was decided in April 2004.  Nevertheless, I think the point the court makes may be helpful. 

The question before the court on Defendant's motion was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a trial by jury on its claims for damages in a trade secrets case under a theory of unjust enrichment.  Defendants argued that under a trade secret case, an unjust enrichment claim was nothing more than a claim in equity, not triable to a jury. 

The court easily rejected the claim under Ohio's Trade Secret Misappropriation Act.  In explaining its decision, the court noted that the trade secret statute provides several methods by which to calculate damages, including unjust enrichment.  And, that the statute

acknowledges that calculating monetary damages for trade secret misappropriation may be difficult to ascertain, it therefore provides specific methods by which to calculate monetary damages.  One method for measuring damages is by calculating the amount of unjust enrichment caused by such misappropriation.  The fact that the statute contemplates different means of calculating damages does not transform the statutorily created legal theory of recovery . . . to become an equitable claim to relief. 

The other two methods of calculating damages:  actual loss caused by the misappropriation and imposition of a reasonable royalty also are not equitable relief, just other methods of calculating the monetary damages available to a successful plaintiff.  Even though the statute refers to "equitable," it means fair.  The damages remedies are legal in nature and thus triable to a jury -- even if difficult to ascertain.

Happy New Year to all!

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

It is generally accepted that that compilations of public information can constitute a trade secret provided that the compilation has unique value, but will that protection extend to watching Michael Jackson's This Is It in an IMAX theater? A New York State court may soon be answering that question in Imax Corporation, v. Cinemark USA, Inc., NY Sup. Ct., NY Co., Ind. No. 09603441.

In its lawsuit, IMAX claims that for five decades it “has specialized in the design and manufacture of highly propriety, premium quality, large-format, immersive theatre systems.” Since 1997, Cinemark-one of the largest movie exhibitors in the world-has been a valued customer of IMAX. Separate and apart from the actual technological components of IMAX's theatre systems, IMAX claims that since its inception in 1967 dedicated significant time and resources, including hundreds of millions of dollars, to the extensive research and development, marketing and promotion of a highly proprietary, immersive theatre experience that is unique to IMAX. Beginning in 1997, IMAX and Cinemark allegedly entered into a series of contracts that provided for the installation, maintenance and operation of IMAX theaters at Cinemark locations, and the marketing and commercial promotion of IMAX by Cinemark.

IMAX claims that it recently discovered that, contrary to representations Cinemark made to IMAX, the parties' business relationship has been blatantly used by Cinemark to attempt to reproduce the entire, trademarked "IMAX Experience®" in the form of a product that Cinemark unveiled earlier this year and that Cinemark refers to as "Extreme Digital Cinema" and "Cinemark XD," or simply, "XD." Whereas for years IMAX theatres have been widely marketed and promoted as having "screen[s] that typically span from wall to wall and floor to ceiling... and loudspeaker technology that ensures every theatre seat is in a good listening position," Cinemark has marketed and promoted its XD as a cinema with "huge wall-to-wall screens, wrap around sound [to] ensure that every seat is an intense sensory experience." Adding fuel to the fire, IMAX claims that Cinemark has touted its XD as being "just like" and in some instances, "better than" IMAX.

Thus, IMAX seeks redress for Cinemark's willful breach of contract, fraud, tortious interference with existing and prospective economic relations, breach of the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment and deliberate acts of bad faith, as well as misappropriation of trade secrets.

The ruling of this case could have interesting implications in light of the United State’s Supreme Courts recent grant of certiorari (argued on November 9^th) on what has been called the "business method patent" case, Bilski v. Kappos, where the Court appears poised to rule that the business method claim at issue is not the valid subject of a patent. Whether the Court will provide further guidance as to what is and what is not a patentable "process" is uncertain. A ruling that sides with the Patent Office could bar patents on processes and methods of doing business, such as online shopping techniques, medical diagnostic tests and procedures for executing trades on Wall Street. But, such a ruling also may lend support for making your IMAX experience a trade secret.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Because the laws of various states regarding non-compete clauses differ significantly, cases involving these provisions often entail fights at the outset as to the proper venue. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently faced just such an issue in CertainTeed Corp. v. Nichiha USA, Inc., Civil Case No. 09-CV-3932-LS, 2009 WL 3540796 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2009). In that matter, CertainTeed contested with Bruno Demey, its former Director of Manufacturing and Technology, and Nichiha, Demey’s new employer, over whether litigation between the parties should go forward in Pennsylvania or Georgia.

CertainTeed’s headquarters are located in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, and it has manufacturing plants in Indiana, North Carolina, and Oregon. Its confidential information, trade secrets, and computer servers are located in Valley Forge. CertainTeed hired Demey in March 2003. Demey executed a non-compete agreement with CertainTeed in September 2004. During his employment with CertainTeed, Demey resided in South Carolina and made numerous trips to Valley Forge for meetings.

The timeline of events relevant to the litigation are as follows: 

1.         Demey resigned from CertainTeed on August 20, 2009.

2.         Demey filed a complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia on August 24, 2009. Demey stated that he intended to move to Georgia to work for Nichiha and therefore sought injunctive relief against CertainTeed setting forth: (a) that the non-compete and non-disclosure terms of the non-compete agreement are unenforceable under Georgia law; and (b) that CertainTeed could not take action to enforce the covenants against Demey or otherwise preclude Demey from working for Nichiha.

3.         On August 26, 2009, CertainTeed removed the state court action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. 

4.         CertainTeed filed an action against Demey and Nichiha in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on August 28, 2009. CertainTeed alleged a breach of contract claim and breach of fiduciary duty claim against Demey, a tortious interference with contractual relations claim and an unfair competition claim against Nichiha, and violations of the Pennsylvania, South Carolina, North Carolina, Indiana, and Oregon trade secrets acts, as well as a civil conspiracy claim, against Demey and Nichiha.

5.         On August 31, 2009, CertainTeed requested a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

6.         On September 2, 2009, the Georgia district court granted Demey’s motion for a temporary restraining order and enjoined CertainTeed from enforcing the non-competition covenant in Georgia. On that same date, Nichiha filed a motion to dismiss, transfer or stay the Pennsylvania action.

7.         On September 3, 2009, CertainTeed filed a first amended complaint in the Pennsylvania action, removing any claim to enforce the non-compete covenant in Georgia.

The Pennsylvania district court ultimately decided to deny Nichiha’s motion to dismiss, stay, or transfer and therefore let CertainTeed proceed with its claims in Pennsylvania. In its order, the Pennsylvania court addressed three issues. First, it rejected Nichiha’s claim that the first-filed rule required that the matter progress exclusively in Georgia. The court found that the Pennsylvania action was not “truly duplicative” of the Georgia action because the former included a number of claims that were not present in the latter. The court rejected Nichiha’s assertion that the claims asserted by CertainTeed were mandatory counterclaims in the Georgia action, instead finding that the trade secret claims were not so related to the non-compete claims that separate trials would lead to “substantial duplication of efforts.”

The district court next addressed the issue of venue. It decided that a substantial portion of the events at issue took place in Pennsylvania. Specifically, it cited CertainTeed’s allegations that: (a) Demey and Nichiha would be sharing and utilizing confidential information and trade secrets that originated, and are stored, in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania; and (b) Nichiha and Demey conducted negotiations while Demey was in Pennsylvania.

Finally, the district court answered the question of whether it should transfer the case to Georgia in the negative. After recognizing that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is a “paramount consideration,” the court remarked that CertainTeed’s key witnesses and documents are maintained on servers located in Valley Forge. The court also decided that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is as convenient as the Northern District of Georgia for non-party witnesses. Thus, for the time being, the case between CertainTeed, Demey, and Nichiha will proceed on two fronts.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

We are pleased to announce that the Trade Secrets, Computer Fraud, and Non-Competes Group's first webinar on November 5, 2009 entitled Monitoring the Revolving Door: Protecting Your Trade Secrets in Today's Economy was a tremendous success.

There were over 550 registered attendees in various legal and business positions, including business leaders, general and associate in-house counsel, human resource professionals, franchise professionals, competitive intelligence professionals, and outside counsel, from numerous domestic and international locations.

The first webinar covered best practices for protecting your company’s trade secrets and managing risk from trade secret claims. Rarely does a day go by without a news report of another high profile theft of important data from a company or the loss of key employees to competitors. Employer downsizing and competitive pressures have increased the need for companies to ensure that they have adequate protections in place to safeguard company assets.

Topics discussed in the first series of informative discussions included:

• Identifying trade secrets
• Adequately protecting trade secrets
• Conducting trade secret "audits"
• Implementing effective trade secrets policies and procedures
   

As discussed during the presentation, seeking trade secret counseling and a secret audit can assist clients to determine best practices to help protect their most important assets.

For those interested professionals who were not able to attend the first webinar and would like to listen to the recorded audio webinar or would like a copy of the presentation materials, please submit your request to sguigliano@seyfarth.com

Coming up on December 9th, we will host the second in our series, Trade Secret Triage and Restrictive Covenant Relief.  Please register (link to website registration) to join us to discuss what to do when you fear that someone has misappropriated your trade secrets.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Amy E. Bivins recently published another article in the Daily Labor Report addressing the effects of the Ninth Circuit's Brekka decision, which we have posted about previously.  Ms. Bivins quotes Seyfarth attorney Carolyn Sieve on the issue.  Carolyn reminded employers that they "should not rely solely on a potential CFAA claim to protect their proprietary information."  Indeed, employers will need to consider what access to computer systems is "authorized." 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In Coleman v. Retina Consultants, P.C., the Georgia Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s decision to enjoin a former employee based on his non-compete provision, but it upheld the injunction to the extent that it prevented the employee from using his former employer’s trade secrets. The case is especially interesting from a factual perspective, as it covers the increasingly common situation of an employee and employer disputing ownership of software developed over the course of employment. The relevant facts as follows:

Retina Consultants is a medical practice specializing in retina surgery. Retina Consultants hired Brendan Coleman as a software engineer in 2000. When Coleman joined Retina Consultants, he already had written and marketed a medical billing program called Clinex.  While employed by Retina Consultants, Coleman, with the assistance of the doctors who worked for Retina Consultants, modified his Clinex program to suit Retina Consultants’s specific business needs. Coleman integrated Retina Consultants’s trade secrets and confidential information into the new program, which was named Clinex-RE. Clinex-RE integrated electronic medical records, image storage, and a billing software component. Clinex and Clinex-RE are different programs, but Clinex-RE only works in conjunction with Clinex.

In 2003, Coleman and Retina Consultants entered into a Software Agreement that set forth that Retina Consultants owned Clinex-RE, Coleman owned Clinex, and that Retina Consultants had a non-exclusive license to use and sell Clinex. The Software Agreement also contained a non-compete provision stating that “Coleman will not distribute, vend or license to any ophthalmologist or optometrist the Clinex software or any computer application competitive with the Clinex-RE software without the written consent of Retina Consultants.”

Shortly before resigning on November 24, 2008, Coleman removed all applicable encryption keys and source and access codes for Clinex, along with any manual/installation instructions. After his resignation, Coleman attempted to license Clinex and Clinex-RE to other ophthalmologists; refused to disclose to Retina Consultants the passwords required to use Clinex and Clinex-RE software; refused to provide copies to Retina Consultants of all documentation in his possession and control relating to the programming and use of the software; refused to return to Retina Consultants copies of the Clinex-RE software; used Retina Consultants’s trade secrets; and took funds from a bank account belonging to a business set up jointly by Retina Consultants and Coleman. It is not unreasonable to speculate that the trial court was influenced by Coleman’s pre- and post-resignation behavior when it elected to enjoin Coleman in a broad fashion based on the non-compete provision.

Coleman appealed directly to the Georgia Supreme Court, which held unsurprisingly that the non-compete provision was unenforceable because it lacked geographic or temporal terms. However, the Supreme Court decided that the Clinex-RE package was a trade secret belonging to Retina Consultants, so Coleman could be enjoined from using it. Coleman could not be enjoined from using Clinex, because that was his property. Thus, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it enjoined Coleman from retaining Clinex encryption keys, access codes, source codes, manual/installation instructions, passwords, and documentation. In the end, Retina Consultants was able to prevent Coleman from using the software that it owned, but the trial court went too far in stopping Coleman from using his software and in enforcing a limitless non-compete provision. 

The case illustrates the fact that the statutory protections of an applicable trade secret statute can act as a useful backstop in the event that a non-compete provision is unenforceable.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

By Jason Stiehl

Often one of the most confidential aspects of a business is its pricing mechanism and the quotes that it provides its customers. It is for this reason that the general rule governing trade secret law is that a company’s non-published pricing is a trade secret. See generally PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1270 (7^th Cir. 1995).  What happens, however, when a company does not prohibit its customer from sharing that pricing with others in the industry? 

This precise question was addressed in Southwest Stainless, LP v. Sappington, 582 F.3d 1176 (10^th Cir. 2009), and we touched on it in an earlier posting.  However, as the issue comes up fairly frequently, we thought it might warrant deeper discussion.

In Southwest Stainless, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that although pricing generally may be protectable, a court needs look at the specific pricing at issue in the case to determine whether the company protected that pricing. Ultimately, the Court in Southwest Stainless held that sharing pricing with a customer, without restriction, removes any claim of confidentiality that may have existed.

John Sappington and William Emmer worked for over ten years supplying metals to customers in the Tulsa-area on behalf of Southwest Stainless. Within a month of each other (and shortly after the departure of another Southwest employee), Sappington and Emmer left Southwest to work for a local competitor, Rolled Alloys. After their departure, Southwest identified two Southwest customer (previously serviced by Sappington and Emmer) who transferred business to Rolled Alloys. At trial, it was adduced that the former employees had assisted in preparing pricing quotes to these customers, including re-quoting Rolled Alloys’ prices at a price lower than the Southwest quote known to the former employees. The trial court entered judgment on behalf of Southwest, relying upon the steps undertaken by Southwest to keep its pricing confidential, such as: (1) confidentiality agreements, (2) password protection, (3) expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars to keep the information confidential, and, notably (4) the admission of the former employees that they understood price quotes to be confidential. Southwest Stainless, 582 F.3d at 1189.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed this holding,[1] drawing a distinction between “general measures” used to protect trade secrets and the “particular” pricing at issue in this case. Id. at 1190. It cited record evidence that Southwest had provided customers with “posted pricing,” that customers revealed competitors’ pricing, and that Southwest did not prevent customers from sharing its information. Id. The Tenth Circuit relied upon the United States Supreme Court decision of Rucklehaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, which held:

If an individual discloses his trade secret to others who are under no obligation to protect the confidentiality of the information, or otherwise publicly discloses the secret, his property right is extinguished.

Here, because Stainless had “disclosed the quote” and the customer was “under no obligation to keep the information confidential,” the Court held the district court erred in holding such a price quote confidential and reversed the judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. 

This holding implies, however, that a company still may be able to assert trade secret protection for information necessarily shared with customers so long as the company requires its customers to treat the information as confidential as well.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In an article published today by the Daily Journal, "Economy Leads Companies to Sue Ex-Workers," (linked with permission) author Laura Ernde talks with a number of California practitioners about what they see happening with trade secrets litigation in the wake of the California Supreme Court's ruling in Edwards v. Arthur Anderson  and the economy.  

Although Ernde indicates that the anecdotal evidence is that interest in trade secrets is on an "upswing," according to Seyfarth Shaw's own Carolyn Sieve and Robert Milligan, research regarding filings in Los Angeles indicates that the actual number of lawsuits mentioning "trade secrets" has decreased over the last two years. 

Ernde's article also touches on the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine, noting that under FLIR v. Parrish, 2009 DJDAR 8598, the doctrine is no longer applicable in California. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently held that a former employer’s price quotations to prospective customers were not trade secrets under Oklahoma law because they did not contain a confidentiality provision, but the former employee who took advantage of those quotations on behalf of his new employer did violate his non-compete covenant.  Southwest Stainless, LP v. Sappington, No. 08-5127 (10th Cir.  Sept. 21, 2009).

An Oklahoma court is permitted to blue-pencil unreasonable contractual geographic limits in a non-compete to make them reasonable. The Tenth Circuit held that the  trial court’s damages award with respect to business lost due to violation of the non-compete was properly based on the ex-employer’s historic profit margins on business with the relevant customers. Moreover, injunctive relief should have been awarded because the ex-employee took advantage of the "personal contacts [with] and a knowledge of the special needs and requirements of" the ex-employer’s customers which the former employee learned during the employment relationship.

Coincidentally, only a few weeks earlier, an Oklahoma district court granted a motion for partial summary judgment in a breach of contract and trade secrets case, based on the plaintiff company’s "legitimate interest in . . . relationships . . . with . . . existing and established customers."   The Court thereby upheld a "hands-off" non-solicitation covenant an independent contractor sales agent signed with the plaintiff.  The plaintiff’s trade secret misappropriation claim was not discussed in the ruling on the partial summary judgment motion.  Drummond Am., LLC v. Share Corp., No. CIV-08-1004-F (W.D. Okla., Aug. 3, 2009), 2009-2 CCH Trade Cases ¶ 76.701.

These decisions teach that in a state (such as Oklahoma) where covenants are enforceable, a breach of contract claim against former sales personnel may be at least as strong a cause of action for a jilted employer as a suit for misappropriation of trade secrets.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In a recent decision, the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals joined a growing number of federal courts that have limited the use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") in suits brought against former employees accused of taking data from a company’s computer system before leaving the company.

In LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, Case No. 07-17116, 2009 WL 2928952 (9^th Cir. September 15, 2009), the Court held that an employer could not maintain its claim under the CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, against a former employee accused of e-mailing company property to his personal e-mail account because the employer could not establish that the former employee accessed its computer system “without authorization” or “in excess of authorization,” causing a loss. The employee argued that he was authorized to access the computer system in connection with his job duties, and was, therefore, authorized to access the computer system. 

In its opinion in Brekka, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ reasoning in International Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006) (Judge Posner, presiding), in which the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant employee’s authorization to access his employer’s computer files terminated when he violated his duty of loyalty to his employer.

Concluding that “[n]o language in the CFAA supports [plaintiff’s] argument that authorization to use a computer ceases when an employee resolves to use the computer contrary to the employer’s interest,” the Ninth Circuit switched the focus of inquiry from the former employee’s motive to an objective standard: What actions did the employer take to define what was authorized access and what was not? “If the employer has not rescinded the defendant’s right to use the computer, the defendant would have no reason to know that making personal use of the company computer in breach of a state law fiduciary duty to an employer would constitute a criminal violation of the CFAA.” 

In Brekka, plaintiff allowed its employee to e-mail company documents to his personal computer in the course of his duties. In addition, plaintiff promulgated no employee guidelines to prohibit employees from e-mailing company documents to personal computers. These were facts fatal to its CFAA claim and may provide a basis to distinguish subsequent cases where employers attempt to assert CFAA claims against former employees accused of e-mailing company information to their personal accounts, provided that they have clear policies prohibiting such activities.

The Brekka Court held “that a person uses a computer ‘without authorization’ under §§ 1030(a)(2) and (4) when the person has not received permission to use the computer for any purpose (such as when a hacker accesses someone’s computer without any permission), or when the employer has rescinded permission to access the computer and the defendant uses the computer anyway.” 

The Brekka decision is a wake-up call to employers to take measures to define for their employees the type of computer activity that is permissible (and impermissible) so that the employers can, to the extent allowable, avail themselves of a CFAA claim.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

By Robert Milligan and Carolyn Sieve

As mentioned in a previous blog entry, the California Court of Appeal issued a significant trade secret decision earlier this year providing additional clarification concerning the trade secret identification disclosures which a party pursuing claims for trade secret misappropriation must make before commencing civil discovery in California state court.

The California Supreme Court subsequently denied Sylvester Stallone's and another named cross-defendant's petition for review challenging the Court of Appeal's decision.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal decision is binding case authority.

A California statute requires that trade secrets be identified with particularity before commencing discovery relating to the trade secret in suits alleging the misappropriation of trade secrets under California’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act.

Specifically, Code of Civil Procedure § 2019.210 provides:

In any action alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Title 5 (commencing with Section 3426) of Part 1 of Division 4 of the Civil Code), before commencing discovery relating to the trade secret, the party alleging the misappropriation shall identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity subject to any orders that may be appropriate under Section 3426.5 of the Civil Code.

In Brescia v. Angelin, 172 Cal.App.4th 133 (Mar. 17, 2009), the Court of Appeal found that Code of Civil Procedure § 2019.210 does not require in every case that a trade secret claimant explain how the alleged trade secret differs from the general knowledge of skilled persons in the field to which the secret relates. The Court found that such an explanation is required only when, given the nature of the alleged secret or the technological field in which it arises, the details provided by the claimant to identify the secret are themselves inadequate to permit the defendant to learn the boundaries of the secret and investigate defenses or to permit the court to understand the designation and fashion discovery. The Court found that the trade secret designation is to be liberally construed, and reasonable doubts regarding its adequacy are to be resolved in favor of allowing discovery to go forward.

Our recent article published by the Oxford Journals in the Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice discusses the Court of Appeal decision in depth and its practical significance.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

By Kurt Kappes and Jim McNairy

            On August 20, 2009, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District issued an order certifying publication of its decision in The Retirement Group v. Galante, No. D054207, 2009 WL 2332008 (Cal. App. 4th July 30, 2009). In Galante, the Court analyzed the tension between California’s strong public policy favoring competition, as embodied in Business and Professions Code section 16600, and the longstanding body of law recognizing an employer’s right to guard against misappropriation of its trade secrets. 

Under the facts presented, the Court concluded that an employer who seeks to prohibit a former employee from soliciting former customers to transfer their business away from the former employer to the employee's new business, cannot specifically enforce a covenant not to compete without showing a tort. The employer must show more than that the former employee had access to customer lists that qualified as trade secrets while employed, and solicited customers once he left. Instead, the former employer must show that the former employee actually used the trade secret list to identify or facilitate the solicitation of existing customers.

In Galante, The Retirement Group (TRG), described as a business “association”, provided broker/dealer, investment advice, and securities sales services to customers on a fee for service basis. TRG provided these services through, among other things, the use of independent contractors, many of whom were registered investment advisors and registered representatives licensed to sell securities. Some of TRG’s customers used the registered representative to buy and sell securities through a third party broker/dealer known as Security Services Network, Inc. (SSN). TRG’s registered representative independent contractors also entered into independent contractor relationships with SSN. 

TRG undertook extensive marketing efforts, including seminars. About 95% of TRG’s customers were obtained through this marketing. TRG’s list of customers and potential customers was maintained in a secure database designed to prevent copying of information in the database.

As a condition to allowing access to the secure database, TRG required execution of a Marketing and License Agreement (MLA). In pertinent part, the MLA defined TRG's confidential information, and provided that (both during the term of the relationship and thereafter) the signing party would keep the information confidential and would not “disclose or use” the information, except as the MLA permitted.   

After one of TRG’s principals left to form a competing business (Monarch) with several of the independent contractors who had worked for TRG, the independent contractors and Monarch allegedly began contacting TRG’s customers and asking them to switch their business to Monarch and Monarch’s new broker/dealer, SII Investments, Inc.

TRG filed suit, alleging among other things, misappropriation of TRG’s trade secret information contained on its database. TRG sought and obtained a preliminary injunction.

The preliminary injunction prohibited certain conduct, including:

“[d]irectly or indirectly soliciting any current TRG [customers] to transfer any securities account or relationship from TRG to [Advisors] or any broker-dealer or registered investment advisor other than TRG[.]”(“Non-solicitation Provision”); and

“[u]sing in any manner TRG information found solely and exclusively on TRG databases. [However,] [s]imilar information found on servers, databases and other resources owned and operated by other entities or businesses is excluded from the injunction[.]” (“Database Provision.”)

The Court of Appeal addressed the propriety of the Non-Solicitation Provision. In doing so, the Court analyzed (1) Bus. & Prof. Code section 16600 and the cases interpreting and applying it, and (2) trade secret case law providing that former employees may not misappropriate the former employer’s trade secrets to compete unfairly with the former employer.

In its analysis of Section 16600, the Court focused on the 2008 California Supreme Court decision in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal.4th 937 (2008). In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that covenants not to compete are void in California under Bus. & Prof. Code section 16600 unless permitted by a statutory exception.   Section 16600 provides that “[e]xcept as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.”

After noting that Edwards “appears pivotal to resolution of this appeal,” the Galante Court highlighted that “[a]though Edwards reaffirmed the broad California rule that invalidates noncompetition agreements falling outside of the statutorily-prescribed exceptions, Edwards expressly stated it was not ‘[a]ddress[ing] the applicability of the so-called trade secret exception to section 16600.’” The Retirement Group, 2009 WL 2332008 at *5 (quoting Edwards, 44 Cal.4th at 946 n. 4). 

In analyzing the trade secrets line of cases, the Galante Court started by noting “[a]n equally lengthy line of cases has consistently held former employees may not misappropriate the former employer's trade secrets to unfairly compete with the former employer.” The Court continued, “in accordance with these principles, the courts have repeatedly held a former employee may be barred from soliciting existing customers to redirect their business away from the former employer and to the employee's new business if the employee is utilizing trade secret information to solicit those customers.” Id. at *6, emphasis in original. The Court then concluded “[T]hus, it is not the solicitation of the former employer's customers, but is instead the misuse of trade secret information, that may be enjoined.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Having analyzed section 16600 and the trade secrets line of cases, the Court concluded that :

“We distill from the foregoing cases that section 16600 bars a court from specifically enforcing (by way of injunctive relief) a contractual clause purporting to ban a former employee from soliciting former customers to transfer their business away from the former employer to the employee's new business, but a court may enjoin tortious conduct (as violative of either the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and/or the Unfair Competition Law) by banning the former employee from using trade secret information to identify existing customers, to facilitate the solicitation of such customers, or to otherwise unfairly compete with the former employer. Viewed in this light, therefore, the conduct is enjoinable not because it falls within a judicially-created “exception” to section 16600’s ban on contractual nonsolicitation clauses, but is instead enjoinable because it is wrongful independent of any contractual undertaking." Id. (bolding added).

Applying this reasoning to the facts before it, the Court concluded that the Non-Solicitation Provision of the preliminary injunction facially violated Edwards and could not be viewed as limited in scope to only enjoining the misappropriation of TRG's trade secrets.  

The Court also rejected the argument that the Non-solicitation Provision could be upheld as an injunction designed to have the limited effect of protecting against the misappropriation of TRG's trade secrets because the Database Provision of the injunction granted the full range of trade secret protections to which TRG was entitled. The Court further held that “[a]bsent the provisions of [the Non-solicitation Provision] [defendants] could compete with TRG for the business of TRG's existing customers by employing all available resources and information except for those materials found ‘solely and exclusively on TRG's databases,’” which constituted protectable trade secrets. Id. at * 7.

TRG’s argument regarding the so-called “trade secret exception” to section 16600 was also rejected by the Court. TRG argued that the conduct enjoined by the Non-solicitation Provision is outside the boundaries of Edwards because Edwards expressly excepted from its ruling noncompetition clauses falling within the trade secret exception to section 16600. Id. Significantly, the Galante Court noted that “[E]dwards did not approve the enforcement of noncompetition clauses whenever the employer showed the employee had access to information purporting to be trade secrets. Instead, Edwards merely stated it was not required to “address the applicability of the so-called trade secret exception to section 16600 [citation] because it was not germane to the claims raised by the employee.” Id.

            Additional reasons for the Court holding that the Non-solicitation Provision was invalid included:

·        TRG did not dispute that the names and contact information for existing customers were readily available to defendants from independent third party sources, thus negating that the names and contact information of existing customers constituted protectable trade secret information;

·        Because the Database Provision already protected against defendants’ use of TRG's trade secrets, the Non-solicitation Provision could not have any additional effect, except to bar solicitations not involving the use of trade secret information; and

·        The Non-solicitation Provision was not enforceable as a mere “narrow restraint” on defendants because the “narrow-restraint” exception developed by 9th Circuit Court of Appeal was rejected in Edwards.

The Court ordered the trial court to vacate the preliminary injunction and enter a new injunction deleting the Non-Solicitation Provision.

The distinction that the Court drew between enforcing a contractual clause and enjoining tortious conduct, introduces new uncertainty whether a covenant not to compete in California explicitly tied to the protection of trade secrets is viable. Although future cases may address this issue, neither Galante nor Edwards expressly held that one cannot by contract prohibit conduct that is otherwise unlawful under one or more statutes.  

The lessons from this case are:

1. Businesses should continue to use caution before utilizing any covenants not to compete in California and should carefully assess whether the restriction on competition can be tied to one of the statutory exceptions to section 16600 or to the protection of trade secrets. However, if tied to the protection of trade secrets, a covenant which seeks to restrict a former employee or contractor from competing against the former employer should be tied to the former employee’s/contractor’s actual misuse of trade secrets. Simply referencing prior access to trade secrets during the term of employment/contract alone is unlikely to address the misuse of that information.

2. This case highlights what the California Supreme Court made clear in its Edwards v. Arthur Andersen opinion: unless falling within one of few exceptions to CBPC § 16600, post-term covenants not to compete are invalid in California regardless of whether such covenants are narrowly drawn.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In the back and forth battle between companies and former employees regarding the confidential nature of customer information, the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska has just issued a decision of note in Softchoice Corp. v. MacKenzie, 08-cv-00249. By the decision, the Court dismissed the action as against the defendant, finding that despite plaintiff’s treatment of the information as secret, had plaintiff truly wished to protect the information it should have had defendant enter into a properly tailored covenant not to compete instead of only having him sign a nondisclosure agreement.

The action was brought by Softchoice against MacKenzie, a former employee, alleging the usual panoply of claims: breach of confidentiality, misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential business information, unfair competition and tortious interference with business relations. The confidential information was alleged to be customer contact information and pricing. MacKenzie had not signed a non-compete covenant, but had signed a nondisclosure agreement.

In dismissing the action, Judge Joseph F. Batailon found that:

“The plaintiff cannot succeed on its claims for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets or unfair competition without a showing that the information he allegedly misappropriated was a trade secret … MacKenzie has [] shown that he obtained the only information that could arguably be categorized as ‘secret,’ that is, pricing information, from the potential customers themselves, who freely shared the information with him in hopes of obtaining a lower price. MacKenzie has also shown that his suppliers shared this sort of information …”

This segued into the Court’s interpretation of the extent nondisclosure agreements will protect customer information:

“Softchoice, or its predecessor, could have limited MacKenzie’s contact with his former customers, and consequently protected its pricing information, through a narrowly drawn, valid and enforceable covenant not to compete, but id did not do so. Softchoice cannot achieve by way of a nondisclosure agreement what it could not have obtained via a non-solicitation agreement …”

It will be interesting to watch if any other courts pick up on Judge Batailon’s interpretation of nondisclosure agreements.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As discussed in our March 9th posting, Illinois Senate bill SB 2149 seeks to alter the landscape of trade secret enforcement and litigation in Illinois by, among other things, a) requiring disclosure of trade secrets before a party issues written or oral discovery; b) requiring attorneys'  fees be awarded to the prevailing party in a trade secrets case; and c) ordering a court to enter an attorneys' fees award against any party that subsequently amends their initial trade secret disclosure. SB 2149 passed through the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 12, 2009, and will now proceed to a full senate vote. The vote likely will occur within the next few weeks. If approved by the Senate (which is quite likely since SB 2149 spent less than one week before the Senate Judiciary Committee), SB 2149 will be sent to the Illinois House of Representatives Judiciary Committee for review and approval. If the House Judiciary Committee subsequently approves SB 2149, SB 2149 will then be considered and voted upon by the entire House of Representatives. We will continue to monitor the bill and its progression through the Illinois General Assembly.
 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks (1)
• Share Link

Opening with a tribute to the iconic New York City subway system, complete with citations to sources as diverse as Leonard Bernstein and The Bonfire of the Vanities, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals earlier this week vacated and remanded a preliminary injunction barring a braking system manufacturer from disclosing proprietary drawings and other information to the New York City Transit Authority during the contracting process. 

In 1993, SAB Wabco (Faiveley Transport Malmo AB’s predecessor-in-interest) entered into a license agreement with then-sister company Wabco (Wabtec’s predecessor-in-interest) that gave Wabco the authority to use SAB Wabco’s “know-how,” including manufacturing data, specifications, designs, plans, and trade secret information. Among other information, this included details related to BFC TBU, described by the court as “a unique air brake system designed to stop trains quickly and smoothly, if not always quietly.”

When the agreement terminated at the end of 2005, Wabtec began to develop its own line of BFC TBU through reverse-engineering, and in 2007 was awarded a sole source contract to provide the braking system for the Transit Authority’s overhaul of a certain class of subway cars. Faiveley sought a preliminary injunction in federal district court, asserting that the BFC TBU information constituted trade secrets that Wabtec was misappropriating by manufacturing the braking system and disclosing information to the Transit Authority during the contracting process. The district court granted the injunction.

On appeal, however, the Second Circuit held that although the district court had not erred in finding that Faiveley was likely to succeed on the merits of its misappropriation claim, there was no evidence of irreparable harm and, thus, no basis for entry of a preliminary injunction. Most notably, the court made a point of correcting the misapplication of the law by some district courts that had erroneously read Second Circuit precedent as meaning that a presumption of irreparable harm automatically arises upon the determination that a trade secret has been misappropriated. Instead, the court clarified that, although a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm may arise where there is a danger that the trade secrets will be disseminated to a “wider audience” or their value otherwise impaired, no such presumption is warranted where “a misappropriator seeks only to use those secrets—without further dissemination or irreparable impairment of value—in pursuit of profits” because such harm can be compensated with money damages.

Thus, the Second Circuit found that no injunction was merited here because the evidence showed only that Wabtec had used Faiveley’s proprietary information to gain a competitive advantage, but had not disseminated any trade secrets and, indeed, was treating the information with the same confidentiality given its own proprietary information. Because there was no risk that Wabtec would further disclose or irreparably harm Faiveley’s trade secrets, the court vacated the injunction and remanded the matter to the district court. This decision serves as an important reminder of the facts that must be alleged and established to prove irreparable harm when seeking temporary or preliminary injunctive relief for trade secret misappropriation.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

By Kurt Kappes and Jim McNairy, Sacramento

Mass layoffs are painful events for employees and employers alike.  But for employers, increasingly more than just personnel are leaving their facilities: researchers estimate that data theft cost businesses $1 trillion in 2008.

In a recent study commissioned by McAfee, Inc., researchers at Purdue University's Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS) polled 800 executives at businesses with more than $250 million in annual sales.  Of the executives surveyed, 42 percent said that laid off workers were the biggest threat to business caused by the current recession.  Businesses reported losing $4.6 million on average in 2008 as a result of data theft.  McAfee noted that a lot of anecdotal evidence shows that many of the thefts were internal. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In August, federal prosecutors charged Biswamohan Pani, a former Intel Corp. engineer, with theft of trade secrets from his former employer, Intel.  This week, a Massachusetts grand jury added four new counts of wire fraud.  If convicted, Pani could serve up to 10 years in prison for the theft of trade secrets count, and up to 20 years on each count of wire fraud.

Federal prosecutors in Massachusetts allege that after Pani resigned from Intel in May 2008, he downloaded confidential documents and trade secrets worth $1 billion, including new microprocessor chip designs. Pani accessed the internal Intel network via his Intel-issued laptop, downloading "mission-critical" documents.

It is reported that Pani told his supervisors that he was leaving Intel to work for a hedge fund, but in reality he had accepted a job months earlier with Intel’s main competitor, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., and began working there days after his resignation from Intel, but while still employed by Intel.  For a brief period, Pani was on both AMD’s and Intel’s payrolls due to accrued, unused vacation time at Intel.  Intel owns 80% of the worldwide market for microprocessors, and AMD owns the rest.

An FBI search of Pani’s home recovered eight Intel documents classified as “secret,” “top secret,” and “confidential.” Pani told FBI investigators that he planned to give the information to his wife, who also works for Intel. AMD is not accused of any misconduct, and there is no evidence that AMD had any involvement in or awareness of Pani’s actions.  Pani, of course, is no longer employed by AMD. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

 By James McNairy & Robert Milligan

A new Ninth Circuit case, Asset Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Gagnon, 2008 WL 4138181 (Sept. 9, 2008), acknowledges (at least in dicta) that there is a trade secrets exception to Business and Professions Code Section 16600.

In the case, Gagnon, an independent contractor who developed computer programs for AMS, a field marketing organization, alleged, among other things that AMS had misappropriated his trade secrets that were contained in the programs’ source code.

The Ninth Circuit rejected Gagnon’s claims that AMS misappropriated his trade secrets.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that Gagnon had granted AMS an implied, unlimited license to retain, use, and modify the software, thus destroying any trade secret status the code might have had.

In rejecting Gagnon’s trade secret claim, the Court affirmed the district court’s holding that the noncompetition agreements signed by Gagnon’s employees were invalid. Gagnon contended that even if AMS obtained an implied license, it still misappropriated his trade secrets that were contained in the programs’ source code by hiring away his employees in violation of their employment agreements. One of the provisions in the employees’ agreements was an agreement not to engage in any employment or personal contractual agreement for AMS for twenty-four months without written consent from Gagnon.

Citing the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d. 285, 288 (2008), the Ninth Circuit stated (arguably in dicta) that noncompetition agreements in California are invalid unless necessary to protect an employer’s trade secrets. The California Supreme Court in Edwards, however, specifically did not address what it called the so-called trade secret exception to Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 and rejected the Ninth Circuit’s narrow restraint exception to section 16600 (the “narrow restraint” exception interpreted section 16600 to allow noncompetition agreements where departing employees were barred from pursuing only a small or limited part of a business, trade or profession). According to the Ninth Circuit, the non-competition agreements that Gagnon had his employees execute “were no longer enforceable” because they were no longer necessary to protect Gagnon’s trade secrets against AMS.

In this first post-Edwards published Ninth Circuit decision regarding section 16600, the Court did not provide any specific analysis concerning the nature of the trade secrets exception and what one must show to make defensible use of it. The Court’s dicta appears to suggest that non-competition agreements executed “to protect” an employer’s trade secrets will be enforceable. But as with most things legal, with trade secrets, the devil is in the details. What exactly the Court meant by a non-competition agreement to protect trade secrets is unclear. Further, mere assertions in employee/employer noncompetition agreements that the agreement has been executed “to protect” trade secrets without more is unlikely to withstand challenge.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that whether a trade secret is a protectable interest is an equitable question not affected by the lack of a written instrument. Niemi v. NHK Spring Company, --- F.3d ---, 2008 WL 4273123 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 2008).

Richard Niemi is an individual engineer who provides various automobile company manufacturers with designs related to stabilizer bars for automobiles. In the early 1990s, Niemi had an idea for a new method of stabilizer-bar manufacturing, which interested his long term client, New Mather Metals (a subsidiary of Defendant NHK Spring Co.) Although the purchase order through which New Mather ordered the manufacturing tooling, which Niemi claimed to be a “trade secret,” included the clause that “no other or different terms or conditions shall apply to this order unless specifically agreed to in writing. . .”, Niemi claimed that he had assurances that his new method would be kept “confidential.” In order to protect itself from Niemi’s selling his designs to its competitors, New Mather requested that Niemi enter into a “exclusivity agreement,” which Niemi described as “reciprocal” despite any language in the instrument to that effect. “No further writing was needed, in Niemi’s estimation, because New Mather’s obligation represented a continuation of an arrangement that had been in place for 25 or 30 years . . . .” 

Niemi learned a few years later that New Mather had disclosed his stabilizer manufacturing trade secret to other designers, and he brought an action against New Mather and its parent companies for misappropriation of trade secrets, as well as for other claims. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment to Defendants on the trade secrets claim, finding that Niemi had not taken sufficient steps to keep his designs secret. 

In reviewing Niemi’s appeal of judgment against his trade secrets claim, the Sixth Circuit considered Ohio’s adopted Uniform Trade Secrets Act, particularly focusing on the factor requiring “reasonable” efforts to maintain secrecy. Ultimately, it concluded that there were direct, disputed material facts sufficient to warrant reversal of the district court.

The decision is most significant, however, for the reasoning underlying its rejection of one of Defendants’ arguments; namely, that Niemi’s “oral reciprocal exclusivity agreement” was barred by the statute of frauds. In rejecting that argument, the court quoted Ohio law in noting that “protection afforded by trade secret laws is not a function of property interests or contract rights, but of ‘equitable principles of good faith applicable to confidential relationships.’” In other words, whether there is a contract or property interest in the trade secrets is “irrelevant” because trade secret protection derives from equity.

The progenitor of the principle quoted by the Sixth Circuit was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ opinion in Masland, where he observed that, in “explaining the nature of a trade secret . . . trade secret laws are not those of property but the equitable principles of good faith applicable to confidential relationships.” Valco Cincinnati v. N & D Machining Service, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ohio 1986) (citing E.I. Du pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917) (Holmes, J.)). 

In any event, although the fundamental character of a trade secret may be one of confidence protected by equity, there is some dispute among the states regarding whether a trade secret is a property right. Compare Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 494 (Utah App. 1994) (trade secret is a property right) with ConFold Pacific, Inc. v. Polaris Industries, Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 959 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that, under Wisconsin law, a trade secret is not a property right but instead an interest protectable by contract).

The Sixth Circuit is correct that the lack of a written instrument does not itself negate a claim under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Certainly, if the existence of a written agreement – such as the “oral” mutual exclusivity and confidentiality agreement present in Niemi – would tend to increase the likelihood of a protectable trade secret, then its absence should mitigate against it.  But the Sixth Circuit seemed to go a step further in concluding that because a trade secret’s nature is one of equity, the lack of a contractual or property claim renders wholly “irrelevant” the lack of a written instrument. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks (1)
• Share Link

 By Robert Milligan, Kurt Kappes and James McNairy

The California Supreme Court released its highly anticipated decision in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP  today and held that employee non-competition agreements are invalid, even if narrowly drawn, unless the agreement falls within a statutory exception. 

In doing so, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s narrow restraint exception, which excepted the prohibition contained in Business and Professions section 16600 on non-competition agreements where one was barred from pursuing only a small part or limited part of the business, trade or profession.

In its decision, the Court limited its review to two issues:

1)      To what extent does Business and Professions Code section 16600 prohibit employee non-competition agreements;

2)      Is a contract provision requiring an employee to release “any and all” claims unlawful because it encompasses nonwaivable statutory protections, such as the employee indemnity protection of Labor Code section 2802.

The Court concluded that Business and Professions Section 16600 prohibits employee non-competition agreements unless the agreement falls within the applicable statutory exceptions of sections 16601, 16602, or 16602.5. The Court also held that a contract provision whereby an employee releases “any and all” claims does not encompass nonwaivable statutory protections, such as the employee indemnity protection of Labor Code section 2802.

On the first issue, the Court found that California state courts have consistently affirmed that section 16600 evinces a settled legislative policy in favor of open competition and employee mobility. Section 16660 states: “Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.” (emphasis added) The chapter excepts non-competition agreements in the sale or dissolution of corporations (§ 16601), partnerships (§ 16602), and limited liability corporations (§ 16602.5). 

The Court noted that it had previously invalidated an otherwise narrowly tailored agreement as an improper restraint under section 16600 because it required a former employee to forfeit his pension rights on commencing work for a competitor (citing Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 239, 242-243). The Court, quoting Muggill, stated section 16600 invalidates provisions in employment contracts and retirement pension plans that prohibit “an employee from working for a competitor after completion of his employment or imposing a penalty if he does so unless they are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets.”

The two clauses at issue in Edwards’ agreement with Andersen provided:

1)      If you leave the Firm, for eighteen months after release or resignation, you agree not to perform professional services of the type you provided for any client on which you worked during the eighteen months prior to release or resignation. This does not prohibit you from accepting employment with a client. 

2)      For twelve months after you leave the Firm, you agree not to solicit (to perform professional services of the type you provided) any client of the office(s) [Los Angeles] to which you were assigned during the eighteen months preceding release or resignation. 

Andersen argued that the Court should interpret the term “restrain” under section 16600 to mean simply to “prohibit,” so that only contracts that totally prohibit an employee from engaging in his or her profession, trade, or business are illegal. 

The Court rejected that argument and found that Andersen’s non-competition agreement was invalid because the two specific clauses at issue in the agreement restricted Edwards from performing work for Andersen’s Los Angeles clients and therefore restricted his ability to practice his accounting profession. 

Earlier in the decision, the Court expressly stated it did not address the applicability of the “so-called trade secret exception to section 16660.” Before the Supreme Court granted the petition for review in Edwards, the lower appellate court’s decision remanded the case to the trial court to determine if the trade secret exception applied, i.e. the non-competition agreement was necessary to protect trade secrets. The Court’s disposition indicates that the issue is closed though and that there will be no such remand to the trial court:

We hold that the noncompetition agreement here is invalid under section 16600, and we reject the narrow-restraint exception urged by Andersen. Noncompetition agreements are invalid under section 16600 in California even if narrowly drawn, unless they within the applicable statutory exceptions of sections 16601, 16602, or 16602.5

Andersen asked the Court to adopt the limited or “narrow-restraint” exception to section 16600. The Court noted that confusion over the Ninth Circuit’s application of section 16600 arose in a paragraph in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Campbell v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. (9^th Cir. 1987) 817 F.2d 499, in which the Ninth Circuit stated that some California state courts have excepted application of section 16600 “where one is barred from pursuing only a small or limited part of the business, trade or profession” (citing Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co. (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 188 and King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316). The Court found that the reasoning in these state court cases does not provide persuasive support for adopting the narrow restraint exception because Boughton involved the use of land, not a restriction upon a plaintiff’s practice of a profession, and King relied upon a trade secret exception to the statutory rule. 

The Court acknowledged that recent Ninth Circuit cases have followed Campbell to create a narrow-restraint exception to section 16600 in federal court. The Court stated that California state courts have not embraced the Ninth Circuit’s narrow restraint exception and stated “no reported California state court decision has endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, and we are of the view that California courts have been clear in their expression that section 16660 represents a strong public policy of the state which should not be diluted by judicial fiat” (citing Scott v. Snelling and Snelling, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1990) 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1042).

In sum, while the Court’s decision clearly states California does not recognize a “narrow restraint” exception to the general rule that employee non-competition agreements are invalid, the Court did not specifically address when non-solicitation of customer and employee clauses are permissible to protect trade secrets. 

The San Francisco Chronicle also has posted an article about this case.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

           According to the California Supreme Court's website, the Court’s highly anticipated decision in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP will be available tomorrow, August 7, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. on the Court’s website.

            Trade secret and employment attorneys have been closely following the Edwards case after the Supreme Court granted review of the case on November 29, 2006. 

            In the lower court, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District expressly rejected somewhat settled Ninth Circuit case law that provides an exception to the general rule in California that covenants not to compete are unlawful in the employment context pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 16600. The narrow restraint exception essentially provides that a noncompetition agreement is not unlawful where it leaves a substantial portion of the market open to the employee. The lower court expressly found that the narrow restraint exception was a “misapplication of California law when applied to an employee’s noncompetition agreement.” The court further stated “[i]n our view, section 16600 prohibits noncompetition agreements between employers and employees even where the restriction is narrowly drawn and leaves a substantial portion of the market available for the employee.”

            The lower court also found that the broadly worded release that Edwards allegedly was required to sign was unlawful because it purportedly waived Edwards’ Labor Code section 2802 rights. Labor Code section 2802, subdivision (a), provides: "An employer shall indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties . . ." The lower court held that “[b]ecause Labor Code section 2802's indemnity provisions implement public policy, requiring Edwards to waive indemnity rights as a condition of continued employment violated public policy and constituted an independently wrongful act for purposes of . . .[Edwards’] intentional interference with prospective economic advantage claim.”

            The issues that the Supreme Court are expected to address in tomorrow’s decision are:

 (1) Is a non-competition agreement between an employer and an employee that prohibits the employee from performing services for former clients invalid under Business and Professions Code section 16600, unless it falls within the statutory or judicially-created trade secrets exceptions to the statute?

(2) Does a contract provision releasing "any and all" claims the employee might have against the employer encompass non-waivable statutory protections, such as the employee indemnity protection of Labor Code section 2802?

            We will provide a follow-up blog entry once the decision comes out.  

By Robert Milligan, James McNairy and Summer Associate Julia Brodsky

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

  By Erik Weibust (Boston) 

          Illustrating the roadblocks that Taiwanese companies still must overcome to do business in mainland China (Taiwan split from China amid a civil war in 1949), Forbes.com is reporting that electronics giant Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. recently took out half-page ads in major Taiwanese newspapers complaining about delays in a Chinese court over the prosecution of a Chinese competitor for allegedly stealing its trade secrets. In 2006, Hon Hai, which employs approximately 500,000 Chinese workers, sued BYD Company Limited, a Chinese competitor, for allegedly “systematically looting its trade secrets.”   According to Hon Hai, in 2006, two of its former employees took secret information when they left to work for BYD. Although the two employees have since been convicted of infringement in a Chinese court, according to Hon Hai, that may only be the tip of the iceberg. Specifically, Hon Hai alleges that over the past 4 to 5 years, 400 of its employees have moved to BYD, many of whom are suspected of providing the company with Hon Hai’s trade secrets and proprietary information. 

            According to the newspaper ads, the head of BYD is a member of the powerful People’s Congress, which has “the power to remove members of the judiciary.”  This, Hon Hai alleges in its ads has “result[ed] in a certain degree of unwillingness among local judicial and police members to deal with the case.” Nevertheless, Hon Hai believes that its rights will be vindicated eventually, particularly given China’s senior leaders’ commitment to protecting the interests of Taiwanese businesses on the mainland. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Schalmo, 2008 Wl 2697248 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. July 11, 2008)

The District Court of Appeal for the Second District in Florida confirmed that, no matter how unpleasant the task, when faced with an issue regarding whether documents are covered by Florida's Sunshine in Litigation Act, § 69.081, the trial court must conduct an in camera inspection of the documents and cannot enter a blanket confidentiality order. 

In Goodyear, the tire company refused to produce confidential and trade secrets documents in connection with a products liability lawsuit filed against it by individuals injured when the tire (manufactured by Goodyear) of a motor home separated and caused an accident. Goodyear argued that the Act required the court to conduct an in camera inspection of each of the documents before entering a confidentiality order and requiring production. 

Under the Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act,

            Upon motion and good cause shown by a party attempting to prevent disclosure of information or materials which have not been previously been disclosed, including but not limited to alleged trade secrets, the court shall examine the disputed information or materials in camera. If the court finds that the information or materials or portions thereof consist of information concerning a public hazard or information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from a public hazard, the court shall allow disclosure of the information or materials. If allowing disclosure, the court shall allow disclosure of only that portion of the information or materials necessary or useful to the public regarding the public hazard.

Goodyear, 2008 WL 2697248, *2 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 69.081(7)). The trial court, concerned about the inability to review and understand voluminous technical documents, developed its own procedure by which it protected all confidential materials through a blanket order and directed the parties to resolve the other issues regarding what would be protected, bringing back to the court only those issues the parties themselves could not resolve. The appellate court found that this procedure violated the judge’s duties to act as the gatekeeper of the Act. Id. at *3.

The appellate court went on to recognize that, although a trial court may still prevent public disclosure of trade secrets, it cannot do so if those alleged trade secrets relate to a public hazard.  If the trade secret material is otherwise relevant and discoverable (but not relating to a public hazard), it can be protected by an appropriate confidentiality order. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

United States v. Malhotra, No. 5:08-CR-00423-JF (N.D. Ca.)

Former Hewlett Packard vice president Atul Malhotra today pleaded guilty in federal district court in San Jose, California to one count of theft of trade secrets. In an information filed on June 27, 2008, the United States charged Malhotra with violating the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2), by disclosing to HP certain confidential pricing information he obtained while employed at IBM. Specifically, the government charged that in his capacity as director of sales and business development for output management services for IBM Global Services, Malhotra obtained trade secret information regarding the IBM Global Services “CC Calibration Metrics.” This information concerned products costs and materials that IBM used to compete in the marketplace for printers and other output devices. Accordingly the document was stamped “IBM Confidential” on each page.

 Approximately two months after obtaining the confidential IBM information, Malhotra accepted a position as vice president of imaging and printing services at Hewlett Packard in Palo Alto, California. Shortly thereafter, the government alleges, Malhotra sent e-mails to two separate HP senior vice presidents entitled “For Your Eyes Only,” and attached the IBM Global Services CC Calibration Metrics.  An HP statement at the time indicated that HP conducted an internal investigation, terminated Malhotra’s employment, and reported the activity to law enforcement and to IBM.

Malhotra faces up to ten years in prison and a $250,000 fine on the single count of theft of trade secrets. Sentencing is scheduled for October 29, 2008, before District Judge Jeremy Fogel.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks (1)
• Share Link

A company's trade secrets may be some of its most important assets.  Recent headlines underscore their importance, and vulnerability:

1. Recently, an employee was arrested at the airport and over 1,000 company proprietary documents containing trade secrets were seized that the employee was attempting to transport with her to her new job.
   
2.  A national retailer recently was hit with a $21.5 million verdict after a jury found the retailer liable for stealing the design of a popular home improvement tool. 
   
3. A former employee recently pleaded guilty in a U.S. District Court in California to stealing proprietary technologies from his former employer and selling or offering them for sale to foreign governments and military contractors.

A survey of companies estimated that in just one year, companies likely were to have lost as much as $53 to $59 billion dollars in proprietary information and intellectual property through theft and misappropriation.  Seeking trade secret counseling and an audit can assist clients to determine best practices to help protect their most important assets.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

United States v. Meng, No. CR 04-20216 JF (U.S.D.C. N.D. Calif.).

Judge Jeremy Fogel of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in San Jose today imposed a 24-month prison sentence on Xiaodong Sheldon Meng, who pleaded guilty to possessing night vision software for pilots belonging to Quantum3D, his former employer, and using that information in a sales demonstration to Chinese naval officials.

According to the indictment, Meng was employed by Quantum3D in various systems engineering and analysis positions, and later as a consultant to Quantum3D. In that capacity, he had access to various trade secrets belonging to Quantum3D, a producer of hardware and software components for simulation systems for commercial and military customers. Among the products to which Meng had access were “Mantis,” a product used to visually simulate motions and three-dimensional scenes for training and other purposes, and “viXsen,” a visual simulation software program using for training military fighter pilots using thermal imaging (night vision) equipment. As part of his employment, Meng signed an “Employee Proprietary Information Agreement” acknowledging his obligation to return Quantum3D’s information, documents and other property to the company at the end of his employment.

Upon ending both his employment and consulting relationship with Quantum3D, Meng took a position with Orad, a direct competitor of Quantum3D in China. The government charged that Meng then traveled to China and made a presentation and demonstration to various foreign governments and officials, including the Royal Thai Air Force, the Royal Malaysian Air Force, and government entities and military contractors of the People’s Republic of China, using Quantum3D’s products, modified to seem like they belonged to Orad.

The United States government charged Meng with misappropriating Quantum3D’s trade secrets without authorization and attempting to export them from the United States to China in violation of various federal laws including, among others, the Economic Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. § 1831), the Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. § 1832), and the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778). Although the statutory maximum for the economic espionage count to which he pleaded guilty is 15 years in prison, Meng’s plea agreement with the government, in which he pleaded guilty to 2 of the 36 counts of the indictment, recommended a maximum sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment.

At the sentencing hearing, Judge Fogel imposed the 24-month maximum under the plea deal, emphasizing the need to deter others who would consider stealing and selling American technology and jeopardizing national security. In doing so, Judge Fogel became the first judge in the country to sentence a defendant convicted under the rarely-used Economic Espionage Act.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Tracy v. Winfrey, et al., No. 07-1630 (1st Cir. June 11, 2008).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of Darlene Tracy’s copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation suit against Oprah Winfrey, Harpo Productions, and ABC Television.

In a pro se complaint filed in federal district court in Boston, Tracy alleged that she came up with the idea that eventually became the hit reality TV show “Oprah’s Big Give.” In the show, which recently completed its run, Winfrey gave money to ten contestants, who then competed to make the biggest impact on the lives of complete strangers by giving the money away. Tracy alleged that she conceived of the idea for a show entitled “The Philanthropist,” and submitted a proposal to an executive producer for The Oprah Winfrey Show. She claims that a second producer told her the proposal was under review, but that the producers stopped returning her phone calls and ignored her requests to return her proposal. The complaint asserts that more than a year later, Winfrey announced at the end of her daily talk show that she was giving $1,000 to audience members to use for a charitable purpose in their communities. Shortly thereafter, Winfrey and ABC announced a new program with the working title “The Big Give,” which Tracy alleged mirrored her concept for “The Philanthropist.”

The district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to allege facts sufficient to support her claims. Tracy, now represented by counsel, appealed to the First Circuit. But the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that “neither copyright nor misappropriation of trade secrets are apt legal theories for the facts as pled by Tracy, which, even construed in her favor, reveal that Tracy voluntarily and without reservation submitted her material to the defendants.”

While the lawsuit was pending, it garnered widespread media coverage, which was rumored to cause at least one large publishing house to back out of discussions concerning a possible companion “Big Give” book out of fear that it, too, might be named in the suit.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The recent California appellate decision, Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Superior Court, is instructive not just on the issue of when the statute of limitations begins to run in a trade secret matter, but also contains important language with respect to the obligations of the trade secret owner to notify good faith, third-party users of the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets.

In Cypress, Silvaco Data Systems had developed and licensed electronic design automation software (“EDA”). This software was used by Silvaco’s customers to design their own products. One of Silvaco’s EDA products was known as Smart Spice, and Silvaco maintained the source code for SmartSpice as a trade secret. In late 1998, a former Silvaco employee began working for Circuit Systems, Inc. (“CSI”) and incorporated the SmartSpice trade secrets into a CSI product known as DynaSpice. Silvaco first suspected the trade secrets misappropriation in 2000 and sued its former employee and CSI at that time. Silvaco did not directly notify or take any action against CSI customers who had licensed DynaSpice. In August 2003, Silvaco and CSI entered into a settlement agreement and a stipulated judgment. The judgment included an express finding that Silvaco’s trade secrets had been incorporated into DynaSpice. The judgment also required CSI to discontinue licensing DynaSpice, as well as notify DynaSpice license holders that the software contained Silvaco trade secrets and to encourage customers to discontinue using DynaSpice.

Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (“Cypress”), which was one of CSI’s customers, learned of the judgment in late August 2003. After judgment was entered, Silvaco also directly notified CSI customers that DynaSpice contained misappropriated trade secrets from Silvaco. Silvaco contacted Cypress in September 2003 and demanded that Cypress cease using Silvaco’s trade secrets. Silvaco claimed that despite this notice, Cypress continued to use the DynaSpice program, and thus continued to use Silvaco’s trade secrets. Silvaco brought suit against Cypress in May 2004.

The central issue decided by the California Sixth Appellate District in Cypress involved the statute of limitations of Silvaco’s claims against Cypress. However, the decision also contains important language regarding the obligations of a trade secret holder with respect to third parties who are using the holder’s trade secrets.

The Cypress court stated that “a cause of action for misappropriation against a third-party defendant accrues with the plaintiff’s discovery of that defendant’s misappropriation.” The Cypress court also noted that trade secret owners have an incentive under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”) to put good-faith third parties on notice. According to Section 3426.1(d) of the CUTSA, “a trade secret loses its protected status if the owner does not undertake reasonable efforts to keep it secret.” Also, according to Section 3426.1(b)(2)(C) of the CUTSA, good faith acquirers of trade secrets who do not receive notice before materially relying upon the trade secrets may not be liable for misappropriation at all. Therefore, according to the Cypress decision, “the failure of the trade secret owner to take prompt action to protect its trade secrets or to alert good-faith acquirers to the existence of its trade secret claims can serve as a defense in the event the trade secret owner eventually decides to pursue a misappropriation claim against the third party.” (emphasis added).

A trade secret owner, therefore, must promptly investigate instances of possible misappropriation and seek to notify any third parties who may have acquired the owner’s trade secrets. Failure to act promptly, under the CUTSA and the Cypress decision, can give rise to statute of limitations defenses, as well as the possibility that the Court may find that the claimed trade secrets are no longer protected trade secrets at all.

The full text of the Court's decision can be accessed here http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H032114.PDF.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A California appellate court recently held that the statute of limitations for trade secret misappropriation claims against third parties who receive stolen trade secrets from others begins when the plaintiff, not the third party, suspects a misappropriation of trade secrets.

The Court stated: "We conclude that with respect to the element of knowledge, the statute of limitations on a cause of action for misappropriation begins to run when the plaintiff has any reason to suspect that the third party knows or reasonably should know that the information is a trade secret. The third party’s actual state of mind does not affect the running of the statute."

The Court indicated that the trade secret holder's failure to take "prompt action" in notifying the third party about the purported misappropriation may diminish the holder's trade secret misappropriation claim.

Justice Eugene M. Premo, the author of the court decision, stated "A trade secret loses its protected status if the owner does not undertake reasonable efforts to keep it secret."

The Court's opinion is significant because the decision demonstrates that trade secret holders need to take "prompt action" once they suspect a misappropriation of trade secrets, including investigating potential misuses of their secrets.

A trade secret audit can be an invaluable part of protecting a company's trade secrets before and after a company's trade secrets have been compromised. For more information on Seyfarth Shaw LLP's trade secret audit capabilities, click here.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The California Courts of Appeal recently concluded that a former employee could not have breached a duty of loyalty to his employer where he entered into competition with the employer only after leaving the company. Primetech Corp. v. Cohen, 2008 WL 1899976 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. April 30, 2008).

The plaintiff, Primetech Corporation, a supplier of aircraft parts to the military and civilian industry, hired defendant Jonathan Cohen to help produce a database of aircraft parts. A year after Cohen started, the United States Air Force suspended Primetech and “debarred” many of its principals from any government contracting because of allegations that the company had knowingly delivered counterfeit parts to the Department of Defense. Around this time, Cohen, and another employee of Primetech, formed Air Sonic, an aircraft parts business, where they continued to use Primetech’s database. Cohen ultimately separated from Primetech in July 2005, taking several computers with him, as well as a database program containing Primetech’s financial information.

Primetech sued Cohen and his new aircraft parts company, Air Spectrum, which had replaced the earlier Air Sonic. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for Cohen on most of the causes of action, rejecting Primetech’s claims for breach of loyalty, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition, among others. Primetech argued on appeal that the trial court had erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict (nonsuit) on its cause of action for breach of loyalty. Primetech alleged that Cohen had breached his duty of loyalty when he began operating his own aircraft parts company while still employed at Primetech. The trial court, however, concluded that Cohen was never an officer of the company and furthermore, he had started Air Sonic with the consent of Primetech’s vice president and had not actually decided to compete with Primetech until after he had separated from the company, which he was entitled to do since there was no non-compete clause in his employment contract. Reviewing the facts, the Courts of Appeal observed that while substantial evidence supported a determination that Cohen was an officer of Primetech when he set up a competing business using Primetech’s database, Primetech had failed to demonstrate that Cohen had directly harmed the company with his competing venture, so any error was not prejudicial and thus reversal was not warranted. As a result, the Courts of Appeal held that the trial court’s factual findings precluded Primetech from succeeding under a breach of loyalty theory.

This case should prompt companies to consider carefully the circumstances under which they separate from former executives. Although non-competition agreements can protect an employer, a company should not rely on breach of loyalty claims to protect against contemporaneous competition where there is any inference of an amicable split. Employers should also realize that to pursue a breach of loyalty claim successfully , they must demonstrate that the employee “formed the design to compete” while still employed with the company. Similarly, without adequate trade secrets counseling and preparation, even a company’s most valuable asset (in this case the airplane parts database) can be used by former employees in competing businesses if the proper protections are not in place.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

By Scott Krol, New York

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently upheld summary judgment holding that a former employee did not violate the Virginia Computer Crimes Act (“VCCA”) when the former company could not prove that they were unaware of employees’ use of company funds. Further, the employee did not violate the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“VUTSA”) when the company could not show any evidence that the employee in fact used any of the otherwise protected trade secrets for his benefit.

The parties to this case are closely linked. Jerry Nims is an entrepreneur who obtained patents on many technologies used in making identification cards more difficult to temper with or counterfeit. Nims started Orasee which owned many of these patents.

In 2003, Nims formed EC4 Technologies Limited (“EC4 UK”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Orasee, to license the technologies.

In 2005, Nims set up Othentec Ltd. (“Othentec UK”) as a subsidiary of EC4 UK.

Nims’s son-in-law, Jeffrey Phelan, was appointed Managing Director of both EC4 UK and Othentec UK, and later was put in charge of better distributing the company’s product in the United States.

On March 17, 2005, Phelan formed EC4 Technologies, Incorporated (“EC4 USA”) and became that company’s CEO. He began to market and distribute Orasee technologies in the U.S. pursuant to a sublicense agreement between the EC4 UK and EC4 USA. In November 2005, another executive formed Othentec Limited (“Othentec USA”) for the same purpose as EC4 USA, this time as wholly owned by Othentec UK.

By early 2006, after a considerable amount of friction developed between the parties, Phelan was discharged from his positions at the UK companies, but continued to do business as EC4 USA. This gave rise to the case at hand, essentially Nims’ companies claimed that Phelan abused his position of power and trust to form EC 4 USA fraudulently and proceeded to use Othentec UK’s money and trade secrets to run the U.S. business successfully. Phelan moved for and won summary judgment against Othentec UK on all issues except whether Phelan breached his fiduciary duty to Othentec UK.

The district court explained that there are three elements of committing a violation of the VCCA: “(1) using a computer or computer network (2) without authority (3) intending to obtain, embezzle, or convert the property of another.” Va. Code Ann, §18.2-152.3.

The Court found that Phelan clearly was authorized to access Othentec UK bank account, Othentec UK was aware of the withdrawals, and Phelan did not directly withdraw the money using a computer. Instead, Phelan merely sent an email to the accountant asking for the withdrawal. Hence, there was no evidence of the unauthorized use of a computer to commit a crime. Othentec UK “produced no evidence outside of self-serving speculations that Phelan committed a violation. of the VCCA.”

The VUTSA makes it illegal for a person to misappropriate trade secrets from another. Othentec UK argued that Phelan, as Managing Director, was intimately familiar with the technology, “unless someone is foolish enough to believe that all that (EC4 USA’s technology) was developed in a clean-room environment without reference to, use of, or attempting to work around” Othentec UK’s proprietary and highly confidential software and manufacturing process, than Othentec UK had no basis for its argument. The Court agreed with the last part, ruling that these “allegations, speculations, and inference are not enough to survive summary judgment.” See Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan, --- F.3d ----, Case No. 06-2297, 2008 WL 2009740 (4th Cir. May 12, 2008) (emphasis added).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Topps Company, maker of “Bazooka” bubble gum, licensed Stani to manufacture and distribute the gum in Argentina. The original license was entered into in 1957 and was to expire in 20 years. It provided that Topps would share its “know-how, formulae, processes and techniques” with Stani in exchange for royalties on Stani’s sales. In 1976, the parties entered into a new 10-year agreement, with Stani given an option to extend it for another 10 years. The new agreement provided for the parties sharing Topps’ “manufacturing technology, marketing concepts and techniques, … and trademark use” in exchange for Stani’s payment of a yearly license fee. In the 1976 agreement, Topps also gave Stani “the exclusive non-assignable right and license to manufacture ... and sell within the [relevant] Territory, during the continuance of this Agreement, Licensed Products utilizing TOPPS Technology.” Emphasis added. Four years later, the parties entered into two new contracts: a third license agreement, and an escrow agreement. The 1980 license agreement, which expired by its terms in April 1996, gave Stani the same “exclusive non-assignable right and license” that had been given in 1976 except that the corresponding 1980 provision ended with the words “Licensed Products” and did not include "utilizing TOPPS' technology." The escrow agreement (for which Stani paid $100,000) recited that, absent a default, upon expiration of the 1980 license agreement legal title to the registration in Argentina of the trademarks “Topps” and “Bazooka” would pass to Stani.

In 1999, three years after the 1980 license agreement expired, Topps sued Stani and its parent corporation, Cadbury (to whom Stani had assigned the trademarks), alleging that Stani was continuing to use Topps technology which constituted misappropriation of trade secrets. In its answer, Stani denied that it was using Topps’ formulae but argued that, in any event, it had the right under the parties’ agreements to do so. The district court granted summary judgment to Stani and its parent, reasoning that the 1976 and 1980 documents (including the assignment to Stani of the Argentina registration of the trademarks) necessarily gave Stani the right to continue using Topps’ chewing gum formulae after April 1996. The Second Circuit reversed on the ground that summary judgment was inappropriate because the agreements were ambiguous with regard to Stani’s rights after April 1996. Topps Co. v. Cadbury Stani S.A.I.C., No. 06-5316-cv (2d Cir., May 15, 2008).

The court of appeals said that, on the one hand, the 1980 license agreement provided that the “TOPPS Trademarks and the Topps Technology shall at all times remain the exclusive property of TOPPS or its assigns” and gave Stani the right to use TOPPS formulae only “during the continuance” of the agreement. Those provisions suggest that Stani had no post-April 1996 rights. On the other hand, the “during the continuance” provision might have been intended to refer solely to what was to happen if there was an early termination of the 1980 license for cause, and there was no provision expressly granting or expressly denying Stani the right to the formulae after April 1996. Moreover, the assignment of trademark registration gave Stani at least the right to make a substantially similar product if it could do so without using the Topps formulae and without deceiving customers. Therefore, the parties’ intent was a material disputed issue requiring a trial.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Georgia’s Trade Secrets Act prohibits knowing misappropriation of trade secrets. See Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-761. In a recent decision, the Eleventh Circuit briefly examined this principle in affirming a district court’s grant of dismissal and concluded that the Complaint must set forth facts from which the court could infer that any misappropriation of trade secrets was knowing. Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 2008 WL 1700204 (11th Cir. Apr. 14, 2008).

Southern Nuclear Operating Company had retained Electronic Data Systems (“EDS”) to provide computer and software services. Southern Nuclear eventually terminated that agreement and hired Computer Technologies Solutions, Inc., (“CTS”) to perform the same functions. EDS requested that Southern Nuclear return EDS’s products and documentation or certify their destruction. Southern Nuclear never did so, and so EDS filed an action against Southern Nuclear and CTS for misappropriation of its trade secrets.

The only issue on appeal was whether the district court had erred in granting dismissal on the grounds that EDS did not allege that CTS knew or should have known at the time it was hired that it had misappropriated trade secrets of EDS. The court of appeals agreed with the district court and affirmed the dismissal in a very brief opinion because there was “nothing in the Complaint that provides facts from which the court could infer that CTS knew or should have known that it had misappropriated trade secrets of EDS.”

Nonetheless, service providers such as CTS should still be conscious of trade secrets issues when they enter into new agreements to provide services or products, ensuring that information used by the client and made available to the service provider is not a competitors’ trade secrets, particularly if there is some reason to suspect that the information may be protected.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed a ruling granting summary judgment to American Family Mutual Insurance Company on its declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it has no duty to defend the insured defendants in an underlying trade secret misappropriation action the company brought in federal court. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roth et al., No. 1-07-0526 (Ill. App., 2d Dist., Mar. 31, 2008).

American Family, a Wisconsin-based insurer, entered into written agency agreements with defendants Bonnie Roth and Connie Roth, owners of Roth & Roth Insurance, pursuant to which Bonnie and Connie worked as exclusive agents of American Family. The agency agreements provided that the policies, policyholder records, and other materials furnished by American Family to the defendants remained American Family’s property and that all originals and copies were to be returned to American Family within 10 days of termination of the agreements. The agreements also contained provisions, signed by the defendants, governing their access to American Family’s proprietary computer system, software and database, which included customer lists and confidential customer information. In addition, the agreements contained nonsolicitation agreements prohibiting the defendants from soliciting American Family policyholders for one year following termination of the agreements.

After terminating the agreements with Bonnie and Connie, American Family demanded the return of all of its property, including policyholder records, and reminded Bonnie and Connie that privacy laws and the agreements prohibited them from disclosing policyholder information to third parties. Nonetheless, the defendants solicited American Family customers, including sending a solicitation letter to at least one American Family customer that contained personal financial information Connie Roth obtained while an agent of American Family.

American Family sued the defendants in federal court alleging violations of the Wisconsin Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 143.90(1)(c); federal law; and state common law for breach of contract and tortious interference. American Family also instituted a declaratory judgment action in the Illinois circuit court seeking a determination that it has no duty to defend the defendants in the federal court action pursuant to the terms and conditions of the business-owners’ package insurance policy it had issued to them as its agents. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of American Family.

On appeal, the defendants asserted that the circuit court erred because the underlying complaint contained factual allegations of “personal and advertising injury” that brought the action within the policy’s coverage. But the appellate court rejected this argument, finding that the defendants’ alleged retention and use of confidential information gleaned from American Family’s database and computer system amounted to trademark and trade secret infringement, thus bringing the action with the policy exclusion for injuries knowingly caused by the insured and arising out of such infringement. The appellate court also found that the defendants’ alleged retention of American Family’s information and use of that information to solicit American Family’s customers constituted a breach of the agency agreements, thus bringing the action within an exclusion to the policy’s coverage for injuries that arise from breach of contract. Accordingly, the court concluded that American Family did not owe a duty to defend its former agents in the underlying action.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

One of the nation’s large home builders recently filed suit against a former executive in federal court in Albuquerque, New Mexico for alleged misuse of the company’s trade secrets related to a highly confidential internal strategic plan.

Pulte Home Corporation filed suit against former executive Lynn Galindo, a former area vice president based out of Las Vegas, Nevada, in the United States District Court of New Mexico (Case 1:08-cv-00210-JB-LFG) alleging claims of trade secret misappropriation, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.

The complaint alleges that shortly before Galindo’s departure from the company, she misappropriated an internal strategic plan related to the Albuquerque housing market and later used it to create a similar plan for a competitor.

According to the complaint, the plan, which cost in excess of $1 million dollars to produce, contained information that would allow a competitor at Pulte’s expense to make informative decisions regarding the “relative health of the market in terms of marco/micro economic and market forces; the size of the mobility of the population within the market; the organization of Pulte’s Target Consumer Groups; the location preferences by consumer group, price sensitivity, product preferences, over-and under-served consumers groups which indicates market opportunity; and the top performing communities in the market organized by Target Consumer Group.” The plan also contained Pulte’s analysis of this data, its strategy for increasing its presence in the market, an “identification of specific challenges of this market and Pulte’s proposed solutions to those challenges.”

According to Pulte’s complaint, “A knowledgeable person would be able to use Pulte’s . . . [strategic plan] to assess the viability of a specific location (or multiple locations), understand the best opportunities for targeting specific consumer groups in the locations under evaluation and be able to fine tune a product offering in terms of community layout, community design, community amenities, lot size and configuration, floor plan selection and specifications of homes.”

According to the suit, Pulte provided Galindo with notice of her termination in the spring of 2007 as part of a reduction in force. Galindo negotiated a lucrative severance package that paid her nearly $300,000 in severance pay, bonuses and other compensation. Pulte claims Galindo conspired to obtain the strategic plan while she was negotiating her severance from the company and that if it would have known she had obtained the highly confidential plan that it would not have entered the severance agreement. Galindo apparently obtained the plan by contacting a subordinate and induced the employee to send her a copy prior to her separation.

During Galindo’s employment and as part of her severance agreement, Galiando signed agreements to keep Pulte’s proprietary information, such as the strategic plan, confidential, according to the complaint. Pulte claims that Galindo agreed to provide a developer in the Albuquerque area with a marketing study and used material from Pulte's confidential strategic plan in the report.

The case has yet to be set for trial and has been assigned to District Judge James O. Browning and Magistrate Judge Lorenzo F. Garcia.

This case highlights the need for employers to review the activities of departing employees shortly before their departure to ensure that company confidential/trade secret information has not been compromised and that the employees understand their continued confidentiality obligations to the company. Employers should consider reviewing these employees’ e-mail activity and access to proprietary databases prior to their departure, as well as remind other employees to report any suspicious activities, to attempt to safeguard company secrets.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A former software engineer for a Chicago-area telecommunications company has been indicted for allegedly misappropriating over 1,000 proprietary documents containing trade secrets which she was evidently attempting to transport with her to her new job in China. Neither company has been named.

The defendant, Hanjuan Jin, a naturalized citizen, took a medical leave of absence from the Chicago-based company (Company A) in February 2006. During her medical leave, she accepted a job with a company in China (Company B) where she was to develop communications software. She then informed Company A that she would return to work on February 26, 2007, without notifying the company that she had secured a job in China. After purchasing a one-way ticket to China for Feb. 28, 2007, Jin returned to Company A and allegedly downloaded hundreds of documents. She allegedly returned that night as well as the next night to copy more documents. These documents included descriptions of how Company A provides an interstate communication feature that cost the company hundreds of millions of dollars to develop, and federal authorities claim that had Jin succeeded in bringing them to China, Company A could have lost more than $600 million over the next three years.

Jin was arrested and the documents seized at O’Hare Airport on Feb. 28, 2007. She was charged with three counts of theft of trade secrets. If convicted, each count carries a maximum penalty of ten years in prison and a $250,000 fine.

For more information, see http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/suburban-chicago-woman-indicted-for,337647.shtml or http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-trade-secrets-webapr03,1,1758307.story.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of a former Coca-Cola Company employee and one of her co-conspirators for conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). In United States v. Williams, a jury convicted Joya Williams of taking trade secrets related to secret marketing materials from Coca-Cola and working with her co-conspirator, Edmund Duhaney to try to sell them to Pepsi Company through a third-party, Ibrahim Dimson. (Mr. Duhaney pleaded guilty.)

The facts under which Ms. Williams and Mr. Dimson were convicted and sentenced read like a serial clock-and-dagger television series. Ms. Williams snuck files (and even a product sample) out of her workplace, gave them to Mr. Duhaney (who testified against Ms. Williams and Mr. Dimson as part of his plea-bargain), who then contacted Mr. Dimson to act as the go-between with Pepsi Co. Mr. Dimson contacted Pepsi Co. by mailing an executive at Pepsi an offer to provide “very detailed and confidential information” about Coca-Cola he would provide “to the highest bidder.” Pepsi Co., of course, notified Coca-Cola, which then notified the FBI. An undercover agent with the FBI posed as a Pepsi executive and began the process of purchasing small confidential items with an aim towards one large purchase. After the terms of the large purchase were consummated, the FBI arrested each of the three conspirators.

As stated by the Court, the facts leave no doubt as to the validity of the underlying convictions, but Ms. Williams raised two constitutional challenges to her trial. First, she argued that the trial court’s limitation on her cross-examination of Mr. Duhaney violated her Sixth Amendment right of confrontation (the Eleventh Circuit disagreed). Second, she argued that the trial court denied her due process by striking her closing argument’s reasonable doubt analogy (again the Court of Appeals disagreed). And both Ms. Williams and Mr. Dimson appealed their sentences, arguing that the district court had placed too heavy an emphasis on the seriousness of the offense in going above the recommended sentencing guidelines for each of them. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in sentencing them.

¹ Trial lawyers frequently have a series of “reasonable doubt” stories and analogies for use at closing argument, tailored to the case and whether they are the prosecutor or defense attorney. Ms. Williams’ attorney’s analogy is arguably one of the stranger ones: “Williams argues that her counsel properly explained the concept of reasonable doubt by comparing it to a patient's desire to seek a second opinion when told by a doctor ‘you know, I'm looking at you and I think you need to have both of your legs amputated.’”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Chemical Abstracts division of the American Chemical Society (ACS) sued three software developers who left ACS to start their own company, Leadscope. ACS sued for trade secret misappropriation, alleging that the software developers used ACS trade secrets to develop their own product. The filing of the lawsuit scuttled several pending (very promising) deals that Leadscope was about to close on. Leadscope counterclaimed for defamation, tortious interference, unfair competition and deceptive trade practices.

The lawsuit was filed in 2002 was hotly contested. Among other things, there was a dispute over insurance coverage, resulting in a court of appeals decision in favor of coverage, see Am. Chem. Soc. v. Leadscope, Inc. , 2005-Ohio-2557.

The trial lasted 2 months in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (Columbus, Ohio). On March 27, the jury returned a verdict ruling in favor of Leadscope (the defendant and counterclaimant), awarding counterclaim compensatory damages of $27 million.

In closing arguments, Leadscope's attorney argued, that ACS "destroyed the reputations of three dedicated scientists...They have ruined the financial position of LeadScope...These scientists did their own work. They didn't take anything from [ACS]". Much of the case focused on expert analysis of Leadscope's source code. Leadscope presented expert testimony that the source code of their own product was NOT copied.

Certainly, a cautionary tale for people filing trade secret lawsuits!

The Columbus Dispatch has reported on the verdict. See
http://www.columbusdispatch.com/live/content/business/stories/2008/03/28/LEADSCOPE.ART_ART_03-28-08_C12_HF9P1EG.html?sid=101

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Stanley Steemer licensed AAA Abachman to operate a carpet and upholstery cleaning business under the Stanley Steemer name. The franchise agreement gave Abachman “the sole right to use Stanley Steemer’s ‘trademarks, service marks, patents, and trade secrets’ in its carpet and upholstery cleaning business within its assigned territory.”

After Abachman had secured this right, however, Stanley Steemer licensed a second company to operate a “duct cleaning” business in an overlapping geographic area. Abachman complained to Stanley Steemer that this second license violated its exclusive rights in the area, and, after being rebuffed, sought a declaratory judgment that this was so. The parties’ cross summary judgment motions resulted in judgment for the defendant, Stanley Steemer, on the basis that the franchise agreement granted exclusive rights only as to “carpet” and “upholstery” cleaning, not “duct” cleaning. Abachman appealed to the 11th Circuit.

The central issue in the appeal was whether the contract between Abachman and Stanley Steemer afforded Abachman an exclusive right in Stanley Steemer’s mark generally, or only as to carpet and upholstery. The relevant portion of the agreement gave “Abachman the exclusive and perpetual rights ‘to own and operate a Stanley Steemer carpet and upholstery cleaning business (hereinafter referred to as a ‘Stanley Steemer Business’) in the ... ‘Franchisee’s Area’[ ] and to use the trademarks, services marks, patents, [and] trade secrets ... solely in a Stanley Steemer Business in that area and in no other manner.’”

The per curiam decision affirmed the district court, holding that this language provided an exclusive right to the Stanley Steemer mark only as to “carpet and upholstery.” Relying on the language “and in no other manner,” the Court held that this unambiguous language foreclosed any broader understanding of the contract, even a subsequent term requiring payment by Abachman to Stanley Steemer for “any additional sale resulting from or associated with the name Stanley Steemer.”

Although there was a weak, facial argument that the broad language “trademarks, services marks, patents and trade secrets” is broader than only “carpet and upholstery cleaning” if done under the Stanley Steemer name, it seems clear that the Court concluded from the contract language quoted in its opinion that such use is constrained to “Stanley Steemer Business,” a term defined as “a Stanley Steemer carpet and upholstery cleaning business.”

Although neither a trendsetting case nor a departure from black letter law, this case is a good reminder that clearly written, descriptive contract language is (still) critical and definitive in disputes. Here, Stanley Steemer did a good job of providing both the breadth necessary for Abachman to run a successful franchise and at the same time limiting that franchise strictly so as to enter into a separate agreement with another entity.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On February 29, 2008, Allen Cotten pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court in Sacramento to stealing microwave technologies from his former employer, Genesis Microwave, Inc., and selling or offering them for sale to foreign governments and military contractors. In a scheme that lasted two years, Cotten downloaded confidential information from Genesis computers, including plans, designs, and specifications for microwave technologies that, according to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, have military applications such as “enhancing navigation and guidance capabilities, radar jamming, electronic countermeasures, and the ability to locate and pinpoint enemy signals during warfare.” Cotten also stole mechanical parts and hardware made with the confidential plans belonging to Genesis, and both sold and offered to sell those components to foreign governments and military contractors. At his sentencing hearing in May, Cotten faces up to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of $250,000.

Cotton’s illegal activities were uncovered by the Export Enforcement Task Force comprised of various federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, FBI, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, and the armed services. The task force was created to detect, investigate, and prosecute cases involving the theft or export of sensitive technology.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In almost every trade secret/restrictive covenant dispute, a company whose trade secret information has been stolen must confront the possibility that its customers will be dragged into the dispute. One company decided to take the bull by the horns pre-litigation and sent a letter to all of its customers notifying them of a misappropriation by one of its former employees and “suggesting” that, to avoid potential involvement in any ensuing litigation “as a material witness, or otherwise,” the customers should not do business with the former employee.

Unsurprisingly, the former employee sued his former employer for defamation. The former employer brought a motion to strike the defamation complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, which authorizes a court to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill “the valid exercise of constitutional rights,” such as the right of free speech. The trial court’s decision to grant the former employer’s anti-SLAPP motion and strike the defamation complaint was upheld yesterday by the Court of Appeal . See Neville v. Chudacoff, __ Cal.Rptr.3d __, 2008 WL 650658 (Cal.App. 2d. Dist. March 12, 2008).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In a February 29, 2008 Order, the Northern District of California entered a preliminary injunction against four defendants on behalf of Verigy US, Inc. Verigy demonstrated in discovery that Romi Omar Mayder, the principal of Silicon Test Systems, Inc., e-mailed a number of sensitive documents to a business partner, Robert Pochowski. The documents concerned technology for testing flash memory cards.

In granting the preliminary injunction, the district court rejected a number of arguments put forward by Defendants. Defendants first argued that a difference of opinion between Verigy witnesses regarding the application of Verigy’s confidentiality policy, but the court found that the existence of such a policy, along with non-disclosure agreements, was sufficient for Verigy to show reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of its information.

Defendants further argued that the items alleged by Verigy to be trade secrets were publicly known elements. However, the court concluded that Verigy demonstrated that the combination of those elements was not publicly known and was therefore entitled to protection as a trade secret.

Finally, Defendants argued that the product they ultimately developed did not utilize Verigy’s trade secrets because Defendants made significant changes to the final product. The court rejected this argument, holding that Defendants’ use of Verigy’s items gave Defendants a head start in ultimately developing their final product, even if the final product varied from the Verigy plans. Additionally, the court relied upon Defendants’ misappropriation of Verigy information regarding the requirements of other vendors in concluding that Defendants’ actions gave them an unwarranted competitive advantage.

The court was also forced to grapple with the question of the duration of the injunction restricting Defendants marketing or selling their product. To answer this question, the court had to determine how much of a temporal head start Defendants obtained by misappropriating Verigy’s trade secrets. The court determined that Mayder took eight months at Verigy working on the project in question, but then elected to shorten the injunction period to five months because: (1) some of the technology used on the project was publicly available; and (2) Defendants’ final product ultimately went in a different direction than the product sold by Verigy.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A federal court in the Southern District of California recently burst the bubble on a plaintiff’s suit alleging that the defendant, the alleged creator of a novelty chewing gum product, had stolen the plaintiff’s idea for a NASCAR-themed bubble “chew” by granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The decision provides a reminder to companies that provide confidential and trade secret information to others under non-disclosure agreements that they need to follow the precise terms of those agreements, including properly designating all information that they seek to protect, otherwise they run the risk of their information being exposed and compromised.

In the colorful case, Hoffman v. Impact Confections, Inc., Case No. 06cv0489 BTM (NLS), 2008 WL 413751 (S.D. Cal.), the plaintiff alleged that together with a partner they established a bubble gum company named Ollie Pop Bubble Gum, Inc. (“Ollie Pop”). Plaintiff claimed that he came up with the concept of marketing novelty gum and candy “which was designed to combine the popularity of NASCAR and its drivers with the lure of the chew tobacco favored by many of NASCAR's fans by providing a gum or candy in an original new packaging intended to appeal to all ages.” First Am. Complaint 11.

Plaintiff alleged that he contemplated two different packaging options, both to be sold under the mark “Pit Crew Chew.” Id. at 12. The first packaging option was a pouch containing gum or candy and the second packaging option was a plastic container shaped like a tire and wheel that would also contain gum or candy. Id. Plaintiff’s idea purportedly was to have the products licensed by NASCAR and bear NASCAR's logos. Plaintiff also wanted to have the products endorsed by at least one NASCAR driver and display the driver's image and/or his car and/or associated number. Id.

According to the plaintiff, he designed both packages and began working with Motorsports Management to establish a relationship between Ollie Pop and NASCAR. Id. at 13. Plaintiff claimed he entered into discussions with Joe Gibbs Racing to have one of its drivers endorse the product and allegedly was able to obtain the promise of an endorsement from Tony Stewart. Id. at 15.

Plaintiff claimed that in 2003, he entered into negotiations with the defendant regarding the marketing and selling of “Pit Crew Chew” products. Id. at 16. The parties entered into a written non-disclosure agreement in May 2003.

As part of his discussions with the defendant, plaintiff contended that he disclosed confidential information and materials to defendant, including, but not limited to, “the idea/concept of marketing and selling a NASCAR and NASCAR driver endorsed bubble gum, the idea/concept of providing gum and/or candy in a package which would appeal to NASCAR fans' noted fondness for ‘chew,’ and the specific drawings of both the pouch and wheel to be marketed and sold.” Id. at 18. Plaintiff also claimed he introduced defendant’s employees to Motorsports employees.

According to plaintiff’s complaint, by July of 2003, defendant had submitted an application for a license to NASCAR seeking to market and sell “Pit Crew Chew” products with the NASCAR logos in place. Id. at 20. Following defendant’s submission of the licensing application to NASCAR, Motorsports allegedly informed defendant and Ollie Pop that NASCAR was indeed interested in licensing the “Pit Crew Chew” products. Id. at 21. Plaintiff alleged that by August 2003, Dale Earnhardt, Jr. was interested in endorsing “Pit Crew Chew” products. Id. at 22.

Then, around the beginning of September 2003, according to plaintiff, defendant abruptly ended its relationship with Ollie Pop and plaintiff. Id. at 24. With the failure to launch “Pit Crew Chew” products, Ollie Pop encountered financial difficulties and as a result plaintiff took a controlling interest in Ollie Pop. Id. Under the deal he allegedly struck with his former partner, plaintiff claimed that Ollie Pop granted him all right, title, and interest in and to and all intellectual property rights related to the “Pit Crew Chew” mark and products, all rights of Ollie Pop under the non-disclosure agreement, and all patent and copyright rights relating to the tire and wheel design and artwork. Id. at 26.

In 2005, plaintiff allegedly obtained copyright registrations for the two-dimensional artwork on Ollie Pop's candy wheel design. Plaintiff also claimed in 2005 he learned that defendant had launched its own product, “Champion Chew.” According to plaintiff, the product consisted of gum enclosed in a tire and wheel and was designed to bear a resemblance to “chew” tobacco. Id. at 27. Plaintiff alleged that “Champion Chew” was licensed by NASCAR and was endorsed by one of NASCAR's drivers. Id. at 28.

Plaintiff filed suit and his first amended complaint asserted claims for: (1) misappropriation of trade secrets under California’s trade secret misappropriation statute (Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1); (2) intentional interference with economic relationships; (3) negligent interference with economic relationships; (4) breach of contract; (5) breach of implied contract; (6) copyright infringement; (7) quantum merit; (8) unfair business practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200 and California common law; (9) constructive trust/accounting; and (10) injunctive relief.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The critical importance of securing confidential information was brought home again yesterday when the intersection of trade secrets and spy games made the newspapers.

Four men, one a United States Department of Defense systems analyst and three Chinese natives, were arrested and charged with espionage in two separate cases. Aside from the political ramifications of ongoing Chinese espionage, which one top Justice Department official characterized as reaching “Cold War levels,” these two cases highlight the importance of confidential secrets not only as a protectionist principle for businesses, but also for national security.

One of the two cases concerned a civilian analyst’s sale of classified information concerning U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan; the other case concerned a long-time civilian contractor employed by Rockwell International and then Boeing Co., who was accused of providing China with classified military aerospace information. In giving a statement on the arrests and charges, U.S. Assistant Attorney General Kenneth Wainstein, noted that increased Chinese espionage is “a threat to our national security and to our economic position in the world, a threat that is posed by the relentless efforts of foreign intelligence services to penetrate our security systems and steal our most sensitive military technology and information.”

The case of the defense industry employee from Boeing is just as disturbing. Mr. Greg Chung, a 72-year old naturalized U.S. citizen, is reported to have given national defense trade secrets to the Chinese government out of “loyalty to the Motherland,” according to a U.S. Attorney, despite having been a Boeing contractor for over 30 years. Those trade secrets were reported to include information related to the space shuttle and other military airspace programs. That case grew out of an investigation into another Chinese-spying case, which was uncovered in 2006 and concerned espionage by Chinese agents of U.S. military technology related to U.S. Navy warships and submarines.

“Certain foreign governments are committed to obtaining the American trade secrets that can advance the development of their military capabilities,” the U.S. Attorneys’ office said in a statement laced with a cautionary principle for all companies engaged even remotely in defense contractor work. Indeed, the lesson for civilian companies, particularly those whose trade secrets portfolios include any sensitive or classified information, is that espionage is not limited to the corporate realm, and the ramifications of being involved in international espionage may have long-term damaging effects on national security, in addition to the negative impact on a company’s business and perception.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Alliant Insurance Services, Inc. v. Gaddy, No. C055192, 2008 WL 331065 (Cal. App. 3 Dist., Feb. 07, 2008)

On February 7, 2008, the California Court of Appeals affirmed a preliminary injunction, enjoining defendant G. Scott Gaddy from competing against his former employer, Alliant Insurance Services, Inc., within the entire state of California. The appellate court also upheld a non-solicitation provision prohibiting Gaddy from contacting Alliant customers. Alliant acquired Gaddy’s insurance brokerage business in 2004. Prior to the acquisition, the brokerage competed directly with Alliant to provide insurance for construction companies. In the Stock Purchase Agreement, Gaddy agreed, for a period of 5 years from the date of acquisition, “to refrain from carrying on a business, directly or indirectly, which provides any [of Alliant’s] business” within the 58 counties of the State of California. Alliant employed Gaddy after the acquisition until it terminated his employment in October 2006. In both the Stock Purchase Agreement and in his employment agreement with Alliant, Gaddy agreed that, for a period of 3 years after termination of his employment with Alliant, he would not solicit clients of his former business or Alliant clients known to him by virtue of his employment with Alliant. After his termination, Gaddy started a business that provided insurance and surety consulting in the construction industry. In connection with that business, he contacted, and admitted to contacting, “[h]alf a dozen to a dozen” former clients. Alliant sued Gaddy and moved for preliminary injunctive relief.

The trial court’s tentative ruling was to deny injunctive relief, but after a hearing during which Gaddy testified, the court ultimately issued an order preliminarily enjoining Gaddy from:

(a) directly or indirectly using or willfully disclosing to any person (without [Alliant]’s permission or court approval) information about [Alliant]’s clients, as defined by the court; (b) directly or indirectly soliciting [Alliant]’s clients within the 58 counties of California; (c) carrying on business directly or indirectly which “provides any Company business” within the 58 counties of California; (d) directly or indirectly soliciting, hiring, retaining the services of plaintiffs’ employees or independent producers who were employees or independent producers of [Gaddy’s former business] or [Alliant]; (e) destroying or altering any information regarding the facts at issue in this case; and (f) directly or indirectly soliciting, hiring, assisting, or accepting assistance of any other person or entity in attempting to accomplish any of the acts prohibited by the preliminary injunction.

On appeal, Gaddy focused only on whether the non-competition and non-solicitation of customers covenants were enforceable. The court of appeal held that substantial evidence supported the enforceability of these provisions.

Although California has a strong public policy of prohibiting non-competition provisions in the employment context (Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600), an exception exists for a non-competition covenants in connection with the sale of a business (Bus. & Prof. Code § 16601). Section 16601 provides, in part: “Any person who sells the goodwill of a business, or any owner of a business entity selling or otherwise disposing of all of his or her ownership interest in the business entity . . . may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified geographic area in which the business so sold . . . has been carried on, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill or ownership interest from the buyer, carries on a like business therein.” Id. (emphasis added). In this case, the geographic area encompassed by the non-competition agreement was the entire state of California. Defendant Gaddy argued that the acquired business’s clients were in Northern California. Plaintiff’s supplemental declaration in support of its request for an injunction stated that, although its construction company clients were in Northern California, it procured insurance products from insurance companies located throughout the 58 counties of California. Thus, the court of appeal found that substantial evidence showed that the acquired business “carried on” its business in every county in California. As for the non-solicitation agreement, the trial court found that Alliant’s client information constituted trade secrets and that Gaddy had used trade secret information. The court of appeal rejected Gaddy’s effort to challenge the trade secret ruling on appeal because it was raised for the first time in his reply brief. The court, deciding that the non-solicitation provision was a valid restraint to protect trade secrets, found the non-solicitation provision enforceable.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Al Minor & Associates, Inc. v. Martin, Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-292.

The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled yesterday in a case in which it was asked to decide whether a former employee, having taken no confidential documents from the plaintiff employer but instead memorizing client lists, could be held liable for a statutory trade secret violation.

The plaintiff, Al Minor & Associates, Inc. (“AMA”), is an actuarial firm that serves approximately 500 clients. In 1998, AMA hired the defendant, Robert Martin, but did not require him to sign a non-compete agreement or an employment contract. While still employed with AMA, Martin took steps to form his own company which would provide essentially the same services as AMA. He resigned in 2003, and did not take any confidential documents with him. He later successfully solicited 15 AMA clients, using client information that he had memorized.

AMA filed suit, alleging that Martin had violated Ohio’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), and a magistrate found for AMA. The magistrate recommended that the trial court award AMA over $25,000 in fees that AMA would have earned from the clients which Martin solicited. The court of appeals affirmed, and Martin appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, contending that a client list memorized by a former employee cannot be the basis of a trade secret violation, and that the trial court’s decision unduly restricted his right to compete with AMA. AMA maintained that public policy favored the protection of trade secrets regardless of whether they were written or memorized.

The Court analyzed a 1902 case which defined trade secrets, as well as the UTSA, which was adopted in 1994. The Court noted that a 1997 Ohio case had established a six-factor test to determine the existence of a trade secret: 1) the extent to which the information is known outside the business; 2) the extent to which it is known to those in the business; 3) precautions taken to guard the secrecy of the trade secret; 4) the value of the secret to the holder; 5) the amount of money or effort expended in developing the information; and 6) the amount of time and expense needed for others to acquire and duplicate the information.

After looking at these sources, the Court determined that nothing in any of them indicated that the determination of whether or not a client list is a trade secret hinges on its form (e.g., written or memorized). The Court also noted that the legislature could have excluded memorized information from the definition of a trade secret in enacting the UTSA, but it failed to do so. The Court further mentioned that the majority position in the other states is that memorized information can be the basis of a trade secret violation. The Court also recognized the numerous treatises on the issue which supported this view (quoting one for the proposition that “the form of the information and the manner in which it is obtained are unimportant; the nature of the relationship and the defendant’s conduct should be the determinative factors”).

The Court noted that the protection of trade secrets requires a balancing of employers’ rights in their trade secrets and the former employee’s right to use his talents. However, the Court declared, by adopting the UTSA, the Ohio legislature clearly determined that Ohio public policy favors the protection of the employer’s trade secrets. The Court thus affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Although issued in an antitrust case, In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 2008 WL 110896 (D. Kan. Jan. 8, 2008), an opinion by Magistrate Judge Waxse may be relevant to Rule 34 document requests in trade secrets and other litigation wherever filed. In brief, he held that use of the terms “relating to,” “pertaining to,” or “concerning” in such a request can render it objectionable. Do you use those terms in your discovery requests? Don’t we all?

Judge Waxse denied a motion to compel certain parties to produce “[e]ach document concerning your costs of producing, transporting and selling” specified goods. First Request No. 17 (emphasis added). Those parties had objected on the grounds that, in the judge's words, the request was “overly broad and unduly burdensome on its face because it uses the omnibus phrase ‘each document concerning’ in reference to an extremely broad group of documents.” He held “that a discovery request is overly broad and unduly burdensome on its face if it uses omnibus terms such as ‘relating to,’ ‘pertaining to,’ or ‘concerning’ to modify a general category or broad range of documents or information.” Id. (footnote omitted).

Judge Waxse continued: “[D]espite a valid objection that a request is facially overbroad or unduly burdensome, the responding party still has a duty to respond to the extent the request is not objectionable. Before the Court will require an objecting party to answer, however, the Court must receive some guidance – from either the parties or some other source – as to what portion of the request is reasonably answerable.” Id.(footnote omitted). He concluded that, in the lawsuit before him, “inadequate guidance exists to determine the proper scope of First Request No. 17. The Court therefore sustains [the] facial overbreadth and facial undue burden objections.”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

After granting summary judgment for plaintiff in late November 2007, Judge Susan Illston of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California recently awarded plaintiff $6.6 million in damages, the majority of which related to future lost profits due to breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. Although the motion for summary judgment was uncontested, the court's ruling and damages award highlights the importance non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements can play in trade secret disputes.

Plaintiff Oculus Innovative Sciences Inc. entered into non-disclosure and purchase agreements with Nofil Corp. related Oculus' MicrocynTM disinfectant, antiseptic and sterilization technology. Under the agreements, Nofil agreed to manufacture certain machines for the production of MicrocynTM and to not disclose confidential information obtained from Oculus.

After ruling that Nofil had breached the agreements, the court held that Nofil had misappropriated Oculus' trade secrets. The court first held that Oculus had established the existence of a trade secret through reference to language in the non-disclosure and purchase agreements ("while the Court does not find this evidence to be overwhelming, it will assume for present purposes that Oculus can establish the presence of some trade secrets that fall within the scope of the [non-disclosure agreement]").

The court then determined that Nofil had misappropriated such trade secrets through its manufacture and sale to a competitor in Mexico of two machines covered by the agreements between the parties . Specifically, the court found persuasive PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1368 (2000), which held that "[e]mploying … confidential information in manufacturing, production, research or development, marketing goods that embody the trade secret, or soliciting customers through the use of the trade secret information, all constitute use."

In a January 23, 2008 Order, the Court awarded Oculus $916,206 for lost profits for 2006 through part of 2008. The Court awarded future lost profits of $5,727,829 for a period of 5 ½ years discounted to present value.

The case is Oculus Innovative Sciences, Inc. v. Nofil Corporation, et al., Case No. 06-1686, N.D. Cal. 2006.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

House v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 2007-CA-000417-DG, 2008 WL 162212 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2008).

The Kentucky Court of Appeals recently allowed a criminal defendant access to the source code for the breathalyzer device used to develop probable cause for his arrest for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol with the aggravating factor of a level over 0.18. The lower court quashed the subpoena on motion by the Commonwealth of Kentucky and CMI, Inc. The criminal defendant, Lennie House, appealed, and the Circuit Court had affirmed.

At a hearing on the Commonwealth’s and CMI’s motion to quash the subpoena, House produced a computer software engineering expert who testified that if he had the source code for the device, he could examine the code for any bugs or flaws that might have produced an incorrect blood alcohol reading. However, the district court granted the motions to quash and the circuit court affirmed.

But the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the lower courts erred because the Commonwealth and CMI failed to make the required showing under the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure that the subpoena was unreasonable or oppressive. The court noted that the request is not unreasonable because its purpose is to challenge the validity of the readings produced by the Intoxilyzer 5000, which is anticipated will be used at trial by the Commonwealth to prove the drunk driving charge and the aggravating factor. In addition, the court found that the request for the source code is not oppressive because the code can be produced on a CD-ROM with minimal expense.

The Court of Appeals rejected the argument asserted by the Commonwealth and CMI that the computer code is a protected trade secret and that this should weigh against disclosure. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that House had indicated his willingness that he, his attorney, and his expert witness would enter into a protective order barring sharing of the code or its contents with any non-party. Moreover, the court observed that the protective order may also include language requiring that any copies or work product generated by House’s expert be returned to CMI upon completion of his review of the code. Finally, the court noted that the possibility of civil and/or criminal penalties for violating the protective order “should obviate any concern CMI may have with respect to protection of its source code.”

This is not the first court decision to reach the conclusion that a criminal defendant has a right to inspect the source code for a breathalyzer device. For example, in a similar case in 2007 the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered production of the source code for the Intoxilyzer device, relying in large part on the existence of a contract between the state and CMI specifying that the state owned the source code for the device and on the express language of the RFP in which CMI agreed to provide to attorneys representing individuals charged with crimes using evidence from the device any information necessary to comply with a court order. See Underdahl v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 712-13 (Minn. 2007). Arguing that the source code is confidential, copyrighted and proprietary, the state had asked for a “writ of prohibition” barring the source code from being released. But the court rejected that request on the basis that “[a] writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and is only used in extraordinary cases,” and the facts here did not merit such a remedy. See id. at 710.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Trade secrets discovery in a suit for misappropriation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, etc., can give rise to a number of dilemmas. A recent Northern District of Georgia ruling, DeRubeis v. Witten Technologies, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, involves one of those dilemmas. The company asked for identification of the trade secrets the defendants were using in their competing business. The defendants objected, claiming that the company might use the response to “mold its cause of action around the discovery it receives.” On the one hand, the court emphasized, the defendants are entitled to know the nature of the company’s claim and to limit the company’s discovery accordingly. On the other, the company does not necessarily know exactly what trade secret information the defendants allegedly stole and are using.

In DeRubeis, the court required the company to “identify with ‘reasonable particularity’ those trade secrets it believes to be at issue.” The phrase “reasonable particularity” was defined as a sufficient description so that the defendants are “put on notice of the nature of” the claims and “can discern the relevancy of any requested discovery” propounded by the company. “Once [the company] has fulfilled its obligation, it will be entitled to discovery on [the defendants’] trade secrets, provided that what it seeks is relevant.”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage v. D’Ambrosia, No. 08-CV-00166, Complaint (D. Md. Jan. 18, 2008)

On January 18, 2008, Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage filed a federal lawsuit in Maryland against three former key employees and newly-formed competitor Car-Tay, Inc., an affiliate of GMAC Real Estate. The complaint alleges that the former employees, two of whom had been high-level executives, conspired to form the competing brokerage in violation of their employment agreements, the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and state law.

Coldwell Banker claims that the former employees began actively, but covertly, planning, staffing, and building the competing venture more than one year before their departure. Key evidence cited in the complaint includes an extensive trail of emails purportedly sent and received by the defendants while still employed by Coldwell Banker. In the emails, the defendants openly discuss solicitation of Coldwell Banker salespersons, tips for persuading Coldwell Banker clients to move their listings to GMAC, how to access Coldwell Banker’s highly-guarded commercial document database, and how to copy data from Coldwell Banker computers. This “scheme,” the complaint says, was a targeted effort “to eviscerate [Coldwell Banker’s] ability to compete with GMAC.”

Indeed, Coldwell Banker points out that the very day following defendant Ann D’Ambrosia’s resignation, the defendants’ GMAC office opened its doors for business. Within one month, two dozen Coldwell Banker salespersons joined the defendants at GMAC. In six weeks time, Coldwell Banker had received requests from approximately ten clients to cancel and void their listing agreements; all of these clients re-listed with GMAC after securing the releases. Each of these results, Coldwell Banker contends, arose directly from the defendants’ pre-resignation solicitation efforts.

In its fourteen-count complaint, Coldwell Banker claims the defendants violated the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by improperly accessing protected computers and removing confidential and proprietary Coldwell Banker information, including client files, listing agreements, contracts, and property records; breached their employment contracts and duty of loyalty owed to Coldwell Banker; tortiously interfered with contractual and prospective economic relations; and misappropriated trade secrets in violation of the Maryland Trade Secrets Act. Coldwell Banker seeks monetary damages in the amount of $2 million – $1 million as compensatory damages and $1 million as punitive damages – as well as injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from soliciting Coldwell Banker’s clients and employees for one year, and from using Coldwell Banker’s confidential and trade secret information.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Housing, Inc., No. 06-3012, 2008 WL 90081 (7th Cir. Jan. 10, 2008), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated an injunction entered by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, ruling that it was insufficiently specific and therefore was not in compliance with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The facts of the matter as set forth in Patriot Homes are as follows: Forest River hired four employees of Patriot Homes after merger talks between the two companies fell through. Forest River formed a new company named Sterling with the new employees. Patriot Homes, Forest River, and Sterling are all in the modular homes industry. The four employees copied information from Patriot Homes’s computer system before resigning and utilized that information for Sterling. Sterling did not deny that its employees had done so, but it argued that the information taken from Patriot Homes was not a trade secret because it was filed by Patriot Homes with various state governments and could be procured through Freedom of Information Act requests. Discovery revealed that most, but not all, of the information taken from Patriot Homes and used by the four employees could indeed be procured from state governments.

The District Court entered a preliminary injunction forbidding Sterling from “[u]sing, copying, disclosing, converting, appropriating, retaining, selling, transferring, or otherwise exploiting Patriot's copyrights, confidential information, trade secrets, or computer files.” The preliminary injunction also required Sterling to: “[c]ertify that copied data and materials of Patriot's property, confidential information and trade secrets on computer files and removable media (CDs, DVDs, tapes, etc.) have been deleted or rendered unusable.”

The Court of Appeals found that the injunction was not specific enough to put Sterling on notice as to what acts on its part would constitute contempt of court: “The preliminary injunction entered by the district court uses a collection of verbs to prohibit Sterling from engaging in certain conduct, but ultimately it fails to detail what the conduct is, i.e., the substance of the “trade secret” or “confidential information” to which the verbs refer.” The Court of Appeals based its decision on Sterling’s uncertainty as to what information was truly a trade secret or confidential information and what was not entitled to such protection by virtue of being publicly available. The case stands as a reminder that injunctions compelling parties to simply “follow the law” without more instruction do not comply with Rule 65(d).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Innovative Technologies Corp. v. Kenton Trace Technologies LLC et al., case number 03-cv-3674

Innovative Technologies Corp. (ITC) has won nearly $23 million in a trade secret suit against three former employees who competed against ITC while still employed by the Ohio-based defense contractor. The state jury awarded $17 million in punitive damages, in addition to $5.7 million in compensatory damages. The employees also were ordered to return the salary earned in their final year working for ITC, close to $300,000.

According to the lawsuit, filed in May 2003, now-former ITC employees David P. Nicholas, James R. Silcott and Sheila K. Silcott set up Kenton Trace Technologies (KTT) in April 2000 to bid for defense contracts, despite the fact that they were still employed at ITC, had signed confidentially agreements, and were bound by contractual agreements not to compete with ITC.

The suit also alleged that the three enlisted the help of Virginia-based competitor Advanced Management Technology Inc. to lure away ITC customers using trade secrets. Testimony in the trial established that the three former employees won a share of a major services contract in 2001 while still working for ITC. At the time, ITC was under contract with the federal government to provide support services for the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base; the contract had been ITC’s since 1995. ITC did not learn of KTT’s existence until a competitor, Modern Technologies Corp., alerted ITC in May 2001 that KTT was trying to win the contract.

The Montgomery County Common Pleas Court issued a temporary restraining order in 2002 to keep KTT from competing with ITC, and a month later issued a preliminary injunction against the employees. Nevertheless, KTT conspired with Advanced Management to get around the injunction and acquired the Wright-Patterson contract.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A California appellate court held in a recent decision that a broad “no-hire” provision contained in a consulting agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law because it was an impermissible restraint on trade in violation of the California Business and Professions Code Section 16600.

Despite the frequent use of “no-hire” and “non-solicitation” provisions in consultant and employment agreements, the validity of these provisions in California, especially broad “no-hire” provisions, is far from certain in light of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Appellate District’s recent decision in VL Systems Inc. v. Unisen Inc., 152 Cal.App. 4th 708 (2007).

The full text of the Court’s decision can be found at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/archive/G037334.PDF

Though the holding in VL Systems appears to be limited to broad “no-hire” provisions, the Court’s policy analysis in the decision suggests, though it is far from certain, that even more narrow “non-solicitation” provisions would be subject to scrutiny by California courts and enforceable only to the extent that they are necessary for legitimate business reasons and are not overly broad in time and scope.

The contract in question included a “no-hire” provision. Specifically, the contract provided that defendant would not hire any of plaintiff’s employees for 12 months after the computer consulting contract’s termination, subject to a liquidated damages provision.

In analyzing the validity of the “no-hire” provision, the Court found that this type of contractual provision may seriously impact the rights of a broad range of third parties, including those who were not even employed by plaintiff at the time of its contract with defendant.

To this end, the court noted that the employee in question was not employed by plaintiff at the time the contract was performed, and that the employee had independently sought employment with defendant.

The court recognized that certain narrower restrictions have been held valid in the past by California courts and expressly stated that it took no position on whether a more narrowly drawn and limited “no-hire” provision would be permissible under California law.

However, it found that the “no-hire” clause at issue was too broad in that it covered not only solicitation by defendant, but all hiring, and it applied to all of plaintiff’s employees, regardless of whether they worked for defendant or were even employed at the time.

The court’s emphasis on the employees’ freedom of mobility protected by Section 16600 of the Business and Professions Code suggests that any contractual restriction on such mobility will be highly scrutinized by California courts.

In light of VL Systems, businesses should reconsider the inclusion of broad “no-hire” provisions in both business service agreements and employment agreements.

Prior to requiring your California employees to sign agreements containing such restrictive covenants, a consultation with a Seyfarth Shaw LLP attorney is recommended.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Polar Molecular Corp. v. Amway Corp., et al., No. 1:07-CV-460, 2007 WL 3473112 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2007).

A Michigan federal court recently declined to dismiss a petroleum additives company’s claim under the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“MUTSA”) against several manufacturers and distributors of its fuel additive product, but held that the company’s common law claims of misappropriation and conversion were displaced by the statute.

Polar Molecular Corporation (“Polar”) sued twelve defendants, alleging violations of the Lanham Act, breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets under the MUTSA, and common law claims for misappropriation, conversion, and conspiracy. Polar had entered into a series of licensing agreements with certain defendants (the “Amway Defendants”) to make, use, and sell its fuel additive, called “DurAlt” and marketed as “Freedom Fuel.” Pursuant to the agreements, Polar provided the Amway Defendants with confidential formulas for DurAlt. After the parties had a falling-out over failed negotiations concerning royalties and fleet sales, Polar alleges that the Amway defendants provided its confidential formulas to another group of defendants (the “DNS Defendants”), who used the formulas to manufacture and sell a “knock off” of DurAlt called “ProFuel” and marketed as “Freedom 2.” Polar further alleges that the defendants misrepresented to potential customers that they had a licensing agreement with Polar for the manufacture and sale of “Freedom 2.”

The defendants argued that Polar’s claim under the MUTSA should be dismissed because Polar published the DurAlt formula in a patent, and thus it was no longer secret. Polar countered that, during the course of its licensing arrangement with the defendants, it had provided Amway with additional, improved DurAlt formulas that were not disclosed in the patent, including the specific formula at issue in this litigation. The court observed that “[a]lthough information disclosed in a patent cannot be a trade secret,…the existence of a patent covering the general subject matter does not necessarily mean that the patent disclosed the specific formula (the trade secret) used to produce a specific commercial product.” The court then concluded that the allegations in the complaint—that the defendants had obtained confidential information not known to others and that this information gave them a competitive advantage—were sufficient to state a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets under the MUTSA.

However the court also had before it the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the MUTSA claim. The court found that Polar’s evidence was insufficient to controvert the seven affidavits produced by the Amway Defendants asserting that there had been no unauthorized disclosure of Polar’s confidential information and that ProFuel had been independently developed based on a reverse-engineering analysis of the Freedom Fuel product and the information in Polar’s expired patent. But the court concluded that Polar had shown a need for some discovery to resolve the issue, and thus declined to rule on the summary judgment motion until after a sixty-day period of limited discovery.

The court also dismissed the common law misappropriation and conversion claims, concluding that they were preempted by the MUTSA because Polar had not sufficiently alleged that these claims were based on wrongful conduct independent of the misappropriation that served as the basis for the MUTSA claim. But the court declined to dismiss the conspiracy claim as preempted, to the extent that, rather than being based upon the alleged theft of a trade secret, it was based on “palming-off or unfair competition” arising out of the defendants’ alleged representations that Pro-Fuel was a “knock off” of DurAlt and their alleged false statement that they manufactured it pursuant to a licensing agreement with Polar. The court also declined to dismiss the trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and granted summary judgment to the Amway defendants on the breach of contract claim to the extent that it was based upon a certain provision of the licensing agreement.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The District Court for the Southern District of New York recently demonstrated the importance of including nonsolicitation language in employment agreements, in addition to noncompetition language, where employers seek to protect their customer base from departing employees. In Silipos, the court, despite finding that the noncompetition covenant in the subject agreement was not enforceable, nevertheless found that the nonsolicitation covenant was enforceable and that the defendant would be bound by the restriction - effectively preventing defendant from competing with plaintiff for its customers.

In the action, the court found that the defendant, a former executive vice president of plaintiff, had entered into a valid employment agreement containing: (1) a post-employment, worldwide, one-year noncompetition covenant prohibiting defendant from having employment with anyone direct or indirect competitor in plaintiff's industry; and (2) a post-employment, worldwide, one-year nonsolicitation covenant prohibiting defendant from soliciting any of plaintiff's current or prospective customers, distributors, suppliers and/or vendors.

The court, applying New York law, repeated the well-established precept that noncompetition and nonsolicitation covenants are enforceable only to the extent necessary to protect Silipos's "legitimate interests." In the action, plaintiff asserted that both covenants were necessary to protect three legitimate interests: (1) protection of its trade secrets; (2) protection of its confidential customer information; and (3) protection of its client base. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant, due to his position within the company and his responsibilities, had access to various types of information during his employment, including business strategy information and pricing information, which constituted trade secrets and/or confidential customer information.

The court, however, found that plaintiff only had one demonstrable "legitimate interest," to wit, protecting its client base. In particular, the court concluded that none of the business information to which defendant had access rose to the level of trade secrets or confidential customer information, and as such, plaintiff lacked a "legitimate interest" to warrant enforcement of the noncompetition covenant.

In contrast to the noncompetition covenant, however, the court found that the worldwide nonsolicitation covenant was enforceable because the protection of a client base was a "legitimate interest" of plaintiff. Consistent with this "legitimate interest," the court enforced the nonsolicitation covenant with respect to: (1) customers that defendant brought to Silipos; (2) customers for whom defendant was the primary contact; and (3) customers with whom defendant had a substantial degree of long-term involvement. The court moreover found that the restriction was not unreasonably broad, holding that "in light of [Silipos's industry's] intimate yet geographically diffuse nature, Silipos's legitimate interests in protecting its customer base extend worldwide."

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A recent ruling from the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware serves as a reminder that, in addition to civil liability, an ex-employee stealing his or her former employer’s trade secrets can face jail time and a fine. On November 6, 2007, former DuPont employee Gary Min was sentenced to 18 months in prison and two years of supervised probation, fined $30,000, and ordered to pay $14,500 in restitution to his former employer. According to a statement released by the company, Min had been a senior scientist. Shortly before he resigned to take a position with another company, he “misappropriated a significant volume of confidential and proprietary DuPont technical documents.” DuPont filed a civil suit against him in federal court, and that “suit was resolved to our complete satisfaction” according to the company's statement. Then, he was indicted for theft, entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced. United States v. Min, No. 1:06-cr-00121-SLR (D.Del.).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

RRK Holding Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04-CV-3944, Verdict (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2007)

A family-owned Wisconsin company that makes power tools recently won a $21.5 million verdict against Sears, Roebuck and Co. after the jury found the national retailer guilty of stealing the design for the popular Craftsman all-in-one cutting tool. Plaintiff RRK Holding Co., formerly known as Roto Zip, convinced the federal jury in Chicago that Sears had willfully and wantonly misappropriated its trade secrets under the Illinois Trade Secret Act and breached the parties’ nondisclosure agreement.

In the late 1990s, Roto Zip was one of Sears’ major suppliers of the rotary saw. The suit alleged that in 1999, pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement, Roto Zip disclosed to Sears drafts for a next generation, hand-held combination power saw, but after negotiations broke down over price, Sears declined to make a deal. Instead, Sears took the design to a Chinese manufacturer for lower-cost production. Unaware of Sears’ breach of the nondisclosure agreement, Roto Zip continued to develop the tool to bring it to market. While Roto Zip’s finished product sold for $119, Sears’ Craftsman combination tool undercut at just $59. Sales of Roto Zip’s rotary saw declined dramatically after the Sears version launched.

The $21.5 million verdict includes $13.5 million for lost profits and an additional $8 million in punitive damages. Sears plans to appeal. http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/658969,CST-NWS-tool20.article; http://ip.law360.com/secure/ViewArticle.aspx?Id=41303

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

New lawsuit filed in Utah accuses a former research scientist employed by a nutritional supplement company of stealing trade secrets, customers, and employees when forming a rival vegan supplement company.

Systemic Formulas, Inc. claims that its former research director, Daeyoon Kim, is using Systemic’s trade secrets and proprietary information as the basis for its formula in the rival vegan supplement company. In its complaint against Kim, Systemic alleges that Kim executed Confidentiality and Non-Disclosures Agreement intended to protect Systemic’s proprietary information. Systemic alleges that Kim was specifically hired to develop a line of nutritional supplements without the RNA/DNA factor that is considered to be an animal product and therefore less appealing to certain portions of the supplement-consuming public that want a more natural supplement. Kim asserts that his primary duty was an employee manager and claims that Systemic did not have a research facility. However, Systemic’s website states, “Systemic Formulas uses a technologically advanced research and production facility to manufacture the bottling and capsulation process of its product’s raw materials.”

After Kim resigned from Systemic, he requested a modification to the Confidentiality Agreement to allow Kim to manufacture a line of vegan dietary supplements. Systemic alleges that Kim admitted that the proposed line of vegan dietary supplements would represent a line of products in conflict with his obligations under the Confidentiality Agreement and therefore requested a modification. Kim asserts he reached an agreement with Systemic in June regarding his request to develop the vegan supplements and that the lawsuit surprised him.

This case should be full of classic trade secret issues including an analysis of the scope of the confidentiality agreement and Kim’s exposure to proprietary information as a research director or an employee manager. Another area of inquiry will no doubt be whether the confidentiality agreement was altered by an oral or written agreement. Ultimately, the degree of similarity between Systemic’s supplements and Kim’s vegan supplements will be a major factor in this dispute. Another interesting issue may be whether Kim had a certain amount of knowledge before he was an employee of Systemic or whether he developed his vegan formula idea independently from the scope of his duties at Systemic.

This case can be monitored under Case No. 07-CV-159 in the District Court of Utah, Central Division.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The taking and using of customer lists is no longer just a matter for civil proceedings and injunctive relief. On Monday, November 26, 2007, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed a jury’s criminal conviction of an individual who took and used her former employer’s master client list to solicit customers, who used company computers to plan her new business venture, and otherwise misappropriated client files.

Defendant Shan DuCom was tried and convicted after it was discovered that she had attempted to wipe out her former employer (C&D)’s property management business completely by converting the property management function to her own, newly created entity. Indeed, DuCom conspired with other employees to start a new firm, used C&D’s computers to create new “letterhead and logos, press releases, solicitation postcards, and various ‘to-do’ lists,” as well as to engage in “massive” copying of information maintained on C&D’s computer hard drives to discs. Her actions were apparently so wanton that the day after she left, the former employers’ team came to work and found the office had “been left barren, ‘cleaned out.’ The computer server was turned off, the hard copies of client files were missing, the fax and credit card phone lines had been sabotaged, and office supplies and equipment were missing.” Once the computer service was restored, C&D found that entire databases were missing and that the C&D website had been transferred to DuCom’s new firm. Three of DuCom’s co-workers resigned and joined her new firm as well. Georgia’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act specifically protects client and customer lists as trade secrets, provided they

(A) Derives economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and

(B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

O.C.G.A. § 16-8-13(a)-(b). The appellate court remarked, in particular, that as a new business, DuCom’s new firm “would have opened its doors with little or no property to manage, and with no property to manage, it would have very little income,” reflecting that her head-start approach runs afoul of the law. Noting the damage that she caused by her acts in stealing the client list, the court affirmed the lower court’s award of restitution based on valuation of C&D’s “book of business.”

DuCom also was convicted of “computer theft” under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93(a) for using C&D’s computers without authorization. The appeals court reflected that she had downloaded data she was not permitted to use and that the jury could have found “beyond a reasonable doubt that DuCom used a computer, owned by her employer, with knowledge that such use was without authority and with the intention of removing programs or data from that computer and appropriating them for her own use.” Under Georgia law, unauthorized use includes “the use of a computer or computer network in a manner that exceeds any right or permission granted by the owner of the computer or computer network” O.C.G.A. 16-9-92(18). With a broad definition and unassailable facts, the appellate court did not waste much time in discussing its reasoning to affirm.

Although it is not unusual to hear tales of such wanton conduct in preparing to compete in a new business, it is not very often that we hear of criminal prosecutions of such matters at the state level in Georgia. We’ll be keeping our eyes and ears open for any further such cases.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A recent California Court of Appeal decision reaffirmed what those who practice trade secret law already knew, but do not always focus upon, in trade secret litigation --the purported trade secret cannot qualify for protection under California’s trade secret statute unless there is a showing that the information has a demonstrated economic value from not being known to third parties who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.

The Court’s decision appears to add an additional wrinkle to this proposition by suggesting that to show independent economic value, one must also demonstrate that there is a discrete advantage to third parties who could utilize the information to the disadvantage of the original owner, thereby creating economic value in its secrecy. Secrecy and usefulness alone will not establish independent economic value.

In Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. Tea Systems Corp., 154 Cal. App. 4th 547 (2007), the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District upheld the trial court’s decision granting a former employee’s motion for nonsuit and dismissing a software design company’s trade secret misappropriation claim on the basis that it had failed to demonstrate that segments of its computer source code had independent economic value.

The text of the Court’s entire opinion can be located at this link http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist=6&doc_id=286480&doc_no=H029604

California defines a trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as information that “derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from it disclosure or use, and is subject to efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d)(1), (2) (2007).

On appeal, the software design company argued that testimony that segments of its source code that were taken would provide “some help” to a programmer to create new routines or to save time programming and that this helpfulness was alone sufficient for a finding of independent economic value in the segments. The appellate court rejected this argument and stated that testimony merely suggesting that the information was useful in carrying out a certain activity does not compel a finding that the information was sufficiently valuable to afford an economic advantage over others.

Appellant also argued that the segments achieved independent economic value because it kept the segments in confidence and entered into non-disclosure agreements with its employees. The Court was unpersuaded and stated that secrecy only exhibits an opinion that secrecy may be advantageous.

The Court also found that appellant failed to establish independent economic value because there was testimony that the segments were not of high quality and were not designed for use by others. The Court noted that the testimony suggested that the segments had no value to anyone outside of the parties themselves. According to the Court, appellant failed to establish that the segments “in and of themselves would provide a competitive advantage to a competitor.” The Court found that there was no evidence that appellant derived independent economic value in keeping the segments from others’ use.

In sum, Yield Dynamics suggests that information lacking value to anyone except its holder that cannot be exploited to gain a competitive advantage by others cannot qualify for trade secret protection despite its secrecy.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Adcor Industries, Inc. v. Bevcorp, LLC, 2007 WL 3104796, No. 06-4260 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 2007).

Last month, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed an Ohio federal d istrict court’s grant of summary judgment in a trade secrets misappropriation case. Adcor Industries, Inc. sued Bevcorp, LLC, among other defendants, in the Northern District of Ohio for allegedly misappropriating Adcor’s trade secrets and violating a consent decree entered in 1988.

The consent decree was issued against Baron Haag and Chester Romp, individual defendants in the Adcor case, arising out of a scheme in which Haag and Romp, who owned Brau Manufacturing, Bevcorp’s predecessor corporation, illegally obtained drawings to manufacture replacement parts for beverage fillers created by Crown, the predecessor to Adcor. The main thrust of the decree was that it prohibited Haag and Romp from manufacturing Crown parts. Furthermore, the decree applied to their successors, among others.

In 2003, Adcor sued Bevcorp and the other defendants, claiming that Bevcorp, as successors to Brau, had violated the consent decree and misappropriated Adcor’s trade secrets by using the drawings obtained by Haag and Romp. The district court granted summary judgment on the breach of consent decree claim, finding that Adcor had failed to prove to a reasonable certainty that the owners of Bevcorp had acquired the drawings directly from Haag and Romp. The court also granted summary judgment in the trade secrets misappropriation claim, ruling that the claim was time-barred.

In affirming the district court’s decision, the Sixth Circuit pointed to Ohio’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which provided that a trade secret misappropriation claim must be brought within four years of the discovery of the misappropriation, or when the plaintiff should have reasonably discovered it. The statute further provided that a continuing misappropriate constituted a single claim. The court found that there was undisputed evidence that Adcor had inquiry notice of the misappropriation more than four years before the suit was commenced. Furthermore, the court noted that there was evidence in the record that Adcor’s delay in commencing the lawsuit was a “strategy deadlock.”

Finally, the court ruled that Adcor had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants had violated the consent decree, agreeing with the district court that there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that the owners of Bevcorp had obtained the drawings from Romp and Haag.

Judge Karen Nelson Moore concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that Adcor had presented evidence that there were genuine issues of material fact as to when Adcor should have known that the defendants misappropriated the drawings.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Bob Fernandez of the Philadelphia Inquirer reports that scientist Dr. Manhua Mandy Lin has taken a significant step in clearing her name of trade secret allegations, well, at least in the opinion of one government employee. Lin, who has been engaged in a protracted legal battle with her former employer, materials innovator Rohm & Haas Co., recently received word from a Department of Energy chemist, Charles Russomanno, of his determination that she did not steal trade secrets to develop her innovative procedure for the production of methacrylic acid. Despite this apparent victory, it does little to advance Lin’s interests in her pending litigation.

In November 1999, Lin resigned from her position with Rohm & Haas pursuant to a settlement agreement reached as a result of allegations that she was the victim of unlawful discrimination while at the company. Following her departure from Rohm & Haas, among other legal disputes that have ensued, the company alleged that Lin misappropriated its trade secrets in engaging in her independent research for her company EverNu Technology L.L.C. Montgomery County Court Judge Bernard A. Moore has refused to order an independent scientific assessment in the case and has imposed daily fines of $200 on Lin for her failure to release her research to Rohm & Haas. In total, she has already been penalized more than $200,000.

Worried that her business was in jeopardy due to Rohm & Haas’s suggestion that the Department of Energy was in the process of investigating Lin, she sent confidential court submissions to the Department of Energy in the hopes of avoiding agency action. Although Russomanno’s review of the documents resulted in a finding that Lin did not misappropriate any trade secrets, it remains to be seen whether this conclusion will educe any measurable benefit to Lin in the courtroom. Presumably, Russomanno’s determination will either help spur settlement negotiations or, ultimately, just represent another hollow victory in the course of this seemingly never ending litigation.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Woburn Daily Times Chronicle has reported that iRobot Corp., a Burlington, MA corporation, has been granted a preliminary injunction in the District of Massachusetts in its case against Robotic FX, Inc., and its founder and president, former iRobot employee Jameel Ahed. iRobot is suing Ahed and Robotic for misappropriation of trade secrets.

iRobot’s lawsuit alleges that Robotic used iRobot’s trade secrets to develop the Negotiator, a replica of iRobot’s PackBot robot. iRobot describes the PackBot robots as “robots that perform dull, dirty or dangerous missions in a better way.” The PackBots were the first ground robots to be used in combat by U.S. forces.

The U.S. Army had a $280 million contract with Robotic for use of the Negotiator, but set aside the contract in October pending a re-examination of Robotic’s ability to deliver the Negotiator “as a responsible contractor.” The Army has notified both Robotic and iRobot that if Robotic is unable to provide the Negotiator, the contract will be awarded to iRobot instead.

In issuing the preliminary injunction, U.S. District Judge Nancy Gertner found that iRobot had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its case. The exact terms of the order are under seal so as to further protect iRobot’s trade secrets; however, iRobot reports that the injunction prohibits Robotic from using “critical features” in the design of the Negotiator.

iRobot has a separate lawsuit pending in the Northern District of Alabama for patent infringement. iRobot sought the injunction in Massachusetts after discovering that Robotic had attempted to destroy evidence in both the Alabama case and the Massachusetts case. Judge Gertner ordered a trial date of no later than April 7, 2008.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

It appears that the Georgia Court of Appeals narrowly interpreted the phrase “on behalf of” in a non-solicitation clause to prevent application of a non-solicitation provision to support a breach of contract claim. Although the parties did not dispute that the Clause applied to clients who transacted business with the plaintiff, Atlantic Insurance Brokers LLC (“AIB”), and dealt with the agent (“Phillips”) during the course of the relationship, the Court nonetheless concluded that there was no breach of the Agreement.

The Clause provided, in pertinent part, that

Phillips covenants that during the term of this Agreement, and for a period of two (2) years following termination of this Agreement for any reason, he shall not at any time, directly or indirectly, solicit, sell, attempt to divert or provide competing insurance services or coverages to any insureds who transacted business with AIB and with whom Phillips dealt with on behalf of AIB and had material contact . . . .

Atlantic Ins. Brokers LLC v. Slade Hancock Agency Inc., Case No. A07A1177, 07 FCDR 3002 ( 10/12/07).

In some unusual facts, the client at issue, 24/7 contacted Phillips for assistance in procuring insurance after Phillips left AIB but before the Agreement terminated. He referred the business to AIB to assist him in procuring insurance. AIB assisted in procuring the insurance for 24/7 (splitting the commission with Phillips’s new employer), but the insurer declined to renew the policy the following year. 24/7 again asked Phillips for help, and he brokered insurance for them through his new company, without assistance from AIB. AIB sued, alleging that 24/7 was an insured covered by the Clause, and thus Phillips breached the agreement. The Court rejected AIB’s claim because AIB did not ask Phillips to work with 24/7. In other words, it appears that the Court may have equated the phrase “on behalf of” to be equivalent to “at the request of.” Although the factual scenario is highly unique, one should consider whether through its interpretation of the agreement the Court created unusual defenses in upcoming breach of contract cases about the meaning of “on behalf of.”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

InstitutionalInvestor.com reported that the National Futures Association (“NFA”) has issued the new rules, “to prevent members from using illegitimate means to gain a competitive advantage if doing so would harm customers.”  InstitutionalInvestor.com noted, click here to view article, that new Compliance Rule 2-4 is directed at activity such as:

• Misusing customer information, for example by misappropriating social security numbers or deliberately violating the firm's privacy statement.
• Disclosing customer orders before execution.
• Obtaining or trying to obtain information disclosing a commodity trading adviser's historical trading positions without the CTA's permission.

 According to the article, Rule 2-4 became effective last month; however, the Securities and Exchange Commission has yet to rule on it.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

WebWire reports: http://www.webwire.com/ViewPressRel.asp?aId=50093

Economic Espionage and Theft of Trade Secrets – On Sept. 26, 2007, Lan Lee and Yuefei Ge were charged in a superseding indictment the Northern District of California on charges of economic espionage and theft of trade secrets. The indictment alleges that the pair conspired to steal trade secrets from two companies and created a new firm to create and sell products derived from the stolen trade secrets. The charges also allege that Lee and Ge attempted to obtain funds for their new company from the government of China, in particular China’s General Armaments Division and China’s 863 Program, otherwise known as the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China. The case was investigated by the FBI.

Strategy Page also discussed the case recently: http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htintel/articles/20071002.aspx.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link