Bimbo Bakeries v. Botticella: Man vs. Muffin, Muffin Wins Injunction

             On July 27, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s order enjoining a senior executive from Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., from working for one of Bimbo’s competitors, Hostess, until after the district court resolved the merits of Bimbo’s misappropriation of trade secrets claim against the executive. Among other trade secrets at issue in the lawsuit is the recipe for Thomas’ English Muffins, which were estimated to account for approximately $500 million in Bimbo’s annual sales income. Defendant Chris Botticella is alleged to be one of only seven people who possess all of the knowledge necessary to replicate independently the muffins.

            The Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s finding that Bimbo was likely to prevail on the merits of its misappropriation of trade secrets claim under Pennsylvania’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“PUTSA”). Specifically, the Circuit Court left undisturbed the district court’s determination that Bimbo likely would be able to prove at trial that Botticella would misappropriate Bimbo’s trade secrets if allowed to work at Hostess.

            The Circuit Court focused on PUTSA section 5303 and related case law, which allows courts to enjoin actual or threatened misappropriation of trade secrets. The district court’s finding that there was “[a] substantial likelihood, if not an inevitability, that [Botticella] will disclose or use Bimbo’s trade secrets in the course of his employment with Hostess,” was proper, held the Circuit Court. In so holding, the Circuit Court rejected Botticella’s argument that the district court could only issue an injunction where it is shown that it would be “virtually impossible” for Botticella to perform his new job at Hostess without disclosing trade secrets.

            In reaching this holding, however, the Circuit Court took exception with the district court’s analysis of Pennsylvania’s law concerning the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine. Specifically, the Circuit Court noted that “[w]hile we agree…that Pennsylvania law empowers a court to enjoin the threatened disclosure of trade secrets without requiring a plaintiff to show that disclosure is inevitable, we do not consider that an injunction granted absent such a showing was issued pursuant to the ‘inevitable disclosure doctrine’.” Rather, said the Court, an injunction enjoining one from assuming particular employment may issue where the facts of the case demonstrate a substantial threat of trade secret misappropriation.

            Citing the district court’s findings of fact, the Circuit Court held that the district court had, and properly exercised, discretion to enjoin Botticella from working at Hostess to the extent his proposed employment there threatened to lead to the misappropriation of Bimbo’s trade secrets. The Circuit Court noted that, among other things, the district court found that (1) Botticella had accessed via his laptop computer in his final days at Bimbo highly sensitive information belonging to Bimbo which information would have been damaging to Bimbo if obtained by a competitor; (2) Botticella’s explanation at deposition regarding his suspicious use of the laptop was “confusing at best” and “not credible”; and (3) Botticella’s conduct following his acceptance of the Hostess job offer demonstrated his intention to use Bimbo’s trade secrets during his employment with Hostess. As to this latter point, the district court found that Botticella (a) did not disclose to Bimbo his acceptance of a job offer from a direct competitor and remained in his position to receive Bimbo’s confidential information, (b) received Bimbo’s confidential information after his acceptance of the Hostess job offer, and (c) copied trade secret information from his work laptop onto external storage devices.

The Third Circuit’s decision provides guidance to employers as to the showing required to enjoin former employees from assuming new employment where the facts show that there is a substantial threat of trade secret misappropriation.

Inevitable Disclosure of Nooks and Crannies

When explaining to lay people what we do, trade secret practitioners often use the classic examples of the formula for Coca-Cola or KFC’s secret recipe of eleven herbs and spices. Now, we can add as an illustration the nooks and crannies of Thomas’ English Muffins, as demonstrated by a case filed by Bimbo Bakeries (“BBakeries”) in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. BBakeries, which sells a variety of different breads and baked goods, brought an action against Chris Botticella, a high-level BBakeries executive, on January 15, 2010. In the action, BBakeries is seeking, among other things, a preliminary injunction forbidding Botticella from commencing employment as an executive with Hostess Brands, a BBakeries competitor. The Honorable R. Barclay Surrick of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held a hearing on BBakeries’ motion on January 25, 2010. At present, he has not ruled on the motion.

Not unlike other major companies that have pursued an executive going to competitors, BBakeries is proceeding against Botticella on an inevitable disclosure theory. BBakeries’ claim is that Botticella’s knowledge of its trade secrets and confidential information is so thorough that he would inevitably use that information in his work for Hostess, thus violating a non-disclosure agreement with BBakeries and the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act. In its motion and accompanying declarations, BBakeries alleges that Botticella is one of “less than ten people in the world with full knowledge of how to produce Thomas’ English Muffins, famous for their distinctive ‘nooks and crannies’ characteristics.” BBakeries also claims that Botticella knows the cost structure and strategies for most of its products, such as its “super premium breads.” All of this information would, according to BBakeries, give Hostess an improper competitive advantage. Finally, BBakeries asserts that Botticella concealed his intentions to move to Hostess, and then instructed his secretary to delete information from his hard drive.

As evidenced by the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by Botticella on January 29, 2010, Botticella is making several counter-arguments, which include the following: (1) there is no evidence as to Botticella’s responsibilities for Hostess, including whether he will be working on its English muffins, so BBakeries cannot show that he would inevitably disclose confidential information; (2) Botticella did not look at confidential materials sent to him by BBakeries after signing an “Acknowledgment and Representation Form” with Hostess on December 7, 2009; (3) the materials that Botticella deleted from his hard drive were of a personal nature, although he did accidentally delete work files; and (4) Botticella used an external storage device to practice his computer skills. 

Botticella also argues that the inevitable disclosure doctrine should not apply because BBakeries set forth his post-employment obligations in its agreement with him. That agreement included a non-disclosure covenant, but not a non-compete provision. Thus, Botticella posits, the agreement provides a contractual framework governing his post-BBakeries employment and that framework should trump the inevitable disclosure doctrine.

A Classic Fight Over Venue

Because the laws of various states regarding non-compete clauses differ significantly, cases involving these provisions often entail fights at the outset as to the proper venue. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently faced just such an issue in CertainTeed Corp. v. Nichiha USA, Inc., Civil Case No. 09-CV-3932-LS, 2009 WL 3540796 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2009). In that matter, CertainTeed contested with Bruno Demey, its former Director of Manufacturing and Technology, and Nichiha, Demey’s new employer, over whether litigation between the parties should go forward in Pennsylvania or Georgia.

CertainTeed’s headquarters are located in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, and it has manufacturing plants in Indiana, North Carolina, and Oregon. Its confidential information, trade secrets, and computer servers are located in Valley Forge. CertainTeed hired Demey in March 2003. Demey executed a non-compete agreement with CertainTeed in September 2004. During his employment with CertainTeed, Demey resided in South Carolina and made numerous trips to Valley Forge for meetings.

The timeline of events relevant to the litigation are as follows: 

1.         Demey resigned from CertainTeed on August 20, 2009.

2.         Demey filed a complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia on August 24, 2009. Demey stated that he intended to move to Georgia to work for Nichiha and therefore sought injunctive relief against CertainTeed setting forth: (a) that the non-compete and non-disclosure terms of the non-compete agreement are unenforceable under Georgia law; and (b) that CertainTeed could not take action to enforce the covenants against Demey or otherwise preclude Demey from working for Nichiha.

3.         On August 26, 2009, CertainTeed removed the state court action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. 

4.         CertainTeed filed an action against Demey and Nichiha in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on August 28, 2009. CertainTeed alleged a breach of contract claim and breach of fiduciary duty claim against Demey, a tortious interference with contractual relations claim and an unfair competition claim against Nichiha, and violations of the Pennsylvania, South Carolina, North Carolina, Indiana, and Oregon trade secrets acts, as well as a civil conspiracy claim, against Demey and Nichiha.

5.         On August 31, 2009, CertainTeed requested a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

6.         On September 2, 2009, the Georgia district court granted Demey’s motion for a temporary restraining order and enjoined CertainTeed from enforcing the non-competition covenant in Georgia. On that same date, Nichiha filed a motion to dismiss, transfer or stay the Pennsylvania action.

7.         On September 3, 2009, CertainTeed filed a first amended complaint in the Pennsylvania action, removing any claim to enforce the non-compete covenant in Georgia.

The Pennsylvania district court ultimately decided to deny Nichiha’s motion to dismiss, stay, or transfer and therefore let CertainTeed proceed with its claims in Pennsylvania. In its order, the Pennsylvania court addressed three issues. First, it rejected Nichiha’s claim that the first-filed rule required that the matter progress exclusively in Georgia. The court found that the Pennsylvania action was not “truly duplicative” of the Georgia action because the former included a number of claims that were not present in the latter. The court rejected Nichiha’s assertion that the claims asserted by CertainTeed were mandatory counterclaims in the Georgia action, instead finding that the trade secret claims were not so related to the non-compete claims that separate trials would lead to “substantial duplication of efforts.”

The district court next addressed the issue of venue. It decided that a substantial portion of the events at issue took place in Pennsylvania. Specifically, it cited CertainTeed’s allegations that: (a) Demey and Nichiha would be sharing and utilizing confidential information and trade secrets that originated, and are stored, in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania; and (b) Nichiha and Demey conducted negotiations while Demey was in Pennsylvania.

Finally, the district court answered the question of whether it should transfer the case to Georgia in the negative. After recognizing that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is a “paramount consideration,” the court remarked that CertainTeed’s key witnesses and documents are maintained on servers located in Valley Forge. The court also decided that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is as convenient as the Northern District of Georgia for non-party witnesses. Thus, for the time being, the case between CertainTeed, Demey, and Nichiha will proceed on two fronts.