Trading Secrets : Trade Secrets Lawyers & Attorneys : Seyfarth Shaw Law Firm : Computer Fraud, Confidentiality Agreements, Corporate Espionage

In New York, injunctive relief will not be awarded unless the plaintiff sets forth specific non-monetary harm to Plaintiff in a trade secret case.

In Systems Management Planning, Inc., v. Gordon, 23 Misc.3d 1104(A), 2009 WL 901514 (N.Y.Sup.) (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co, April 3, 2009), the court, in determining a preliminary injunction, assumed that the trade secret status of the information and the fact of its misappropriation has indeed occurred and therefore focused on the issue of irreparable harm and the “related” doctrine of inevitable disclosure. 

Plaintiff asserted that, in all cases, irreparable harm is presumed when trade secrets have been misappropriated. The Gordon court first noted that “no appellate case in New York has laid down such a hard and fast rule” and the subsequently declined to adopt such a rule citing the recent Second Circuit decision in Faiveley Transport Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., --- F.3d at ---, 2009 WL 636020 (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 2009) (such a presumption “might be warranted in cases where there is a danger that, unless enjoined, a misappropriator of trade secrets will disseminate those secrets to a wider audience or otherwise irreparably impair the value of those secrets.”)

The Gordon court, applying the principles of Faiveley Transport, concluded that plaintiff in that case had not adduced clear evidence of irreparable harm. Instead, the court found the plaintiff’s moving affidavit wholly lacking, because it merely stated in conclusory fashion that the defendants had used the confidential and proprietary information that they stole to unfairly divert business and solicit certain specified customers. The court held that these “conclusory assertions wholly fail to show how this worldwide $20 million business cannot readily ascertain its damages if successful in proving that the claimed diversion of six customers resulted from defendant's misuse of wrongfully appropriated trade secret information, instead of what defendants insist was legitimate competition occurring in the absence of a confidentiality agreement or restrictive covenant.”

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Emigra Group, LLC v. Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy LLP, et al., No. 07 Civ. 10688 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009).

In a decision that should be considerable reassurance to employers in general and law firms in particular, a district judge in New York has rejected an antitrust claim brought by a consulting firm against its former employer, an attorney who returned to his former law firm. 

Emigra, an immigration consulting firm, sued its former vice president of operations, Ryan Freel, and the law firm that was his prior and subsequent employer after Freel resigned from Emigra and returned to practicing law at Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, an international immigration law firm headquartered in New York. Emigra alleged that Freel took confidential and trade secret information that he had obtained while employed by Emigra, including strategies, customer lists, pricing information, and profit and loss data; disclosed this information to Fragomen; and used it to contact Emigra’s customers on Fragomen’s behalf.

However, the court noted that while Emigra filed “the usual state law claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, and the like,…it did not seek a preliminary injunction.” Instead, Emigra asserted a number of antitrust claims and, the court noted, there is reason to believe that it did so in order to “gain access through pretrial discovery to precisely the sort of competitively sensitive information about Fragomen’s business that Emigra claims Freel improperly disclosed to Fragomen about Emigra’s business.”  

In a lengthy 63-page opinion, the district judge granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion. Among other findings, the court concluded that Emigra had offered no evidence of price control, exclusion of competition, or monopoly power in violation of the antitrust laws, and that “a contrary conclusion would turn many disputes over the hiring by one competitor of an employee of another, the stuff of everyday commercial tort claims, into monopolization or attempted monopolization cases.” The court further noted that Emigra cannot avoid summary judgment through “gamesmanship” by withholding its own evidence while insisting that its competitor reveal its competitively sensitive information. For these and other reasons, the court dismissed the federal antitrust claims on the merits with prejudice, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law trade secret and unfair competition claims. The decision serves as a warning to litigants who might consider pursuing questionable antitrust claims in federal court as a means for obtaining discovery that would not otherwise be available to them in a state court proceeding.

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Opening with a tribute to the iconic New York City subway system, complete with citations to sources as diverse as Leonard Bernstein and The Bonfire of the Vanities, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals earlier this week vacated and remanded a preliminary injunction barring a braking system manufacturer from disclosing proprietary drawings and other information to the New York City Transit Authority during the contracting process. 

In 1993, SAB Wabco (Faiveley Transport Malmo AB’s predecessor-in-interest) entered into a license agreement with then-sister company Wabco (Wabtec’s predecessor-in-interest) that gave Wabco the authority to use SAB Wabco’s “know-how,” including manufacturing data, specifications, designs, plans, and trade secret information. Among other information, this included details related to BFC TBU, described by the court as “a unique air brake system designed to stop trains quickly and smoothly, if not always quietly.”

When the agreement terminated at the end of 2005, Wabtec began to develop its own line of BFC TBU through reverse-engineering, and in 2007 was awarded a sole source contract to provide the braking system for the Transit Authority’s overhaul of a certain class of subway cars. Faiveley sought a preliminary injunction in federal district court, asserting that the BFC TBU information constituted trade secrets that Wabtec was misappropriating by manufacturing the braking system and disclosing information to the Transit Authority during the contracting process. The district court granted the injunction.

On appeal, however, the Second Circuit held that although the district court had not erred in finding that Faiveley was likely to succeed on the merits of its misappropriation claim, there was no evidence of irreparable harm and, thus, no basis for entry of a preliminary injunction. Most notably, the court made a point of correcting the misapplication of the law by some district courts that had erroneously read Second Circuit precedent as meaning that a presumption of irreparable harm automatically arises upon the determination that a trade secret has been misappropriated. Instead, the court clarified that, although a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm may arise where there is a danger that the trade secrets will be disseminated to a “wider audience” or their value otherwise impaired, no such presumption is warranted where “a misappropriator seeks only to use those secrets—without further dissemination or irreparable impairment of value—in pursuit of profits” because such harm can be compensated with money damages.

Thus, the Second Circuit found that no injunction was merited here because the evidence showed only that Wabtec had used Faiveley’s proprietary information to gain a competitive advantage, but had not disseminated any trade secrets and, indeed, was treating the information with the same confidentiality given its own proprietary information. Because there was no risk that Wabtec would further disclose or irreparably harm Faiveley’s trade secrets, the court vacated the injunction and remanded the matter to the district court. This decision serves as an important reminder of the facts that must be alleged and established to prove irreparable harm when seeking temporary or preliminary injunctive relief for trade secret misappropriation.

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Nixon Peabody v. Taylor Wessing France, 2008 NY Slip Op. 51885(U) (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cty. Sept. 16, 2008).

A trial court in upstate Monroe County, New York earlier this month granted summary judgment for law firm Nixon Peabody LLP (“Nixon”), which sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief as a result of alleged tortious interference with prospective business relations by French law firm Taylor Wessing France (“Taylor Wessing”). 

On July 31, 2007, in anticipation of entering into merger discussions, the two firms had executed a Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement (the “Agreement”) containing a non-solicitation provision stating that neither firm would “employ or offer partnership directly or indirectly” to any partners or attorneys of the other firm for a period of two years from the date of the agreement. The merger negotiations eventually broke down in October 2007. However, Taylor Wessing’s founding partner subsequently joined Nixon and brought with him a dozen of Taylor Wessing’s non-equity partners. 

When Taylor Wessing sought to enforce the Agreement’s non-solicitation provision, Nixon filed this action, seeking a declaration that the Agreement was unenforceable and requesting injunctive relief preventing Taylor Wessing from interfering with its former partners’ right to join Nixon. Taylor Wessing brought suit against Nixon in New York County Supreme Court (subsequently consolidated with the Monroe County action and transferred to Monroe County) asserting claims for breach of the Agreement, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with contractual relations.

In a detailed decision that could have significant consequences for law firms engaged in merger or acquisition talks, the Monroe County trial court held that the Agreement was unenforceable as violative of New York State public policy. Citing to a 1989 New York case that “codified” ethics opinions by the ABA and the New York County Lawyers Association, the court noted that it is unethical for an attorney to include a restrictive covenant in an employment contract with another attorney. However, the court went on to observe that the policy “embraced” by this rule is not limited solely to employment agreements, and that this authority has been “woven into the fabric of New York case law.” The court concluded that the rationale behind the rule — protecting lawyers’ autonomy and the ability of clients to freely chose their counsel — applies to the Agreement in this case which, as the court characterized it, contained “an out-right prohibition[n] on the practice of law,” to which the affected non-equity partners had not agreed and of which they had no knowledge.  The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Nixon on Taylor Wessing’s fiduciary duty and tortious interference claims. The slip opinion can be viewed here . 

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On August 6, 2008, New York Governor David A. Paterson signed Bill S02393, dubbed the “Broadcast Employees Freedom to Work Act” into law. The act, amends the New York Labor Law so as to prohibit non-compete agreements in the broadcasting industry.  The enactment is effective immediately, and is codified as section 202-k of the Labor Law

Specifically, the newly minted Section 202-k provides that a “broadcasting industry employer shall not require as a condition of employment, whether in an employment contract or otherwise,” that a broadcast employee or prospective broadcast employee, after the conclusion of employment, refrain from obtaining subsequent employment “(a) in any specified geographic area, (b) for a specific period of time, or (c) with any particular employer or in any particular industry.” The act further declares as unenforceable any contractual provisions that would waive these prohibitions.

Within Section 202-k definition of “broadcasting industry employer” are companies operating television, radio, cable stations, networks, and/or internet or satellite-based services “similar to a broadcast station or network,” any broadcast entities “affiliated” with such entities, and “any other entity that provides broadcasting services such as news, weather, traffic, sports, or entertainment reports or programming.”  Likewise, a “broadcast employee” is defined as any on- or off-air employee of a broadcasting industry employer, “excluding management employees.”

The act provides that broadcast employees, as defined, can seek civil damages, including attorney’s fees and costs, as against a broadcasting industry employer violating Section 202-k.

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