Trade Secrets Lawyers & Attorneys : Seyfarth Shaw Law Firm : Computer Fraud, Confidentiality Agreements, Corporate Espionage

On November 21, 2008, Judge Kenneth Karas of the Southern District of New York published his November 7, 2008 Amended Opinion and Order granting IBM’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction against former IBM executive Mark Papermaster. Judge Karas granted the Motion following extensive briefing from the parties, as well as a November 6, 2008 hearing on the Motion. The parties did not offer in-court witness testimony at the hearing, instead choosing to rely on the affidavits that they had submitted. Interestingly, Judge Karas notes at the outset of the Opinion and Order that IBM learned for the first time at the hearing that Papermaster had started work with Apple.  

In the Facts section of the Opinion and Order, Judge Karas synthesizes the numerous affidavits submitted by the parties. Judge Karas does reference IBM’s new type of digital storage device, the mention of which led a number of tech-focused analysts following the case to write about the possibility that IBM’s new “Racetrack” technology is at the heart of the matter. That said, Judge Karas does not reference this technology in the “Discussion” section, indicating that Racetrack is not at the center of the dispute (at least not at present).

In evaluating the legal merits of IBM’s Motion, Judge Karas engages in an analysis of whether Papermaster would inevitably disclose the IBM trade secrets known to him. In so doing, Judge Karas takes IBM’s argument, which had focused on Papermaster breaching the restrictive covenants contained in his Noncompetition Agreement, and shifts it to an inevitable disclosure argument, which is more focused on trade secret misappropriation than breach of contract. 

Judge Karas articulates that Papermaster’s new role makes him responsible for improving Apple’s iPods and iPhones, “that is, to make sure that they store more information, do it more quickly, and use less power in doing so.” Judge Karas concludes that Papermaster would inevitably disclose his knowledge of microprocessors and the “Power” architecture in performing the responsibilities of his position at Apple. In support of his conclusion, Judge Karas cites to Apple’s reference to Papermaster’s knowledge of microprocessor design in its internal deliberations prior to hiring Papermaster.

Judge Karas also focuses on the sequence of events that led to Apple hiring Papermaster. Apple initially elected not to offer Papermaster the position heading its iPod/iPhone division in early 2008. Apple then purchased P.A. Semi, a microchip company that competes with IBM in the microprocessor market, in April 2008. Apple subsequently re-interviewed Papermaster and offered him the position of Senior Vice President, Device Hardware Engineering on October 10, 2008. Apple’s change of heart regarding Papermaster after it purchased P.A. Semi led Judge Karas to conclude that Papermaster would inevitably disclose IBM trade secrets in setting the technical specifications for the microprocessors that P.A. Semi may produce for the iPod and iPhone.

Although it is by no means the centerpiece of his Opinion and Order, Judge Karas also addresses IBM’s claim that Papermaster would breach his Noncompetition Agreement by working for Apple. The Judge finds that the Agreement is reasonable in geographic and temporal scope. He also determines that Papermaster would violate the Agreement by working for Apple because Apple competes with IBM in the chip market, especially after purchasing P.A. Semi.

Papermaster filed a Notice of Interlocutory Appeal on November 20, 2008. In that Notice, Papermaster is appealing Judge Karas’s decision granting IBM’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Court has sent the certified record to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, although the appeal has not yet been docketed.

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On November 21, 2008, Judge Kenneth Karas of the Southern District of New York published his November 7, 2008 Amended Opinion and Order granting IBM’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction against former IBM executive Mark Papermaster. Judge Karas granted the Motion following extensive briefing from the parties, as well as a November 6, 2008 hearing on the Motion. The parties did not offer in-court witness testimony at the hearing, instead choosing to rely on the affidavits that they had submitted. Interestingly, Judge Karas notes at the outset of the Opinion and Order that IBM learned for the first time at the hearing that Papermaster had started work with Apple.  

In the Facts section of the Opinion and Order, Judge Karas synthesizes the numerous affidavits submitted by the parties. Judge Karas does reference IBM’s new type of digital storage device, the mention of which led a number of tech-focused analysts following the case to write about the possibility that IBM’s new “Racetrack” technology is at the heart of the matter. That said, Judge Karas does not reference this technology in the “Discussion” section, indicating that Racetrack is not at the center of the dispute (at least not at present).

In evaluating the legal merits of IBM’s Motion, Judge Karas engages in an analysis of whether Papermaster would inevitably disclose the IBM trade secrets known to him. In so doing, Judge Karas takes IBM’s argument, which had focused on Papermaster breaching the restrictive covenants contained in his Noncompetition Agreement, and shifts it to an inevitable disclosure argument, which is more focused on trade secret misappropriation than breach of contract. 

Judge Karas articulates that Papermaster’s new role makes him responsible for improving Apple’s iPods and iPhones, “that is, to make sure that they store more information, do it more quickly, and use less power in doing so.” Judge Karas concludes that Papermaster would inevitably disclose his knowledge of microprocessors and the “Power” architecture in performing the responsibilities of his position at Apple. In support of his conclusion, Judge Karas cites to Apple’s reference to Papermaster’s knowledge of microprocessor design in its internal deliberations prior to hiring Papermaster.

Judge Karas also focuses on the sequence of events that led to Apple hiring Papermaster. Apple initially elected not to offer Papermaster the position heading its iPod/iPhone division in early 2008. Apple then purchased P.A. Semi, a microchip company that competes with IBM in the microprocessor market, in April 2008. Apple subsequently re-interviewed Papermaster and offered him the position of Senior Vice President, Device Hardware Engineering on October 10, 2008. Apple’s change of heart regarding Papermaster after it purchased P.A. Semi led Judge Karas to conclude that Papermaster would inevitably disclose IBM trade secrets in setting the technical specifications for the microprocessors that P.A. Semi may produce for the iPod and iPhone.

Although it is by no means the centerpiece of his Opinion and Order, Judge Karas also addresses IBM’s claim that Papermaster would breach his Noncompetition Agreement by working for Apple. The Judge finds that the Agreement is reasonable in geographic and temporal scope. He also determines that Papermaster would violate the Agreement by working for Apple because Apple competes with IBM in the chip market, especially after purchasing P.A. Semi.

Papermaster filed a Notice of Interlocutory Appeal on November 20, 2008. In that Notice, Papermaster is appealing Judge Karas’s decision granting IBM’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Court has sent the certified record to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, although the appeal has not yet been docketed.

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There have been several developments in the litigation between IBM and its former executive Mark Papermaster since the Court enjoined Papermaster from working for Apple on November 6, 2008. First, the Court has ordered IBM to post a bond in the amount of $3,000,000 to cover any potential finding that IBM wrongfully obtained its injunction against Papermaster. 

Papermaster filed his Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims on November 13, 2008. In his Counterclaims, Papermaster sets forth his arguments that the non-compete provision of his Noncompetition Agreement with IBM is unenforceable. Papermaster argues that the provision purports to prevent him from working for any company that competes with IBM, even if: (1) he is not working for the part of the company that competes with IBM; or (2) he is not doing work similar to the work he performed for IBM. Papermaster also argues that the worldwide scope of the non-compete is overly broad, as is the one-year time limitation because of the speed with which information becomes outdated in the world of technology. Finally, Papermaster argues that the New York choice of law provision in the agreement is unenforceable because he lives in Texas, he will be working for a California company, and he has no contacts with New York. Papermaster does not seek any relief in the Counterclaims beyond a declaratory judgment that the Noncompetition Agreement is overly broad and that it should be governed by Texas or California law.

One particular footnote in IBM’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction has led to a good deal of speculation regarding IBM’s motivation and interest in bringing its claims against Papermaster. In footnote 1 of its Reply, IBM states that it has developed a memory device that would enable an iPod to store 500,000 songs, all while being cheaper to produce. This device also would permit an iPod to run on a single battery charge for weeks at a time. IBM does not contend that Papermaster worked on this particular technology. 

Various observers of the technology industry have speculated that the unnamed technology referenced in the footnote is “racetrack memory,” a technology that allegedly uses the spin of an electron to keep track of data. If the observers are correct, then they may have put meat on the bones of one of IBM’s arguments to counter Papermaster’s claim that IBM and Apple do not compete. The argument, as set forth in IBM’s Reply, is that Apple used to buy personal computer chips from IBM and now buys iPod and iPhone chips from Intel, an IBM competitor. If Apple used its P.A. Semi to produce chips for the iPod and iPhone, the argument goes, then it will deprive IBM of the chance to sell such chips to Apple.

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New York Supreme Court Justice Debra James has issued a preliminary injunction restraining a former employee of a dog care business, which provides services such as dog walking, feeding and grooming, from competing with his former employer within a ten (10) mile radius of his former employer’s business. The action is entitled The Paw Shop, LLC v. Brian Mestre, New York County Supreme Court, Index No.: 601950/08, and Justice James’s order has likely left the Defendant growling. 

Defendant commenced employment with Plaintiff in January 2007 as a receptionist, kennel manager, driver and assistant dog trainer. On July 27, 2007, Defendant signed an “Employee Non-Compete Agreement,” which included a two year, ten (10) mile radius restrictive covenant against direct competition with Plaintiff. The covenant was to be effective from the date of termination, and the restrictive radius was to be measured from the location of Plaintiff’s business at the time of termination; the covenant was to be effective regardless of the reason of Defendant’s termination. At the time of entering into the non-compete agreement, Defendant received a pay-raise as consideration.

Defendant’s employment was terminated in May 2008, and Plaintiff shortly thereafter commenced the action and moved for the preliminary injunction enforcing the restrictive covenant, alleging that the Defendant had been observed performing dog walking services for the Plaintiff’s clients within the restricted radius.

In granting Plaintiff’s motion, Justice James found that the duration and scope of the restrictive covenant were not “unduly burdensome to the defendant.” Although silent as to its reasoning with regards to the duration, the Court found that the ten (10) mile radius was reasonable because: “defendant lives more than ten miles away from plaintiff’s business, and during the period of the covenant may certainly provide services to dog owners in the neighborhood where he resides.”

The Court found that the Defendant’s services were likely to be “unique” and/or “extraordinary,” by reason of affidavits of former customers of Plaintiff averring such. Ironically, these affidavits were submitted by Defendant in opposition to the motion. Surprisingly, given the result, the Court found that Plaintiff had failed to make a showing that Defendant had either used Plaintiff’s customer lists or used confidential client information. Regardless of this lack of showing, however, the Court nevertheless granted the preliminary injunction, citing holding finding that Plaintiff was being irreparably harmed by Defendant’s providing dog walking services to Plaintiff’s clients within the restricted area.

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On November 6, 2008, Judge Kenneth Karas of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted preliminary injunctive relief to IBM and ordered that a former executive, Mark Papermaster, refrain from working for Apple. 

According to IBM’s Complaint, Papermaster worked for IBM as a member of the Company’s elite Integration and Values Team, which has a hand in developing corporate strategy. On June 21, 2006, Papermaster executed a Noncompetition Agreement with IBM that forbids Papermaster from engaging in or associating with any competitors within the area for which Papermaster had job responsibilities at IBM. At the time of his resignation, Papermaster served as IBM’s Vice President for a unit that designs and delivers servers using “blade” technology.   

Papermaster announced his intent to resign on October 13, 2008. IBM made efforts to retain Papermaster, offering him a salary increase, as well as the possibility of a year’s salary in return for not competing against the company. Papermaster declined these offers and resigned from employment with IBM on October 21, 2008. Papermaster set his last day of employment as October 24, 2008. Upon joining Apple, Papermaster was slated to become the Senior Vice President for Devices Hardware Engineering. According to Apple, Papermaster would supervise the development of iPods and iPhones in this position.

On October 22, 2008, IBM sued Papermaster in the Southern District of New York, and filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction two days later. In the Complaint, IBM asserts that Papermaster breached the terms of the Noncompetition Agreement and misappropriated trade secrets. IBM specifically alleges that it competes with Apple in three areas: servers, personal computers, and microprocessors. The Noncompetition Agreement contains an exclusive jurisdiction clause mandating that all actions under the Agreement take place in the state and federal courts for Westchester County, New York. 

Papermaster responded to IBM’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction with several arguments. Papermaster argued that Apple does not compete with IBM because Apple is in the consumer electronic products market, whereas IBM focuses on business systems such as servers and IT infrastructure. More specifically, Papermaster claimed that the needs of microprocessors for servers and consumer electronics are different, with the former emphasizing speed and the latter emphasizing efficient use of power. Papermaster also contended that IBM could not show that it faced irreparable injury because it permitted Papermaster to continue to work for IBM and access its confidential information for two weeks after Papermaster stated his intention to resign. If Papermaster was privy to so much IBM confidential information and represented such a competitive threat, the argument goes, then why was he permitted to remain employed by IBM with unfettered access to its various systems and facilities after announcing his intention to join Apple?

Papermaster also argued that injunctive relief was inappropriate because the Noncompetition Agreement was unenforceable as written for two reasons. First, Papermaster offered that the Agreement was overbroad in that it purported to prevent him for working for a competitor, regardless of whether his acts were actually competitive. Second, Papermaster contended that the one-year time period covered by the non-compete provision was an “eternity” in the electronics industry and thus should not be considered reasonable under the circumstances. Third, Papermaster asserted that the agreement was overbroad because IBM claimed that the Agreement purported to cover the entire world. Papermaster further asserted in a footnote that because Papermaster lives in Texas and works in California, New York law should not govern the dispute, but it acknowledged that it did not have the space to fully develop this argument.  You can find IBM's reply brief here.

Although Judge Karas granted IBM’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at the conclusion of the November 6, 2008 hearing, in the entry for the case on the Court’s docket, Judge Karas sets forth that an Opinion will follow. Until such time, it is unclear which arguments the Court found persuasive.  The case nonetheless continues.  At present, the parties are litigating the issue of the amount of a bond to be paid by IBM to the Court.  It also is likely that the parties will now want to engage in expedited discovery, a topic that will be discussed in a November 18, 2008 court conference.

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As a result of the instability in the financial markets generally and at financial institutions in particular, the financial services industry has experienced significant turnover in 2008. The below chart recently found in the New York Times reflects that the financial services industry has experienced more layoffs than any other industry.

Because of the importance of relationships between brokers and other customer-facing personnel in the financial services industry on the one hand and customers on the other, restrictive covenants are commonplace in the industry. These covenants typically take the form of: (1) customer non-solicitation covenants, in which employees agree not to solicit the clients of their former employees for a set period of time; and (2) non-disclosure covenants, in which employees agree not to use confidential information such as client lists and account or trading information.

It is likely that the significant turnover in the financial services industry will lead to an increase in the number of disputes between financial firms and their former employers, especially as those employees who were laid off find new positions in the industry and seek to mine relationships with former customers. (The obvious exception here is that employees laid off by liquidating financial institutions do not face the prospect of being sued by their former employers.)

an additional factor that can lead to an increase in restrictive covenant litigation in the financial services industry is the prevalence of larger firms buying smaller or distressed firms. Acquisitions of new companies often lead to restrictive covenant litigation because the employees of the purchased company find themselves working in a new work culture. A common scenario in such a situation is for the employee to bristle at the new culture, leave the company shortly after the acquisition, and then solicit their former clients. 

One factor that will reduce the tide of restrictive covenant litigation is the Protocol for Broker Recruiting. The Protocol, which has been signed by a number of (but by no means all) financial services institutions, identifies with particularity the information that departing brokers may take to their new employers. The Protocol also sets forth the clients that departing brokers may solicit after leaving. The Protocol was created for the purpose of reducing litigation between financial institutions and normalizing the process of broker movement. As such, it becomes especially important in the current environment for financial services institutions.

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Eric Rush (a/k/a Eric Romero), a 37-year old dance instructor in Texas, was jailed last week when he violated the Court's order enforcing his non-compete agreement with his former employer, Arthur Murray Dance Studios in Plano, Texas.  The Associated Press reported that Rush a/k/a Romero was unrepentent. 

Rush acknowledged in a jailhouse interview that he advertised his services and provided forbidden dance lessons to students in the area.

But in his defense, Rush said, he couldn't help himself.

"I love to dance," Rush told The Dallas Morning News. "It's my soul."

(Assoc. Press Oct. 18, 2008.)

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Earlier this year, the Georgia Court of Appeals made news in Atlanta Bread Company Int'l v. Lupton-Smith, Court of Appeals Case No. A08A0348, when it struck down in-term restrictive covenants of a franchisee on the grounds that the in-term restrictive covenants did not pass the test of reasonableness applied to post-term restrictive covenants.  In this case, the franchisee had opened several allegedly competing stores at the same time that he was operating Atlanta Bread Company franchises.  Atlanta Bread Company then terminated his franchise.   The Court of Appeals ruled that the post-term restrictive covenants and the in-term covenants were inextricably tied and because the post-term restrictive covenants did not pass muster, the in-term covenants also failed. 

The case has sparked great interest within the franchise community, as the International Franchise Association has indicated that the lower court decision would wreak havoc on franchise systems in Georgia by  rendering  "unenforceable the in-term restrictive covenants in the vast majority of franchise contracts for businesses operated in Georgia, including many of the most well-known and respected franchises in the world."   The Court of Appeals ruling was cast as opening the door for franchisees potentially to compete with their own franchisors during the term of the franchise agreement.  Georgia applies strict scrutiny review to post-termination restrictive covenants between franchisees and franchisors, which is the same standard applied to such agreements between employees and employers.  As a result, Georgia will not blue pencil such an agreement, even though it will blue pencil a non-competition covenant contained in the sale of a business.  

On October 6, 2008, The Georgia Supreme Court granted Atlanta Bread Company's petition for certiorari.  The Court agreed to hear, in particular, the following questions:

1. Did the [Court of Appeals] err in holding that under Jackson & Coker v. Hart, 261 Ga. 371 (1991), the reasonableness standard applicable to post-termination restrictive covenants also applies to in-term restrictive covenants?

2. Did the [Court of Appeals] err in applying to in-term restrictive covenants in franchise agreements the rule against allowing the blue-pencil doctrine of severability.

The Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari means that oral argument is mandatory.  The case will proceed on the January 2009 oral argument calendar. 

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Nixon Peabody v. Taylor Wessing France, 2008 NY Slip Op. 51885(U) (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cty. Sept. 16, 2008).

A trial court in upstate Monroe County, New York earlier this month granted summary judgment for law firm Nixon Peabody LLP (“Nixon”), which sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief as a result of alleged tortious interference with prospective business relations by French law firm Taylor Wessing France (“Taylor Wessing”). 

On July 31, 2007, in anticipation of entering into merger discussions, the two firms had executed a Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement (the “Agreement”) containing a non-solicitation provision stating that neither firm would “employ or offer partnership directly or indirectly” to any partners or attorneys of the other firm for a period of two years from the date of the agreement. The merger negotiations eventually broke down in October 2007. However, Taylor Wessing’s founding partner subsequently joined Nixon and brought with him a dozen of Taylor Wessing’s non-equity partners. 

When Taylor Wessing sought to enforce the Agreement’s non-solicitation provision, Nixon filed this action, seeking a declaration that the Agreement was unenforceable and requesting injunctive relief preventing Taylor Wessing from interfering with its former partners’ right to join Nixon. Taylor Wessing brought suit against Nixon in New York County Supreme Court (subsequently consolidated with the Monroe County action and transferred to Monroe County) asserting claims for breach of the Agreement, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with contractual relations.

In a detailed decision that could have significant consequences for law firms engaged in merger or acquisition talks, the Monroe County trial court held that the Agreement was unenforceable as violative of New York State public policy. Citing to a 1989 New York case that “codified” ethics opinions by the ABA and the New York County Lawyers Association, the court noted that it is unethical for an attorney to include a restrictive covenant in an employment contract with another attorney. However, the court went on to observe that the policy “embraced” by this rule is not limited solely to employment agreements, and that this authority has been “woven into the fabric of New York case law.” The court concluded that the rationale behind the rule — protecting lawyers’ autonomy and the ability of clients to freely chose their counsel — applies to the Agreement in this case which, as the court characterized it, contained “an out-right prohibition[n] on the practice of law,” to which the affected non-equity partners had not agreed and of which they had no knowledge.  The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Nixon on Taylor Wessing’s fiduciary duty and tortious interference claims. The slip opinion can be viewed here . 

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 Following is a Press Release from the Georgia House of Representatives.

Speaker Richardson Appoints Representative Kevin Levitas to Chair House Study Committee on Restrictive Covenants in the Commercial Arena

ATLANTA –Speaker of the House Glenn Richardson (R-Hiram) has appointed Representative Kevin Levitas (D-Atlanta) to chair the House Study Committee on Restrictive Covenants in the Commercial Arena.

“I am confident that Representative Levitas will be an asset to this study committee. He is an extremely diligent worker, and I know he will work well with the other Representatives appointed to this committee,” Richardson said.

House Resolution 1879 established the House Study Committee on Restrictive Covenants in the Commercial Arena to examine the proper functioning of restrictive covenants in today’s marketplace and to fulfill the legislature’s role in defining public policy in this area.  

A restrictive covenant is an agreement between an employer and an employee (or an independent contractor) that limits the ability of a former employee to unfairly compete against the employer after termination of employment. 

In the absence of clear direction from the General Assembly, Georgia courts have issued conflicting decisions and voided many of these agreements in their entirety, often on the basis of a strict reading of a technical defect in one part of an agreement. 

Levitas said, “It is time that the legislature studied this issue in depth and provided clear guidance to the courts regarding the sustainability of these private agreements between private contracting parties and how to make them fair to all parties.” Levitas said that the study committee will examine court precedent and hear testimony from witnesses regarding the effect of the current state of the law.

“I am honored that Speaker Richardson has appointed me to chair this study committee,” noted Levitas. “The history and treatment of restrictive covenants in Georgia have never been fully studied before by the General Assembly. It is imperative that we carefully examine all aspects of this important issue so that both employer and employee can know their rights and duties after employment has ended.”

Levitas remarked, “Both parties need to know with certainty what they can and cannot do, and that is why legislation in this area is so important. In addition to providing certainty to the parties, clarifying the law will have a significant impact on Georgia’s economy and the ability of the state to attract businesses to this state and to keep them here.”

Levitas noted the he expects that the committee will hear from a diversity of witnesses with differing viewpoints on the subject. Levitas said that he intends for the committee “to bring together all necessary points of view and to gather all of the facts so that we can, once and for all, clearly define and bring certainty to this important area of the law.”

The committee will hold its first meeting at 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday, September 24, in Room 132 of the State Capitol. The other members of the committee are: Representative Tim Bearden (R-Villa Rica), Representative Butch Parrish (R-Swainsboro), Representative Richard Smith (R-Columbus), Representative Brian Thomas (D-Lilburn) and Representative Al Williams (D-Midway).

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In Baird and Warner Residential Sales, Inc. v. Mazzone, No. 1-07-2179, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District reversed the circuit court’s determination that a restrictive covenant between Patricia Mazzone and her former employer, real estate broker Baird & Warner, was unenforceable as a matter of law. The ruling was issued in June as an unpublished order but was later published on August 15, 2008, upon the motion of Baird & Warner, which requested publication to provide guidance to the real estate industry where restrictive covenants are commonplace.

Baird & Warner sued Mazzone and her current employer, competing broker Midwest Realty Ventures, seeking to enjoin Mazzone for violating the restrictive covenant that prohibited her from soliciting Baird and Warner employees and independent contractors for one year following the end of her employment there. Although the circuit court initially granted a temporary restraining order and ordered expedited discovery, Mazzone and Midwest Realty quickly moved to dismiss on the ground that the non-solicitation agreement was unreasonable, overly broad, and thus enforceable because it sought to impose a “poison pill” whereby any competitor that hired any Baird & Warner manager was then precluded from hiring any of Baird & Warner’s thousands of employees and independent contractors. 

Baird & Warner opposed the motion, contending that, based on other language in the agreement, the covenant should be interpreted to apply only to the Baird & Warner office where Mazzone had worked.   But the circuit court dismissed the complaint and dissolved the TRO, concluding that the plain language of the agreement was not limited to the one office and declining to “blue pencil” the agreement because doing so would discourage precise drafting of agreements.

In an interlocutory appeal, the Appellate Court determined that even though the agreement was ambiguous as to whether it applied to one office or all of the company’s employees, “there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the agreement was overly broad.” The court noted that under Illinois law, a court determining the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant should consider, among other factors, the hardship caused to the employee and the effect upon the general public. Here, the court concluded, there was no evidence on the face of the complaint to weigh those factors, and therefore it cannot be determined that the covenant is unreasonable as a matter of law. 

Based on this ruling, the court concluded that it need not address Baird & Warner’s alternative argument that the circuit court erred in refusing to exercise its “blue pencil” powers to modify the non-solicitation agreement to render it enforceable.

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A maritime attachment arising out of a contract action is appropriate where the underlying contract’s nature and character is one of maritime and not simply a non-competition agreement, the Second Circuit ruled recently in Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. Partnership, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 3876570 (Aug. 22, 2008).

The plaintiffs in Williamson had assisted a recovery operation for the S.S. Central America, a steamship that sank off the coast of South Carolina in 1857. In return for a fraction of a percentage of any recovery, the plaintiffs had executed non-disclosure and non-competition agreements. After a successful recovery operation, defendants were able to sell the gold, silver, and valuable artifacts recovered from the S.S. Central America. But defendants never paid the plaintiffs their share, forcing the plaintiffs to bring a breach of contract action in Ohio State Court. 

Defendants removed the State Court action to federal court, and plaintiffs then filed a maritime action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in which plaintiffs sought an attachment on the salvage from the S.S. Central America. After the district court resolved, among other things, an order to show cause on the attachment in favor of plaintiffs, defendants appealed.

On appeal before the Second Circuit, the defendants argued that plaintiffs’ non-compete agreements were not maritime contracts (and thus there was no federal jurisdiction and prejudgment interest), but instead only non-competition agreements. The Second Circuit disagreed, noting that the test for whether a contract sounds in maritime law is its nature and character, and whether the contracts “principle objective . . . is maritime commerce . . . .” Thus, because the principle objective of the non-competition agreements concerned maritime operations (a salvage recovery operation), the Second Circuit concluded that “[w]hile the Defendants may be correct in stating that these are just standard non-compete, nondisclosure, and lease contract agreements, they are incorrect in arguing that the contracts are therefore not maritime contracts.”

Accordingly, companies entering into non-competition and non-disclosure agreements regarding maritime commerce should expect those contracts to provide federal maritime jurisdiction as non-competition agreements and maritime contracts are not mutually exclusive.

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On August 7, 2008, in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, No. S147190, the California Supreme Court seemingly ruled that Section 16600 of the Business and Professions Code prohibits every attempt by an employer to enforce a non-competition agreement. The court indicated that the only exceptions are those expressly set forth in the statute (agreements in connection with the sale or dissolution of a business).

The same day, a class-action complaint was filed in Contra Costa County Superior Court, Vokes, et al. v. Central Garden & Pet Co., No. C 08-01994, that could test the reach of the Edwards decision.  Plaintiffs are asking the court to invalidate a non-compete agreement signed by Vokes when he became Central Garden’s Senior VP Sales and Trade Relations and, on behalf of all all Central Gardens employees, seeking to invalidate all of Central Gardens’ non-compete agreements as violating Section 16600 and related California statutes.

For more than 20 years prior to going to work for Central Gardens, Vokes had been employed by Doskocil, a competitor of Central Gardens. When he left in January 2007, he was VP of Sales. Upon becoming employed by Central Gardens as its Senior VP Sales and Trade Relations, he signed a non-compete agreement. It provided for 24 months of paid post-termination “independent contractor” status (according to the complaint, however, the compensation amount was “a small fraction of his wages as [a Central Gardens] employee”). The agreement mandated non-competitor employment and non-customer solicitation, in virtually any geographic market served by Central Gardens' market, during and for the 12 months following the “independent contractor” period.

In July 2008, Vokes resigned from Central Gardens and returned to Doskocil, in Texas. Central Gardens immediately sued in Texas to enforce the agreement and obtained a TRO (according to the Contra Costa County complaint, ex parte and without notice) against Vokes and Doskocil. They then filed the Contra Costa County complaint.

Whether the Contra Costa County court will adjudicate the complaint or will stay the action in light of the earlier-filed Texas complaint is uncertain. Also unclear is whether the Contra Costa County Court will certify the class and whether the agreement might be enforceable at least during the 24-months “independent contractor” period. The outcome of this case, if it proceeds, will be interesting.

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 By Robert Milligan, Kurt Kappes and James McNairy

The California Supreme Court released its highly anticipated decision in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP  today and held that employee non-competition agreements are invalid, even if narrowly drawn, unless the agreement falls within a statutory exception. 

In doing so, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s narrow restraint exception, which excepted the prohibition contained in Business and Professions section 16600 on non-competition agreements where one was barred from pursuing only a small part or limited part of the business, trade or profession.

In its decision, the Court limited its review to two issues:

1)      To what extent does Business and Professions Code section 16600 prohibit employee non-competition agreements;

2)      Is a contract provision requiring an employee to release “any and all” claims unlawful because it encompasses nonwaivable statutory protections, such as the employee indemnity protection of Labor Code section 2802.

The Court concluded that Business and Professions Section 16600 prohibits employee non-competition agreements unless the agreement falls within the applicable statutory exceptions of sections 16601, 16602, or 16602.5. The Court also held that a contract provision whereby an employee releases “any and all” claims does not encompass nonwaivable statutory protections, such as the employee indemnity protection of Labor Code section 2802.

On the first issue, the Court found that California state courts have consistently affirmed that section 16600 evinces a settled legislative policy in favor of open competition and employee mobility. Section 16660 states: “Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.” (emphasis added) The chapter excepts non-competition agreements in the sale or dissolution of corporations (§ 16601), partnerships (§ 16602), and limited liability corporations (§ 16602.5). 

The Court noted that it had previously invalidated an otherwise narrowly tailored agreement as an improper restraint under section 16600 because it required a former employee to forfeit his pension rights on commencing work for a competitor (citing Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 239, 242-243). The Court, quoting Muggill, stated section 16600 invalidates provisions in employment contracts and retirement pension plans that prohibit “an employee from working for a competitor after completion of his employment or imposing a penalty if he does so unless they are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets.”

The two clauses at issue in Edwards’ agreement with Andersen provided:

1)      If you leave the Firm, for eighteen months after release or resignation, you agree not to perform professional services of the type you provided for any client on which you worked during the eighteen months prior to release or resignation. This does not prohibit you from accepting employment with a client. 

2)      For twelve months after you leave the Firm, you agree not to solicit (to perform professional services of the type you provided) any client of the office(s) [Los Angeles] to which you were assigned during the eighteen months preceding release or resignation. 

Andersen argued that the Court should interpret the term “restrain” under section 16600 to mean simply to “prohibit,” so that only contracts that totally prohibit an employee from engaging in his or her profession, trade, or business are illegal. 

The Court rejected that argument and found that Andersen’s non-competition agreement was invalid because the two specific clauses at issue in the agreement restricted Edwards from performing work for Andersen’s Los Angeles clients and therefore restricted his ability to practice his accounting profession. 

Earlier in the decision, the Court expressly stated it did not address the applicability of the “so-called trade secret exception to section 16660.” Before the Supreme Court granted the petition for review in Edwards, the lower appellate court’s decision remanded the case to the trial court to determine if the trade secret exception applied, i.e. the non-competition agreement was necessary to protect trade secrets. The Court’s disposition indicates that the issue is closed though and that there will be no such remand to the trial court:

We hold that the noncompetition agreement here is invalid under section 16600, and we reject the narrow-restraint exception urged by Andersen. Noncompetition agreements are invalid under section 16600 in California even if narrowly drawn, unless they within the applicable statutory exceptions of sections 16601, 16602, or 16602.5

Andersen asked the Court to adopt the limited or “narrow-restraint” exception to section 16600. The Court noted that confusion over the Ninth Circuit’s application of section 16600 arose in a paragraph in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Campbell v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. (9^th Cir. 1987) 817 F.2d 499, in which the Ninth Circuit stated that some California state courts have excepted application of section 16600 “where one is barred from pursuing only a small or limited part of the business, trade or profession” (citing Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co. (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 188 and King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316). The Court found that the reasoning in these state court cases does not provide persuasive support for adopting the narrow restraint exception because Boughton involved the use of land, not a restriction upon a plaintiff’s practice of a profession, and King relied upon a trade secret exception to the statutory rule. 

The Court acknowledged that recent Ninth Circuit cases have followed Campbell to create a narrow-restraint exception to section 16600 in federal court. The Court stated that California state courts have not embraced the Ninth Circuit’s narrow restraint exception and stated “no reported California state court decision has endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, and we are of the view that California courts have been clear in their expression that section 16660 represents a strong public policy of the state which should not be diluted by judicial fiat” (citing Scott v. Snelling and Snelling, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1990) 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1042).

In sum, while the Court’s decision clearly states California does not recognize a “narrow restraint” exception to the general rule that employee non-competition agreements are invalid, the Court did not specifically address when non-solicitation of customer and employee clauses are permissible to protect trade secrets. 

The San Francisco Chronicle also has posted an article about this case.

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In an order dated July 25, 2008, the Georgia Court of Appeals reiterated that non-compete provisions in Georgia cannot prohibit an ex-employee beyond performing services related to the employer’s business. Avion Systems, Inc. v. Thompson, No. A07A1488, 2008 WL 2854300 (Ga. App. Jul. 25, 2008). In Avion Systems, the Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether the following non-compete provision was enforceable:

For a period of twelve (12) months following the completion of project, the Employee unconditionally agrees to not deal directly, indirectly, or by any other means, either individually or in association with another individual or organization for any pecuniary gain with Corporation's customer or their client to whom he is assigned at the particular job site for that particular division or subdivision with whom Employee had contact....

Despite the fact that the non-compete provision was limited to 12 months in duration and to the customer to whom the employee was assigned, the Court of Appeals held that the provision was unenforceable. The restriction ran afoul of the prohibition in Georgia against “in any capacity” restrictions:

Here, the covenant did not specify the activities in which Thompson was prohibited from engaging, but instead prohibited her from dealing with a client “for any pecuniary gain,” regardless of whether her activities were related to Avion’s business. The provision was thus overbroad and unenforceable, as it is not reasonably necessary to protect the interests of Avion.

Avion Systems stands as a reminder that Georgia has very particular requirements for the enforcement of non-compete provisions and that an employer must pay attention to those requirements to have any chance of enforcing post-employment restrictions.

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