A district court in Arizona recently issued a published decision limiting the use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) by employers who have been the victim of electronic data theft by their former employees. In Shamrock Foods v. Gast, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2008 WL 450556 (D.Ariz.), the district court held that a departing employee’s transmittal of confidential information to his personal e-mail account prior to his resignation did not give rise to a cause of action under CFAA.
According to the employer’s complaint, the employee, who had executed a confidentiality agreement with the employer, allegedly e-mailed numerous company confidential and proprietary files to his personal e-mail account shortly after the employee had begun employment negotiations with a competitor. The day after he sent the company material to his personal e-mail account he allegedly told his manager that he was considering leaving the company and shortly thereafter informed the company that he was joining a direct competitor.
In its complaint, the company alleged that the employee was acting as an agent of the competitor when he assessed and e-mailed the confidential information. The company further alleged that he provided the information to the competitor and that the competitor was using the information to the company’s detriment.
The company brought suit in federal court asserting CFAA claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (4), and (5)(iii), as well as state law misappropriation claims. The employee and the competitor moved to dismiss the CFAA claims for failure to state a claim.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss concluding that 1) a violation for accessing a protected computer “without authorization” occurs only when the initial access is not permitted; and 2) an “exceeds authorized access” violation occurs only when initial access to a protected computer is permitted but the access of certain information is not permitted.
The court analyzed the CFAA statute in some depth and the specific CFAA claims that the employer brought. The court stated that it is a violation of section 1030(a)(2) when a person “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains ... information from any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication.” Next, the court stated that section 1030(a)(4) is violated when a person “knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value....” Finally, the court declared that section (a)(5)(A)(iii) is violated when a person “intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage. . . .”
In sum, the court reasoned that to state a claim under (a)(2) and (a)(4), the employer must allege conduct showing that the employee accessed a protected computer without authorization or exceeded authorized access and under section (a)(5)(A)(iii), the employer must allege conduct showing that the employee accessed a protected computer without authorization.
The competitor and the employee argued the CFAA claims were not actionable because the employee was authorized to access the computer and information at issue. The employer argued that the employee was no longer authorized to access its confidential information once he acquired the improper purpose to use this information to benefit himself and the competitor.
The district court acknowledged that there were two lines of cases interpreting the meaning of “authorization” under the CFAA. According to the court, some courts have applied principles of agency law to the CFAA and have held that an employee accesses a computer “without authorization” whenever the employee, without knowledge of the employer, acquires an adverse interest or is guilty of a serious breach of loyalty. The court cited the following the cases in support of that proposition: Int'l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-421 (7th Cir.2006); ViChip Corp. v. Lee, 438 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1100 (N.D.Cal.2006); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1125 (W.D.Wash.2000).
The court also stated that other courts “have opted for a less expansive view, holding that the phrase ‘without authorization’ generally only reaches conduct by outsiders who do not have permission to access the plaintiff's computer in the first place.” The court cited the following cases in support of this contrasting position: Diamond Power Intern., Inc. v. Davidson, Nos. 1:04-CV-0091-RWS-CCH and 1:04-CV-1708-RWS-CCH, 2007 WL 2904119, at *13 (N.D.Ga. Oct.1, 2007); Brett Senior & Assocs., P.C. v. Fitzgerald, No. 06-1412, 2007 WL 2043377, at *2-4 (E.D.Pa. July 13, 2007); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at *5 (M.D.Fla. Aug.1, 2006); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F.Supp.2d 479, 495 (D.Md.2005).
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