Fitness Companies Spar Over Unauthorized Access Of Departing Employee's Personal E-mail Accounts

By Robert Milligan and Joshua Salinas

Wrongfully accessing someone’s personal email account may cost you $1,000 per unauthorized access, even if that person suffers no injury or loss. In Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 2010 WL 5222128 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), a New York district court permitted the recovery of statutory damages under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) (18 U.S.C. § 2707(a)) without proof of actual damages sustained.

Lauren Brenner allegedly hired former U.S. Marines Ruben Belliard and Alex Fell to work as “drill instructors” at her Pure Power Boot Camp physical fitness center. While still employed at Pure Power, Belliard and Fell allegedly made plans to open a competing boot camp style physical fitness center. Belliard and Fell left Pure Power, and shortly thereafter opened Warrior Fitness Boot Camp.

Fell alleged that after he left, Benner, or someone from Pure Power, accessed his personal e-mail account and printed e-mails from his personal Gmail, Hotmail, and Warrior Fitness accounts. Fell had left his username and password information saved on Pure Power computers, which allowed access to his email accounts. The emails revealed that Belliard and Fell allegedly copied Pure Power documents, stole Pure Power customers, and shredded their non-compete agreement.

Benner allegedly read these emails and Pure Power Boot Camp brought claims against Belliard and Fell, which included claims for breach of their non-compete agreements and theft of Pure Power’s business model, customers, and documents.

Fell counterclaimed against several parties, including Brenner and Pure Power, alleging that the unauthorized access of Fell’s account violated the SCA and entitled him to statutory and punitive damages, as well as attorneys’ fees.

A significant issue in this case was whether Fell could recover statutory damages under the SCA, even though he failed to allege or prove actual damages. In fact, Fell confirmed in his deposition that he sought only statutory and punitive damages.

On summary judgment, the court held that proof of actual damages is not required to recover under the SCA. The interesting aspect of this case was the court’s departure from the holding in Van Alstyne v. Elec. Scriptorium, Ltd.,560 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2009), the only federal appellate decision to analyze this issue. Van Alstyne required proof of actual damages in order to recover the $1,000 statutory damages under SCA. Van Alstyne based its decision on Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004), where the Supreme Court required proof of actual damages for recovery under the Privacy Act. However, the Pure Power court criticized Van Alstyne’s analysis because the SCA and Privacy Act have different purposes, language construction, and legislative histories.

Indeed, according to the court, an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions decided after Doe permit recovery of statutory damages under the SCA absent actual damages. This has been applied to unauthorized access of employee’s email accounts (Cedar Hill Assocs., Inc. v. Paget, No. 04cv0557, 2005 WL 3430562 (N.D. Ill. 2005)), restricted websites (In re Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 355 B.R. 225 (D.Haw. 2006)), and social media accounts (Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, No. 06-5754, 2009 WL 3128420 (D.N.J. 2009)).

The court, however, rejected Fell’s argument that each e-mail that was accessed constituted a separate $1000 violation under the SCA. The court found that, because the period over which the emails were accessed was relatively short (a nine day period), and because there was no evidence indicating the specific number of times each account was accessed, it was appropriate to aggregate the intrusions with respect to each individual e-mail account and find that there had been four independent violations of the SCA  --one violation for each unauthorized access of an electronic communications facility, which allowed access to electronic communications while still in electronic storage.  The court also rejected Fell’s request for punitive damages at this stage in the proceedings because the court was unable to determine as a matter of law which party accessed the email accounts, and the surrounding circumstances, and therefore, there was no basis upon which to decide whether punitive damages were appropriate. The court also rejected Fell’s request for attorneys’ fees as premature because the court was presently unable to determine which of the parties named in the counterclaim was liable for the four violations of the SCA.

The Pure Power court’s affirmation of some employee privacy rights and the removal of the actual damages hurdle to a SCA claim have several implications for employers and management. First, increased attention must be given when dealing with employee personal e-mail and social network accounts. The decision does not impair the ability to monitor employee web activity or work provided email accounts, provided that the employer has clear policies articulating that employees have no expectation of privacy. However, extra care must be given to employee personal accounts, particularly when the employee saves login information on the computer and the login information is used to access the employee’s personal accounts. Employers should not engage in such conduct. 

In Pure Power, the access of Fell’s email accounts created a cause of action to recover statutory damages for Fell, where the employer may have a solid non-compete/unfair competition suit against the employee. Perhaps more detrimental to employer Pure Power Boot Camp, the court also excluded the highly relevant emails demonstrating alleged employee disloyalty from evidence. Finally, the ability to recover statutory damages without proof of actual damages, as well as punitive damages and attorney fees, may provide an incentive for employees and their counsel to pursue SCA claims against current and former employers.

Seyfarth Shaw Attorney to Lead Webinar on Trade Secret Issues

Seyfarth Shaw attorney James McNairy will lead a webinar entitled “Trading Secrets: How to Adequately Protect Trade Secrets and Balance Employee Rights in California” on Tuesday, January 25, 2011, 11:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. Pacific Time.

The webinar is part of the Cyber Institute Program hosted by the California State Bar Intellectual Property Section.  Mr. McNairy will lead a discussion of defining and understanding trade secrets in California, California’s general antipathy for non-compete agreements in the employment context, and remedies for trade secret misappropriation.

This webinar will focus on how the interplay between California trade secret law and Business and Professions Code Section 16600 makes California unique in terms of how companies use restrictive covenants to protect their trade secrets. The panel will also discuss appropriate policies and practices to effectively protect trade secrets, including hiring and termination protocols, a discussion regarding the use of restrictive covenants, and effective computer and physical security practices in light of recent technological advances.

California law is constantly evolving in this important area and this webinar will provide the latest developments. Considering joining Mr. McNairy in this informative webinar. 1 hour participatory MCLE credit will be given. If you are interested in attending, please sign up here.

The Eleventh Circuit Splits with the Ninth Circuit in Interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

By Paul Freehling and Scott Schaefers

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ December 27, 2010 decision in U.S. v. Rodriguez, Appeal No. 09-15265, -- F.3d --, 2010 WL 5253231 (11th Cir. Dec. 27, 2010) may mark a significant split among the federal appellate circuits over the meaning of the phrases “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq. (“CFAA”). On one side of the fence sit decisions which reject such suits due to the employer’s prior grant of access, regardless of the employee’s purpose of access or subsequent use of the files. On the other side are decisions which allow CFAA claims where the employee’s purpose for accessing the files was unauthorized, even if the access itself was permitted.

In Rodriguez, the court upheld the criminal CFAA conviction of defendant Roberto Rodriguez, a former Social Security Administration (“SSA”) telephone service representative, because he accessed confidential and sensitive files for “a non-business reason.” The SSA had previously established a policy prohibiting employee access of confidential databases “without a business reason,” of which Rodriguez was made aware several times. Despite these clear warnings from his employer, Rodriguez accessed more than 100 times confidential, personal information from Social Security files concerning women with whom he had a romantic relationship. Even though Rodriguez’s access of the database itself was authorized, the purpose of the access was not, thus triggering the “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access” provisions of the CFAA.

The Eleventh Circuit thus aligned itself with the Seventh Circuit, which in Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006), held that an employee violates the CFAA where he already has decided to quit, and thereafter accesses company files for unauthorized purposes in furtherance of his “breach of duty of loyalty” to the company (i.e. to erase valuable company data). That is, when an employee accesses computer files with a purpose to injure his employer, his access is necessarily unauthorized because by law because he never had permission to work against the company. 

On the other side of the split is the Ninth Circuit‘s September 2009 decision in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). There, the court dismissed the CFAA suit against the former employee for subsequent misuse of company files because the purpose and misuse of the employee’s access was irrelevant, so long as the access itself for was permitted, for any purpose. According to Brekka, reading a purpose-related qualification into the CFAA terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” would run counter to the plain meaning of those statutory requirements. In fact, Brekka explicitly rejected Citrin’s suggested interpretation along those lines.

Rodriguez did not explicitly reject BrekkaRodriguez instead distinguished Brekka because in Brekka there was no express prohibition against the employee’s accessing files and e-mailing them to his home address, whereas in Rodriguez, a prohibition against non-business-related access was in place. Nevertheless, Rodriguez implicitly rejected Brekka, because Brekka limited CFAA claims to those instances in which an employee had not received permission to access a computer for “any purpose,” or where the permission had been previously rescinded and the employee accessed the computer anyway. Rodriguez had permission to access the SSA database, albeit for a limited purpose, so his conviction likely would have been overturned by the Ninth Circuit, not upheld as the Eleventh Circuit did. Also, because of the unique circumstances in Rodriguez, there is a possibility that it could be distinguished on its facts alone.

In any event, the lessons to be learned by corporate counsel and management from this conflict are not limited to whether an employer can sue an employee for violating the CFAA. These decisions serve as reminders to management that they must carefully and vigilantly create and enforce employee computer-use policies, including the following:

*Write clear computer-access policies, disseminate those policies among employees, and periodically remind employees of their obligations;

*Require employees, whether professional, clerical, or otherwise, to sign non-disclosure and computer confidentiality agreements, where access to computers is strictly limited to furthering company business; and

*Develop a limited-permission structure so that employees are provided access only to those files needed to do their job.

You may contact Seyfarth Shaw’s Trade Secret Protection attorneys for further ideas and discussion of issues related to employee misuse or theft of company intellectual property.

Georgia Legislature to Consider Re-enacting Restrictive Covenant Act

 

As we have noted in an earlier blog posting, many have raised questions about the effective date of Georgia's new Restrictive Covenant Act.  The questions derive from inconsistencies in the effective dates between the amendment that gave life to the statute and the statute itself.  To cure this potential issue, Rep. Wendell Willard, Vice Chairman of the Rules Committee and Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, has introduced HB 30 to re-enact the statute.  In Section 1 of the Bill, the purpose of introducing HB 30 is set forth:

During the 2009 legislative session the General Assembly enacted HB 173 (Act No. 64, Ga. L. 2009, p. 231), which was a bill that dealt with the issue of restrictive covenants in contracts and which was contingently effective on the passage of a constitutional amendment. During the 2010 legislative session the General Assembly enacted HR 178 (Ga. L. 2010, p. 1260), the constitutional amendment necessary for the statutory language of HB 173 (Act No. 64, Ga. L. 2009, p. 231), and the voters ratified the constitutional amendment on November 2, 2010. It has been suggested by certain parties that because of the effective date provisions of HB 173 (Act No. 64, Ga. L. 2009, p. 231), there may be some question about the validity of that legislation. It is the intention of this Act to remove any such uncertainty by substantially reenacting the substantive provisions of HB 173 (Act No. 64, Ga. L. 2009, p. 231), but the enactment of this Act should not be taken as evidence of a legislative determination that HB 173 (Act No. 64, Ga. L. 2009, p. 231) was in fact invalid.

The speed with which this may pass through the legislature when it reconvenes on January 10 is unknown.  As of today, it is not yet on the legislative calendar.