Magistrate Judge Denies Motion for Reconsideration in Trade Secrets Case

National Elevator Cab & Door Corp. v. H & B, Inc., 2008 WL 207843 (E.D.N.Y.) No. 07 CV 1562

 

United States Magistrate Judge Levy recently denied a motion for reconsideration after he granted the plaintiff National Elevator Cab & Door Corp.’s motion for a preliminary injunction against defendant H & B, Inc. The litigation stems from the failed acquisition talks between National (a supplier of elevator entrances and cabs in the New York metropolitan area) and H & B (also an elevator cab and entrance supplier, working nationally and internationally), and the resulting alleged breaches of non-compete and confidentiality provisions in an agreement between the two parties.

In 2005, H & B, having little presence in the New York metropolitan market, expressed interest in acquiring National. During discussions between the two corporations, National asked H & B to sign an agreement stating that if the acquisition did not occur, H & B would not solicit business with three of National’s customers (Fujitec New York, ThyssenKrupp Elevator, and the New York City Housing Authority) for five years, would not use National’s confidential information or intellectual property to compete with National, would not test or reverse engineer National’s products, and would not solicit National employees for three years. H & B signed the agreement, and National eventually disclosed such information to H & B as its business model, marketing strategies, internal projections for sales and expenses, and information on its pricing, outsourcing, gross margins, and annual sales.

The acquisition discussions failed, and H & B eventually began to do business with Fujitec and solicited National employees. H & B admitted these facts, but argued that the terms of the agreement were unenforceable. National was granted a preliminary injunction against H & B, and H & B moved for reconsideration.

In evaluating the motion, Judge Levy discussed whether National had demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. He noted that not only would it be difficult to calculate monetary damages to redress National’s losses, but also that in the agreement, H & B expressed admitted that money damages would be an insufficient remedy for breach. Judge Levy found that National made a sufficient showing that H & B’s continued solicitation of the three specified National customers would result in irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. Although H & B argued that it had been unsuccessful in attracting business from two of the three specified customers, Judge Levy declared that National “need not wait until its relationships…are damaged before seeking an injunction.”

Next, Judge Levy reviewed whether National was likely to succeed on the merits of its claims, first analyzing the non-compete and non-solicitation provisions of the agreement. He noted that a non-compete covenant must pass a reasonableness test, and New York courts will only enforce such a provision between businesses where it protects a legitimate business interest, and its terms are reasonable, both temporally and geographically. Judge Levy expressly held that the agreement was reasonable and did not impose undue restraint on competition, because it applied only to three identified customers in one market (the New York metropolitan area). He noted that the customers were not obliged to work with National, but instead could employ other suppliers, and as such, the anti-competitive effects were not so great as to outweigh the harm to National.

Finally, Judge Levy addressed the confidentiality provisions of the agreement. He outlined the factors that New York courts consider in determining whether information constitutes a trade secret: the extent to which the information is known to the public, the extent to which it is known by employees and others in the business, what measures are taken to protect the information, the value of the information to the business and its competitor, the amount of effort or money used by the business to develop the information, and the ease or difficulty with which the information could be acquired by others.

Judge Levy found that the information given to H & B was confidential, and that National had taken adequate steps to guard this information. Despite the fact that National presented no evidence that H & B misused some of its information, Judge Levy found that H & B attempted to procure some of the materials from a mutual client of the two businesses after the acquisition talks failed and it was forced to return what it had been given. Thus, Judge Levy reasoned, the materials contained information that was valuable and not publicly available at the time. Additionally, Judge Levy noted that almost immediately after receiving National’s materials, H & B began offering installation (which it had never done before), changed its design, and was able to successfully attract one of National’s clients. Finding the timing more than merely coincidental, Judge Levy held that H & B violated the terms of the agreement, and further held that the confidentiality provisions were enforceable. Thus, H & B’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Coldwell Banker Sues Former Executives Who Form Competing Brokerage, Take Staff, Clients, and Trade Secrets

Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage v. D’Ambrosia, No. 08-CV-00166, Complaint (D. Md. Jan. 18, 2008)

On January 18, 2008, Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage filed a federal lawsuit in Maryland against three former key employees and newly-formed competitor Car-Tay, Inc., an affiliate of GMAC Real Estate. The complaint alleges that the former employees, two of whom had been high-level executives, conspired to form the competing brokerage in violation of their employment agreements, the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and state law.

Coldwell Banker claims that the former employees began actively, but covertly, planning, staffing, and building the competing venture more than one year before their departure. Key evidence cited in the complaint includes an extensive trail of emails purportedly sent and received by the defendants while still employed by Coldwell Banker. In the emails, the defendants openly discuss solicitation of Coldwell Banker salespersons, tips for persuading Coldwell Banker clients to move their listings to GMAC, how to access Coldwell Banker’s highly-guarded commercial document database, and how to copy data from Coldwell Banker computers. This “scheme,” the complaint says, was a targeted effort “to eviscerate [Coldwell Banker’s] ability to compete with GMAC.”

Indeed, Coldwell Banker points out that the very day following defendant Ann D’Ambrosia’s resignation, the defendants’ GMAC office opened its doors for business. Within one month, two dozen Coldwell Banker salespersons joined the defendants at GMAC. In six weeks time, Coldwell Banker had received requests from approximately ten clients to cancel and void their listing agreements; all of these clients re-listed with GMAC after securing the releases. Each of these results, Coldwell Banker contends, arose directly from the defendants’ pre-resignation solicitation efforts.

In its fourteen-count complaint, Coldwell Banker claims the defendants violated the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by improperly accessing protected computers and removing confidential and proprietary Coldwell Banker information, including client files, listing agreements, contracts, and property records; breached their employment contracts and duty of loyalty owed to Coldwell Banker; tortiously interfered with contractual and prospective economic relations; and misappropriated trade secrets in violation of the Maryland Trade Secrets Act. Coldwell Banker seeks monetary damages in the amount of $2 million – $1 million as compensatory damages and $1 million as punitive damages – as well as injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from soliciting Coldwell Banker’s clients and employees for one year, and from using Coldwell Banker’s confidential and trade secret information.

Seventh Circuit Rules that Injunction is Insufficiently Specific in not Defining the "Trade Secrets and Confidential Information Covered

In Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Housing, Inc., No. 06-3012, 2008 WL 90081 (7th Cir. Jan. 10, 2008), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated an injunction entered by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, ruling that it was insufficiently specific and therefore was not in compliance with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The facts of the matter as set forth in Patriot Homes are as follows: Forest River hired four employees of Patriot Homes after merger talks between the two companies fell through. Forest River formed a new company named Sterling with the new employees. Patriot Homes, Forest River, and Sterling are all in the modular homes industry. The four employees copied information from Patriot Homes’s computer system before resigning and utilized that information for Sterling. Sterling did not deny that its employees had done so, but it argued that the information taken from Patriot Homes was not a trade secret because it was filed by Patriot Homes with various state governments and could be procured through Freedom of Information Act requests. Discovery revealed that most, but not all, of the information taken from Patriot Homes and used by the four employees could indeed be procured from state governments.

The District Court entered a preliminary injunction forbidding Sterling from “[u]sing, copying, disclosing, converting, appropriating, retaining, selling, transferring, or otherwise exploiting Patriot's copyrights, confidential information, trade secrets, or computer files.” The preliminary injunction also required Sterling to: “[c]ertify that copied data and materials of Patriot's property, confidential information and trade secrets on computer files and removable media (CDs, DVDs, tapes, etc.) have been deleted or rendered unusable.”

The Court of Appeals found that the injunction was not specific enough to put Sterling on notice as to what acts on its part would constitute contempt of court: “The preliminary injunction entered by the district court uses a collection of verbs to prohibit Sterling from engaging in certain conduct, but ultimately it fails to detail what the conduct is, i.e., the substance of the “trade secret” or “confidential information” to which the verbs refer.” The Court of Appeals based its decision on Sterling’s uncertainty as to what information was truly a trade secret or confidential information and what was not entitled to such protection by virtue of being publicly available. The case stands as a reminder that injunctions compelling parties to simply “follow the law” without more instruction do not comply with Rule 65(d).

Illinois Appellate Court Warns Against Blue Penciling "Blatantly Unreasonable" Restrictive Covenants

On December 7, 2007, the Illinois First District Appellate Court in Cambridge Engineering, Inc. (“Cambridge”) v. Mercury Partners 90 BI, Inc., No. 1-06-0758 (1st District Appellate Court of Illinois, Sixth Division) determined that Cambridge’s non-solicitation and non-competition provisions were overly broad and unenforceable because the provisions prevented former Cambridge employees from (a) taking any job, “even that of a janitor,” with a competitor (b) working in markets that Cambridge did not do business in, and (c) speaking with Cambridge customers that the employer never serviced or knew were Cambridge customers (thereby requiring the former employee to speculate about who he can and cannot contact/solicit). Although the Appellate Court’s decision was not surprising given Illinois case law, the Appellate Court’s unsolicited opinion/warning to employers who write overly broad restrictive covenants is noteworthy.

Specifically, the Appellate Court wrote/warned after its analysis that:

Allowing extensive judicial reformation of blatantly unreasonable post-termination restrictive covenants may be against public policy, because of the potentially severe effect it could have on the employees who are subject to such covenants. Such reformation, if permitted by courts, would give employers an incentive to draft restrictive covenants as broadly as possible, since the courts would automatically amend and enforce them to the extent that they were reasonable … This could have a severe chilling effect on employee post-termination activities.

The Appellate Court went on to state that judicial reformation (i.e. blue penciling) is unfair to the employee who is “unschooled in the law” and “cannot be expected to know to what extent such a covenant is in enforceable.” Accordingly, “blatantly unreasonable” restrictive covenants, such as the ones authored by Cambridge, should not be revised to comply with Illinois law.

The Appellate Court’s unsolicited opinion will likely find its way into the response of every employee who is faced with an employer’s request to modify or blue pencil an existing restrictive covenant. Accordingly, Illinois employers who rely on the enforcement of restrictive covenants should confer with legal counsel familiar with Illinois restrictive covenant law to ensure that the restrictions contained in their Agreements do not fall into the “blatantly unreasonable” category enunciated in Cambridge.

Wisconsin Court Invalidates Non-Compete and Non-Solicitation Contracts Lacking Fized and Definite Duration

A half-dozen H&R Block employees in LaCrosse, Wisconsin, who had worked for the company for periods ranging from 10-25 years, left and within a few months began competing with their ex-employer. Each of the former employees had signed non-compete and non-solicitation covenants reciting that they lasted for a two-year period, but “such period to be extended by any period(s) of violation.” Seeking to enforce the covenants, H&R Block filed an injunction action immediately in a Wisconsin circuit court. The ex-employees moved for summary judgment on the ground that the restrictive clauses were unenforceable. H&R Block’s motion for an injunction was denied, the former employees’ motion for summary judgment was granted, and those decisions were affirmed on appeal. H&R Block Eastern Enterprises, Inc. v. Swenson, No. 2006AP1210 (Wis. Ct. of App., Distr. 4, Dec. 20, 2007).

The lower court reasoned that two-year limitations were more than H&R Block needed, and with the potential extension, the covenants were plainly invalid. The appellate court assumed “without deciding that the two-year period is reasonable.” Although a Wisconsin employer has a legitimate “interest in protecting its stock of customers” who have been dealing with a particular employee who departs, the State has a “strong public policy against the enforcement of unreasonable trade restraints on employees.” The appellate court concluded that the H&R Block covenants imposed unreasonable restraints because (a) “a former employee cannot tell from the terms of his or her contract how long the extension will be for particular conduct in violation of the clauses,” and (b) the duration of the restraint is “not a fixed and definite time period but a time period that is contingent upon outcomes the employee cannot predict,” namely a court decision as to whether the conduct is a violation. Under Wisconsin law, if any covenant contains both reasonable and unreasonable restraints, the entire covenant is unenforceable. Therefore, H&R Block’s case was doomed.

Southern District of Georgia Upholds Mutual No-hire Restriction between Companies

In Celtic Maintenance Services, Inc. v. Garrett Aviation Services, Inc., No. CV 106-177, 2007 WL 4557775 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 21, 2007 (Wood, J.)), the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia upheld a no-hire provision between two businesses. The case involved an agreement between Celtic and Garrett in connection with Garrett paying Celtic to perform aviation maintenance at Bush Field in Augusta, Georgia. Garrett and Celtic agreed not to “directly or indirectly solicit, hire, or contract for services with any person employed by the other party.” Celtic alleged that Garrett used Greenwood, Inc., a third party, to circumvent the restrictions in the no-hire provision by inducing Greenwood to hire Celtic employees to perform aviation maintenance tasks on behalf of Garrett after Celtic ceased performing services for Garnett. Greenwood hired three Celtic employees, and Celtic went out of business. Celtic brought claims against Garrett for breach of contract and against Greenwood for tortious interference with contract.

The District Court held that the no-hire provision is enforceable under Georgia law. The District Court first held that the agreement was more analogous to a partnership agreement than to an employment agreement because of the relatively equal bargaining position of the two parties and because the provision bound both parties (Celtic and Garrett) equally. Thus, the District Court applied intermediate scrutiny to the agreement. The District Court then went on to conclude that the no-hire provision was enforceable and implied that it would be enforceable even under the strict scrutiny standard applied to employment agreements because Georgia courts have upheld similar provisions in the employment context. The District Court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate and that the matter should progress to trial.

The District Court also addressed an “intriguing argument” put forward by Greenwood in response to the tortious interference claim brought by Celtic against Greenwood. Greenwood argued that Garrett had already decided to terminate its contract with Celtic and seek a third party straw man to circumvent the no-hire provision before Greenwood got involved in the process. The Court rejected this argument, holding that Greenwood may have shown that it did not induce Garrett to breach its contract with Celtic, but it may have conspired with Garrett and aided and abetted Garrett in its breach. Thus, the Court concluded that summary judgment on the tortious interference claim was inappropriate.

Non-Compete Dispute Turns on Value of Shares

A recently filed action in state court in Duluth, Minnesota illustrates the problems that can arise when a business divorce goes wrong. The case involves EmpowerMX, a Duluth-based maker of software for airlines. EmpowerMX filed a lawsuit against its founder, Barry Sinex, alleging that Sinex intended to violate the non-compete provision in his separation agreement with the company.

Sinex argues that the provision is unenforceable, not for the typical reasons relating to the geographic scope covered by the agreement or the activities proscribed, but instead because of a provision in the agreement that states that the non-compete provision becomes null and void if “holders of common stock are paid less than $1 per share for their stock.” Sinex’s claim is that the company has not been managed properly since his departure and that the value of the shares is now less than $1.

The company counters by arguing that the non-compete provision is rendered null only in the event that shares are actually sold for less than $1 in connection with a “sale, merger, consolidation or other significant change in ownership of the company.” EmpowerMX obtained a temporary restraining order against Sinex on or shortly after filing the complaint on December 17, 2007.

http://www.duluthnewstribune.com/articles/index.cfm?id=57689§ion=homepage&freebie_check&CFID=80821590&CFTOKEN=94821650&jsessionid=88303c98b0845370581d

Defense Contractor Wins Nearly $23 Million in Trade Secrets Lawsuit Against Former Employees

Innovative Technologies Corp. v. Kenton Trace Technologies LLC et al., case number 03-cv-3674

Innovative Technologies Corp. (ITC) has won nearly $23 million in a trade secret suit against three former employees who competed against ITC while still employed by the Ohio-based defense contractor. The state jury awarded $17 million in punitive damages, in addition to $5.7 million in compensatory damages. The employees also were ordered to return the salary earned in their final year working for ITC, close to $300,000.

According to the lawsuit, filed in May 2003, now-former ITC employees David P. Nicholas, James R. Silcott and Sheila K. Silcott set up Kenton Trace Technologies (KTT) in April 2000 to bid for defense contracts, despite the fact that they were still employed at ITC, had signed confidentially agreements, and were bound by contractual agreements not to compete with ITC.

The suit also alleged that the three enlisted the help of Virginia-based competitor Advanced Management Technology Inc. to lure away ITC customers using trade secrets. Testimony in the trial established that the three former employees won a share of a major services contract in 2001 while still working for ITC. At the time, ITC was under contract with the federal government to provide support services for the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base; the contract had been ITC’s since 1995. ITC did not learn of KTT’s existence until a competitor, Modern Technologies Corp., alerted ITC in May 2001 that KTT was trying to win the contract.

The Montgomery County Common Pleas Court issued a temporary restraining order in 2002 to keep KTT from competing with ITC, and a month later issued a preliminary injunction against the employees. Nevertheless, KTT conspired with Advanced Management to get around the injunction and acquired the Wright-Patterson contract.